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SUMMARY 
Section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution states that property may only be expropriated for a 
public purpose or in the public interest and compensation must be paid. This dissertation 
analyses the public purpose and public interest requirement in light of recent court 
decisions, especially with regard to third party transfer of expropriated property for 
economic development purposes. 
The public purpose requirement is explained in terms of pre-constitutional case law 
to create a context in which to understand the public purpose and public interest in terms 
of the 1996 Constitution. This leads to a discussion of whether third party transfers for 
economic development purposes are generally for a public purpose or in the public 
interest. The legitimacy of the purpose of both the expropriation and the transfer of 
property to third parties in order to realise the purpose is considered. Conclusions from a 
discussion of foreign case law dealing with the same question are used to analyse the 
South African cases where third party transfers for economic development have been 
addressed. Based on the overview of foreign case law and the critical analysis of South 
African cases, the dissertation sets out guidelines that should be taken into account when 
this question comes up again in future. 
The dissertation also considers whether an expropriation can be set aside if 
alternative means, other than expropriating the property, are available that would also 
promote the purpose for which the property was expropriated. Recent decisions suggest 
that alternative and less invasive measures are irrelevant when the expropriation is clearly 
for a public purpose. However, the dissertation argues that less invasive means should be 
considered in cases where it is not immediately clear that the expropriation is for a valid 
public purpose or in the public interest, such as in the case of a third party transfer for 
economic development. 
The role of the public purpose post-expropriation is considered with reference to 
purposes that are not realised or are abandoned and subsequently changed. In this regard 
the dissertation considers whether the state is allowed to change the purpose for which the 
property was expropriated, and also under which circumstances the previous owner would 
be entitled to reclaim the expropriated property when the public purpose that justifies the 
expropriation falls away. It is contended that the purpose can be changed, but that the new 
purpose must also comply with the constitutional requirements.  
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OPSOMMING 
Artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet van 1996 vereis dat `n onteining slegs vir `n openbare doel 
of in die openbare belang mag plaasvind, en dat vergoeding betaalbaar is. In die proefskrif 
word die openbare doel en openbare belang geanaliseer in die lig van onlangse regspraak 
wat veral verband hou met die onteining van grond wat oorgedra word aan derde partye 
vir doeleindes van ekonomiese ontwikkeling. 
Die openbare doel vereiste word geanaliseer in die lig van respraak voor die 
aanvang van die grondwetlike bedeling om beide die openbare doel en openbare belang 
in terme van die Grondwet van 1996 te verstaan. Op grond van hierdie bespreking word 
die vraag ondersoek of die onteiening van grond vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling en die 
oordrag daarvan aan derde partye vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang is. 
Gevolgtrekkings uit `n oorsig van buitelandse respraak waarin dieselfde vraag reeds 
behandel is dien as maatstaf vir die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak oor die vraag te evalueer. 
Op grond van die kritiese analise van die buitelandse regspraak word sekere aanbevelings 
gemaak wat in ag geneem behoort te word indien so `n vraag weer na vore kom. 
Die vraag of `n onteiening ter syde gestel kan word omdat daar `n alternatiewe, 
minder ingrypende manier is om die openbare doel te bereik word ook in die proefskrif 
aangespreek. In onlangse regspraak word aangedui dat die beskikbaarheid van ander, 
minder ingrypende maniere irrelevant is as die onteiening vir `n openbare doel of in die 
openbare belang geskied. Daar word hier aangevoer dat die beskikbaarheid van 
alternatiewe metodes in ag geneem behoort te word in gevalle waar dit onduidelik is of die 
onteining vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied, soos in die geval van 
oordrag van grond aan derde partye vir ekonomiese ontwikkelingsdoeleindes. 
Ter aansluiting by die vraag of die onteining van grond vir oordrag aan derdes vir 
ekonomiese ontwikkeling geldig is, word die funksie van die openbare doel na onteiening 
ook ondersoek. Die vraag is of die staat geregtig is om die doel waarvoor die eiendom 
onteien is na afloop van die onteiening te verander. Die vraag in watter gevalle die vorige 
eienaar van die grond teruggawe van die grond kan eis word ook aangespreek. Daar word 
aangevoer dat die staat die doel waarvoor die eiendom benut word kan verander, maar 
dat die nuwe doel ook moet voldoen aan die grondwetlike vereistes.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1 1 Background to the Research Problem 
In the recent decision of Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-
Phofung Municipality1 (Bartsch) the municipality expropriated the applicant’s land for the 
purpose of constructing a road and doing all things necessary in connection with 
constructing the road as indicated in the expropriation notice. The applicant argued that 
the expropriation of his property was not for a public purpose as required by section 2 of 
the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 because the municipality intended to transfer a part of the 
expropriated property to a private party for the construction of a shopping mall. The 
applicant further argued that since the municipality only required a portion of his land for 
the construction of the road, expropriating the property in its entirety was unlawful. In this 
regard the applicant argued that the expropriation of the entire property was unreasonable 
‘to the extent that the stated purpose for the expropriation could not be said to be for a 
public purpose.’2 
The court held that the expropriation of the applicant’s property for the construction 
of a road was a valid public purpose. It also held that the description of the purpose of the 
expropriation in the expropriation notice, namely building a road and doing all things 
necessary in connection with building the road, was wide enough to include the 
expropriation of property to erect a shopping mall. According to the court, the economic 
advantages that building a shopping mall would generate, such as increased employment 
opportunities, are in the public interest even if the property is made available to a third 
party. The court dismissed the applicant’s second argument, namely that the expropriation 
of the entire property was unlawful since only part of the property was needed for an 
apparent lawful purpose, on the basis that the applicant confused motive with purpose. 
When it is clear that the expropriation is for a valid public purpose and exercised in good 
faith, the motive to expropriate the property is irrelevant in the face of additional options 
other than expropriation. 
The Bartsch decision shows that the purpose for which property is expropriated is 
not subjected to rigorous scrutiny; courts do not seriously consider whether expropriation 
is strictly necessary for the realisation of a clearly circumscribed public purpose. Accepting 
                                            
1
 [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 February 2010. 
2
 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 
February 2010 para 1 5. 
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that the expropriation in this case (which involved a third party transfer for economic 
development purposes) was for a valid public purpose, without a clear legislative 
foundation or authority, indicates that South African courts apply a low level of scrutiny 
towards the purposes for which property may be expropriated. The courts also adopt a 
deferential approach when evaluating the decision of an expropriating authority to 
expropriate property for a particular purpose. Furthermore, it is arguable that factors such 
as increased employment opportunities and increased revenue are not sufficient to justify 
an expropriation that involves a third party transfer of the expropriated property for 
economic development purposes outside of a legislative scheme.3 
In a different decision, Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others4 (Harvey), the 
municipality expropriated the applicant’s property for a particular public purpose, namely to 
create a public open space and conservation area to be used as a recreational facility by 
the public. When that purpose could not be realised, the municipality decided to change 
the purpose for which the property was to be used. The applicant argued that since the 
original public purpose that justified the expropriation fell away, he had a right to re-claim 
the property. The applicant based his argument on a particular interpretation of the public 
purpose requirement in section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa and on authority in German law. 
The court refused to order re-transfer of the expropriated property because there 
was no precedent or legislation to authorise such an order. The court also held that since 
the municipality initially expropriated the property in good faith it was allowed to change 
the use of the property if the original purpose became impossible due to changing 
circumstances. The changed purpose in this case also involved a third party transfer in the 
form of a sale of the expropriated property on public tender to a private developer for the 
establishment of a residential area. However, the court did not consider whether the new 
purpose, which can be described as economic development by a third party, was also a 
valid public purpose in terms of the Expropriation Act and the Constitution.5 This decision 
raises the question whether the state is allowed to do as it pleases with property post-
expropriation, or whether it is bound to use the property only for the specific purpose for 
                                            
3
 The validity of the expropriation of property for economic development purposes by third parties was also 
addressed in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 
2009 (5) SA 661 (SE); 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA). The expropriation of property for economic development 
purposes that did not involve a third party transfer was an issue in eThekwini Municipality v Sotirios 
Spetsiotis [2009] ZAKZDHC 51, 6 November 2009. These decisions are discussed in ch 4. 
4
 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP). 
5
 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 497-498; Van der Walt AJ & Slade BV 
‘Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 
601 (KZP)’ (2012) 129 SALJ 219-235 at 227. 
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which it was expropriated. It is also moot whether the previous owner should be able to re-
claim the property once the purpose of expropriation is not realised or if it is abandoned. 
The Bartsch and Harvey decisions show up a number of interesting aspects of 
expropriation in South African law, especially in relation to the public purpose requirement. 
In terms of section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution, an expropriation must be for a public 
purpose or in the public interest and compensation must be paid. The public purpose or 
public interest requirement is considered to be the justification for an expropriation,6 while 
compensation is considered to be a ‘necessary consequence of an expropriation’7 or, 
alternatively, the ‘result of an expropriation’.8 Since the public purpose or public interest 
justifies the expropriation of property it is necessary to determine, with specific reference to 
the issues raised by these cases, to what extent and under which circumstances the public 
purpose or public interest requirement can in fact justify the expropriation of property in 
South African law. 
 
1 2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The Bartsch and Harvey decisions, together with other recent decisions like Offit 
Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and 
Others,9 specifically highlight the problems surrounding the transfer of expropriated 
property to third parties for economic development purposes. Therefore, the central 
question considered in this dissertation is whether expropriation for economic development 
that involves a third party transfer is justifiable in terms of section 25 of the 1996 
Constitution. This problem, as well as other public purpose or public interest issues, has 
not been sufficiently dealt with by the South African courts or in South African academic 
literature to date,10 but it has been addressed by courts and in academic literature in 
various foreign jurisdictions.11 The South African courts routinely accept that the 
                                            
6
 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 82. 
7
 Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri SA (CALS Amicus Curiae) (458/11) [2012] ZASCA 93, 31 May 2012 
para 18. 
8
 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 82. 
9
 2009 (5) SA 661 (SE); 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA). 
10
 The Deputy Chief Justice of the South African Constitutional Court recently said that ‘very few cases on 
land restitution or expropriation or acquisition for public use have reached our [Constitutional] Court:’ 
Address by Dikgang Moseneke to mark the 30
th
 anniversary of the assassination of Ruth First, 17 August 
2012 (www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid=320188&sn=Detail&pid=71616 
accessed 22 August 2012). 
11
 See for example Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) (United States of America (US)); Regina 
(Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council [2010] UKSC 20 (United Kingdom (UK)); 
Clinton v An Bord Pleanála and Others [2005] IEHC 84, [2007] IESC 19 (Republic of Ireland); BVerfGE 74, 
264 [1986] (Boxberg) (Germany). These and related foreign decisions are discussed in the chapters that 
follow. 
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expropriation of property for purposes of economic development by a third party, even 
outside of a legislative scheme, is a lawful use of the state’s power of expropriation without 
recognising the numerous problems - as can be observed from foreign case law and 
commentaries - that this exercise of power may cause. 
Section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution requires an expropriation to be for a public 
purpose or in the public interest. The inclusion of the public interest requirement arguably 
broadens the scope of purposes for which property may be expropriated, but it still needs 
to be determined in every specific case whether the particular purpose in fact satisfies the 
constitutional requirement. Economic development must therefore satisfy the public 
purpose or public interest requirement to legitimatise the expropriation of property for such 
purposes. However, it is uncertain whether the goal of economic development as such, 
without any further qualification, is a public purpose or in the public interest so clearly as to 
justify the expropriation of property for that purpose. It is also uncertain whether the 
transfer of the property to third parties for economic development is for a public purpose or 
in the public interest. If third party transfers for economic development are allowed, the 
effects of such a scheme on the protection of property owners in view of section 25 of the 
1996 Constitution should be considered, since allowing third party transfer of expropriated 
property for economic development, without further qualification or controls, may have 
disproportionate effects on the rights or interests of property owners. 
Arguing from first principles, the transfer of expropriated property to third parties for 
purposes of economic development must be for a valid public purpose or in the public 
interest if the expropriation is to be justified in the first place. It is generally accepted that 
the transfer of expropriated property to third parties may be lawful in cases where the third 
party requires the property to fulfil a specific public purpose on behalf of the state or where 
it is otherwise deemed to be in the public interest. Given that specific cases of economic 
development may not be for a public purpose or in the public interest, the transfer of the 
property to a third party for the fulfilment of such a purpose could consequently also be 
unlawful. This dissertation will therefore determine whether economic development as 
such, as well as the transfer of expropriated property to third parties for purposes of 
economic development is for a public purpose or in the public interest. 
In addition to these central questions, it is also necessary to address various 
ancillary questions that are related to the public purpose or public interest requirement and 
that arise in the context of economic development of expropriated property by third parties. 
The first of these ancillary questions is whether the expropriator is entitled to expropriate 
more property than is immediately necessary for a particular public purpose, as was 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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contended in the Bartsch12 decision. In that decision the additional property - property not 
needed for the primary purpose of constructing a road - was to be made available to a 
third party for purposes of economic development. Stated differently, will an expropriation 
be valid when the purpose for which the property was expropriated can be realised by 
expropriating only a portion of the property? Stated slightly more widely, will an 
expropriation be valid when it is possible for the state to adopt different means, other than 
expropriation, that would still ensure that the public purpose is realised? It is assumed for 
the sake of argument that this question only comes up in cases where the expropriation is 
judged to be for a valid public purpose or in the public interest in general, and the only 
remaining question is whether the expropriation should be set aside because its purpose 
can also be realised by different and less invasive means. 
Another ancillary question regarding the public purpose requirement that also 
surfaced in Harvey13 concerns the enduring nature of the public purpose. Should the public 
purpose endure beyond the initial act of expropriation and, if so, what should happen when 
the public purpose is not realised, or when it is completed or abandoned? Is the state able 
to change the purpose when circumstances change to any purpose that it might find 
useful, or would it at least be able to continue using the property for a different but equally 
valid public purpose? Furthermore, would the previous owner be able to reclaim the 
property when the original purpose of the expropriation is not realised or ends, and if the 
property is then used for a different public purpose? These are questions that relate to the 
issue of expropriation for economic development in the sense that if the state decides to 
change the use of the property due to impossibility, completion or abandonment of the 
original public purpose, the case law indicates that the tendency is then often to transfer 
the property to a third party for economic development purposes. For example, in the 
Harvey decision the changed purpose involved the sale of land on tender to a private 
developer for the development of a residential neighbourhood. The question is whether 
such a change in the purpose is justified in terms of the constitutional requirement. 
The central research question in this dissertation is whether third party transfer of 
expropriated property for economic development purposes complies with the public 
purpose or public interest requirement in the Constitution of 1996. It is assumed that the 
inclusion of the public interest phrase in section 25(2) broadens the scope of purposes for 
which property may be expropriated; it is also accepted that certain third party transfers of 
                                            
12
 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 
February 2010. 
13
 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP). 
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expropriated property may be valid on face value. Third party transfers for economic 
development may therefore be for a public purpose or in the public interest, but the central 
hypothesis of this dissertation is that allowing it without any control or qualification may 
have unforeseen negative effects. 
A further question that is raised in this dissertation is whether the availability of less 
invasive means other than expropriation is a valid defence against an ensuing 
expropriation. This question comes up in some cases where the lawfulness of a third party 
transfer for economic development is considered. South African courts show an 
unwillingness to invalidate an otherwise valid expropriation purely on the basis that there 
are less invasive means of fulfilling the public purpose. Since the central question in this 
dissertation, namely the legitimacy of a third party transfer of expropriated property for 
economic development, arguably implies the further question into the availability of less 
invasive means the latter question is also relevant and needs to be considered. 
This dissertation also considers whether the public purpose or public interest that 
justifies an expropriation should endure beyond the initial act of expropriation. It is 
assumed that the public purpose may be changed, but the hypothesis is that in case of 
necessary change the new purpose must also be a valid public purpose or in the public 
interest. This question also arises when the validity of a third party transfer for economic 
development is considered. 
 
1 3 Research Method and Outline of Chapters 
To determine whether the transfer of expropriated property to a third party for economic 
development purposes constitutes a valid public purpose or is in the public interest, the 
meaning of the ‘public purpose’ and ‘public interest’ requirements in the 1996 Constitution 
must be determined. In Chapter 2 the phrases ‘public purpose’ and ‘public interest’ are 
reviewed with reference to how they were understood before the Interim Constitution Act 
200 of 1993. This overview adopts the form of a historical analysis of the public purpose 
requirement in expropriation legislation and case law. South African expropriation 
legislation traditionally only refers to the public purpose requirement. Older legislation did 
not always define the phrase ‘public purpose’ and the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, the 
first general Expropriation Act that does define this phrase, only defines ‘public purpose’ in 
broad and vague terms.14 The interpretation of ‘public purpose’ as it was adopted by 
                                            
14
 The Expropriation Act 55 of 1965, which was the first general expropriation act applicable throughout the 
Republic of South Africa, did not define the public purpose requirement. In s 1 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 
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various South African courts prior to 1993 is considered in Chapter 2 to provide some 
clarity in this regard. 
The 1975 Expropriation Act is still the primary legislation used to effect 
expropriation.15 Following the tradition of earlier expropriation legislation, the Act only 
refers to ‘public purpose’. Accordingly, the phrase ‘public interest’ was not considered by 
courts in earlier expropriation decisions.16 However, by way of a discussion of South Africa 
case law that pre-dates the Interim Constitution of 1993, it is shown in Chapter 2 how the 
public purpose requirement was interpreted either narrowly (relating to government 
purposes) or broadly (relating to purposes that benefit the public). Following on from this 
distinction, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court first introduced the phrase ‘public 
interest’ into South African law of expropriation in Administrator, Transvaal and Another v 
Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd17 (Van Streepen). In this decision the court stated 
that an expropriation that benefits a third party can never be for a public purpose, but in 
specific circumstances it can still be valid insofar as it is in the public interest. This decision 
therefore created the impression that ‘public purpose’ refers to a narrower, government 
purpose and ‘public interest’ to a wider category that could include transfer of the 
expropriated property to a third party. 
Assuming that the pre-1994 understanding of the public purpose and public interest 
requirement had an impact on the understanding of these phrases as they are used in the 
Interim Constitution of 1993 and ultimately the Constitution of 1996, the interpretation of 
the public purpose and public interest requirements in the constitutional era is discussed in 
Chapter 3. The property clause (section 28) of the Interim Constitution of 1993 only 
referred to expropriation for public purposes, but the phrase ‘public interest’ was 
introduced by section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution. As a result of the Van Streepen 
decision the public interest alternative was included in section 25(2), and section 25(4)18 of 
the 1996 Constitution was added to ensure that expropriation for land reform is not 
invalidated simply because it may involve a third party transfer of expropriated land.19 
                                                                                                                                                 
1975 public purpose ‘includes any purpose connected with the administration of the provisions of any law by 
an organ of State’. 
15
 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) para 2. See also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & 
Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 566. 
16
 The phrase ‘public interest’ is, however, found in various other areas of law: Du Plessis LM Re-
Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 167-168; Du Plessis WJ ‘`n Regsteoretiese Ondersoek na die Begrip 
“Openbare Belang”’ (1987) 50 THRHR 290-298 at 290. For an analysis of the phrase ‘public interest’ in 
various areas of the law, see Du Plessis WJ ‘`n Regsteoretiese Ondersoek na die Begrip “Openbare 
Belang”’ (1987) 50 THRHR 290-298. 
17
 1990 (4) SA 644 (A). 
18
 S 25(4)(a) states that the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform. 
19
 See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
591-592; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 462-463. 
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Apart from section 25(4), the 1996 Constitution does not comprehensively stipulate what is 
meant by these phrases and it is left up to the courts to interpret them. 
Against this backdrop Chapter 3 analyses the public purpose or public interest 
requirement with specific reference to third party transfers. It is shown there that the 
transfer of expropriated property to a third party for realisation of a public purpose - as 
understood narrowly - can be valid. It is possible in these cases that the party responsible 
for realising the public purpose is irrelevant; it can be either the state or a private party. If 
the public purpose is to be realised by a third party, transfer of the expropriated property to 
that party may well be justified. Furthermore, a third party transfer for a purpose that is in 
the public interest (rather than a narrow public purpose) may also be valid, and in Chapter 
3 it is considered when this will be the case and whether the justification of such transfers 
should be subject to qualification or control of some kind. 
In Chapter 4 the distinction between a third party transfer for a public purpose and a 
third party transfer that is in the public interest is analysed in more detail. The chapter 
starts with a discussion of the transfer of expropriated property for narrow public purposes, 
or government purposes as it was described in earlier case law. Furthermore, since 
legislation sometimes grants administrators the power to expropriate property on behalf of 
a private party for the fulfilment of a particular project of public importance, the instances 
where this occurs are considered with reference to foreign law.20 The position in German 
and US law is briefly reviewed to show that third party transfers for narrow public purposes 
are generally unproblematic. This is followed by a discussion of the more problematic 
examples of expropriation and transfer of property in the public interest, or for broader 
public purposes. The expropriation of property in the public interest includes instances 
where the property is not expropriated for a government purpose and will not necessarily 
be used by the general public after expropriation, but where expropriation and transfer of 
the property to a third party may be justified for a purpose that is still deemed to be in the 
public interest. This argument is illustrated by the expropriation and transfer of property for 
slum clearance and land reform purposes. 
In Chapter 4 it is shown how constitutionally required and sanctioned land reform 
requires property to be expropriated and transferred to third parties for their exclusive use 
in order to break up the historically unequal distribution of land ownership or to restore 
land to people who lost their rights as a result of unfair laws and practices. The 
constitutional framework and the legislation that legitimises third party transfers for land 
reform purposes in South African law are discussed to show how the legitimate purpose of 
                                            
20
 See for instance s 3 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
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these state actions justify both the expropriation and the third party transfer and to indicate 
how they function. Thereafter, two conflicting examples in foreign law are discussed to 
indicate that the approach towards the validity of a third party transfer for broader public 
purposes such as land reform is not as unproblematic as the transfer of expropriated 
property to third parties for narrow public or government purposes. The US Supreme Court 
decision of Midkiff v Hawaii Housing Authority21 and the Australian High Court decision of 
Clunies-Ross v The Commonwealth of Australia and Others22 are discussed to illustrate 
this point. 
The main part of Chapter 4 examines third party transfers for economic 
development purposes through an analysis of foreign case law. As a point of departure it is 
assumed that it is unclear whether third party transfers for economic development 
purposes can at all be for a public purpose or in the public interest. Examples of foreign 
decisions where this issue has been addressed include the US Supreme Court’s infamous 
decision in Kelo v City of New London,23 the UK Supreme Court decision in Regina 
(Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council,24 the Irish Supreme Court 
and high court decisions in Clinton v Pleanála and Others,25 and the Boxberg26 decision of 
the German Federal Constitutional Court. These cases are analysed to provide a 
framework for considering the issue in South African law. Despite the differing legal 
traditions of these jurisdictions, the judicial approaches adopted by the various courts and 
the factors employed to determine the lawfulness of third party transfers for economic 
development provide a valuable comparative basis for considering such transfers in South 
African law. These jurisdictions also provide interesting comparative insights regarding the 
approach of the various courts towards the purposes for which property may be 
legitimately expropriated. 
The discussion of each of the jurisdictions starts with a brief explanation of the 
relevant constitutional provisions regulating expropriation, or alternatively the authority to 
expropriate property in terms of legislation. The focus is on the justification for the 
expropriation (the public purpose) and not on other aspects of expropriation, such as 
compensation or the distinction between a deprivation and an expropriation. The overview 
of foreign law is not aimed at giving an extensive analysis of the law in each jurisdiction but 
                                            
21
 267 US 229 (1984). 
22
 (1984) 155 CLR 193. 
23
 545 US 469 (2005). 
24
 [2010] UKSC 20. 
25
 [2007] IESC 19; [2005] IEHC 84. 
26
 BVerfGE 74, 264 [1986] (Boxberg). 
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rather simply to introduce the specific case law where expropriation and third party transfer 
for economic development of the property has been addressed. 
Foreign case law is discussed to point out two opposing views regarding third party 
transfers for economic development purposes. The US, English and Irish courts seem to 
allow the expropriation and transfer of property to third parties for economic development 
more easily than the German courts. A possible reason for the deferential approach of the 
former jurisdictions is the fact that legislation in those countries usually explicitly authorises 
the expropriation of property for economic development or regeneration, or the 
expropriation takes place in terms of a development scheme that specifically allows for 
expropriation of the property for economic development. The same authorising legislation 
often provides for transfer of the expropriated property to third parties for the fulfilment of 
the specified development or regeneration goals. The courts in these jurisdictions 
therefore seem to accept these broad purposes as legitimate because they are set out in 
legislation and thus the courts adopt a deferential approach towards the purposes for 
which property may eventually be expropriated. German courts, on the other hand, adopt a 
stricter approach and require specific legislation to authorise both the purpose of the 
expropriation and the transfer of the property for the realisation of the purpose. This 
renders German law an important comparative tool ‘because of the extensive and clear 
decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the issue of third party 
transfers.’27 The two opposing views in foreign law are analysed in some detail in Chapter 
4 because they can assist South African courts in eventually deciding which route would 
be the optimal method for purposes of South African law. 
After the overview of foreign law, the South African position is explained in the rest 
of Chapter 4 with reference to the decisions in eThekwini Municipality v Sotirios 
Spetsiotis,28 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung 
Municipality,29 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd and Others30 and Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others.31 The position in 
South African law regarding third party transfers for economic development is unclear as it 
has not been developing systematically but seems to develop on a case-by-case basis, 
much as in US, English and Irish law. The deductions that can be made from the overview 
of foreign law enable a conclusion on the question whether the expropriation of property 
                                            
27
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 475-476. 
28
 [2009] ZAKZDHC 51, 6 November 2009. 
29
 [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 February 2010. 
30
 2009 (5) SA 661 (SE); 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA). 
31
 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP). 
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for economic development purposes is more easily justified when it is specifically 
authorised by legislation. This analysis draws on the similarities between the respective 
statutes involved in foreign law and how these similar provisions have been interpreted in 
case law. Although the conclusions drawn by foreign courts will be helpful in this regard, it 
must still be determined whether economic development complies with the public purpose 
or public interest requirement in section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution in the specific 
context of South African law, especially when the development involves transfer of the 
expropriated property to a third party. It is therefore further considered whether third party 
transfers for economic development constitute a public purpose or is in the public interest. 
In this regard it is assumed that both the expropriation and the transfer must be properly 
authorised by legislation and comply with section 25(2) of the Constitution. This issue is 
therefore approached from the side of the legitimacy of the purpose of the expropriation, 
considered in view of both the transfer of the property to third parties and the nature of the 
purpose. 
Numerous arguments have been raised against the expropriation and transfer of 
property for economic development purposes in light of decisions such as Kelo v City of 
New London.32 These range from the unfair and harsh effects that third party transfers for 
economic development purposes have on less affluent members of society, to the erosion 
of the security of property rights. These arguments are considered in Chapter 4 because 
they indicate that third party transfers for economic development may not be desirable in 
principle, irrespective of the expected employment opportunities and increased tax 
revenue that they may generate. Several authors advocate for either a complete ban on 
third party transfers for economic development, or at least an added requirement that 
courts should be stricter when determining their legitimacy.33 As a result, evaluative 
conclusions about the desirability and legitimacy of third party transfers for economic 
development are drawn from the comparative overview as well as from the discussion of 
the theoretical arguments. 
Chapter 5 analyses a different aspect of the public purpose requirement which can 
also relate to third party transfers for economic development purposes in certain situations. 
This chapter considers whether the availability of alternative and less invasive means is a 
                                            
32
 545 US 469 (2005). See Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-
88; Underkuffler LS ‘Kelo’s Moral Failure’ (2006) 15 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 377-387; Walsh R 
‘“The Principles of Social Justice” and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for Redevelopment in 
the United States and Ireland’ (2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23; Waring EJL ‘The Prevalence of 
Private Takings’ in Hopkins N (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol VII (forthcoming 2013) (copy of paper 
on file with the author). 
33
 See Goodin AW ‘Rejecting the Return to Blight in Post-Kelo State Legislation’ (2007) 82 NYU LR 177-208 
at 191; Fee J ‘Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of the Home’ (2006) 81 Notre Dame LR 783-819. 
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valid defence against an ensuing expropriation. Apart from the consideration of whether 
expropriation is lawful in terms of the public purpose requirement if the purpose of the 
expropriation (which is assumed to be a valid purpose) can also be realised without 
expropriation, by adopting less invasive means, this chapter also takes cognisance of 
administrative law principles, since the decision of the expropriating authority is invariably 
an administrative action.34 The less invasive means argument is therefore considered from 
both a constitutional property law perspective and an administrative law perspective. 
Chapter 5 also considers whether courts should adopt a proportionality-type test in 
terms of section 25(2) instead of the more lenient rationality-type evaluation, since a 
stricter test can arguably afford stronger protection to property owners and prevent unfair 
results. Therefore, it is considered whether the proportionality test, as is also used in 
administrative law, could be applied to the decision of the administrator to expropriate 
property for a particular purpose. In German expropriation law, the proportionality principle 
- together with the public good requirement of article 14.3 of the 1949 German Basic Law35 
- requires that expropriation must be the only possible method to realise a specific public 
purpose.36 This would involve a consideration of the availability of alternative measures, 
since the existence of an alternative measure (other than expropriation) could render the 
expropriation of the property unlawful in the specific circumstances. However, since the 
application of a proportionality test is not clear-cut in South African administrative law,37 it 
is considered whether a proportionality-type inquiry should be followed in South African 
expropriation law, as is the case in German expropriation law. 
Irish courts are more receptive than the South African courts towards the availability 
of an argument based on less invasive means to realise a specific public purpose, and the 
Irish position, as developed in case law, is therefore briefly discussed in Chapter 5. Irish 
courts are willing to consider whether the expropriating authority took alternative means 
into account when it decided to expropriate property for a particular public purpose. 
Therefore, decisions such as Lord Ballyedmond v The Commission for Energy Regulation 
                                            
34
 Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works [2011] ZASCA 246, 1 December 2011 para 12; Offit 
Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 (4) SA 242 
(SCA) para 36. See also Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 77; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 501. 
35
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) 1949. 
36
 BVerfGE 24, 367 [1968] (Deichordnung); Papier HJ ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T, Dürig G et al (eds) Grundgesetz 
Kommentar Vol II (53
rd
 update 2008) 309-310 para 589; Hofmann H ‘Art. 14’ in Schmidt-Bleibtreu B, 
Hofmann H & Hophauf A (eds) Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (11
th
 ed 2008) 513-514 para 67; Wendt R 
‘Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung’ in Sachs M (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 2007) 582-639 at 629 
para 164. 
37
 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 344. 
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and Others38 are discussed in Chapter 5 to show that the Irish courts will seriously 
consider whether the expropriating authority took (or should have taken) alternative, less 
intrusive means into account when deciding to expropriate property. However, the strength 
of an argument based on the availability of alternative means to expropriation would have 
to depend on the contextual setting to prevent courts from unduly interfering with the 
decisions of administrators in a way that threatens the separation of powers doctrine. 
Chapter 6 considers what should happen in the event that the public purpose for 
which the property was originally expropriated is not realised or completed, or if it is 
abandoned. The two questions that this issue raises are firstly whether the state is allowed 
to use the property for a different purpose and if it is, under which conditions; and secondly 
whether and under which circumstances the previous owner should be entitled to 
successfully reclaim the property upon non-realisation, completion or abandonment of the 
public purpose. The various issues unfold in Chapter 6 through a discussion of the 
decision in Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others.39 Additional issues that also 
surface in Harvey, namely whether the state has the same rights as a private owner, and 
whether good faith justifies the state in changing the use to which expropriated property is 
put, are also addressed in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 secondly focuses on the right of the expropriated owner to reclaim the 
property once the purpose terminates or is abandoned. To this end reference is made to 
the position in foreign law, namely German, Malaysian, Philippine and English law. 
German law is considered, not only because the court in Harvey considered German 
authorities, but also because the right to reclaim the property upon non-realisation of the 
public purpose is contained in German legislation. However, apart from this statutory basis 
the right to reclaim property upon non-realisation is considered to flow directly from the 
German Basic Law even in the absence of legislation. Given the similarities between the 
property clauses in the German Basic Law and the South African Constitution, the German 
position holds important comparative value for South African law. English law is 
considered since the Crichel Down Rules40 that developed in that system compel certain 
government departments to offer compulsorily acquired property that has become surplus 
for sale to the previous owner at the current market value. These Rules are fairly detailed 
and are considered to be an example of how the right of re-transfer can operate in 
practice. Malaysian and Philippine law are discussed since recent case law from these 
                                            
38
 Lord Ballyedmond v The Commission for Energy Regulation and Others [2006] IEHC 206. 
39
 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP). 
40
 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Compulsory Purchase and the Crichel Down Rules Circular 06/2004 
(31 October 2004). 
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jurisdictions has dealt with the same issue that was present in the Harvey decision. 
Legislation does not regulate the re-transfer of property upon termination of the public 
purpose in these jurisdictions, but the right of re-transfer was developed by the respective 
courts on a particular interpretation of the public purpose requirement. Since the South 
African court in Harvey refrained from developing such a doctrine the decisions from these 
jurisdictions offer helpful arguments to consider in developing such a right in future if the 
legislature does not enact legislation to that effect. 
In Chapter 7 the various findings made throughout the preceding chapters are 
summarised to show the main points that have crystallised in this dissertation. In that 
chapter recommendations are made to provide possible solutions to the various problems. 
 
1 4 Definitions and Qualifications 
Certain terms used in this dissertation need to be defined. The term ‘economic 
development’ is used here to describe any project that involves land development that 
promises the creation of employment opportunities, the increase of the tax base or the 
general enhancement of economic conditions, but excluding a narrow government 
purpose or public use of or public access to the land. It would therefore exclude the 
building of public airports, even if built and managed by private parties, since in those 
cases the property will still be used by the general public and legislation usually specifically 
regulates the public-interest operation thereof. 
The term ‘third party transfer’ is used to refer to the situation when the state uses its 
power of eminent domain to expropriate property with the intention to transfer title to the 
expropriated property to a third, private party so that the third party can realise the 
particular purpose of the expropriation. The term is used here to include both a third party 
transfer in this sense and cases where the third party receives a benefit from the 
expropriation, such as having the exclusive use of the property. 
The US term ‘taking’ is only used with reference to US law, where it indicates the 
taking of property through the state’s power of eminent domain. Use of this term does not 
for present purposes include regulatory takings and is therefore restricted to the instances 
where it corresponds with the term ‘expropriation’ in South African and German law. The 
terms ‘takings’ and ‘expropriation’ are therefore used interchangeably when discussing US 
law. The phrase ‘compulsory acquisition’ derives from Anglo common law and is used with 
reference to the discussion of expropriation in the UK, Irish and Malaysian law. This 
phrase does not apply in South African law, since the South African state does not have 
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the inherent power to expropriate property but only the power to expropriate as granted by 
legislation. Therefore, the phrase ‘compulsory acquisition’ is used exclusively as it is 
applied in foreign jurisdictions from the Anglo tradition. In those instances the term is used 
interchangeably with expropriation. 
It is constitutionally acknowledged that land reform is a legitimate and central 
purpose in South African law. In terms of third party transfers of expropriated land for land 
reform purposes the use to which the property is put after expropriation is therefore 
irrelevant, as long as the expropriation and transfer serve the relevant purpose of land 
reform. The purpose of redistribution, for example, is to break up the unequal division of 
land ownership, while the purpose of restitution is to afford previously dispossessed 
persons the opportunity to have land restored to them. When property is transferred to 
third parties for one of these land reform purposes the public purpose requirement is 
thereby fulfilled and what the third party does with the property post-expropriation should in 
principle be irrelevant. It might even be possible for the third party to use the property for 
economic development purposes (or even sell it), but this is deemed to be irrelevant for 
purposes of this dissertation. Furthermore, even if the expropriated property is not used by 
the third party for any purpose, a right of re-transfer by the previous owner is also 
irrelevant, since the purpose of the expropriation, namely redistributing or restoring land, 
has been realised as soon as the property has been expropriated and transferred. 
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CHAPTER 2: PUBLIC PURPOSE IN EXPROPRIATION LAW 
BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA 
 
2 1 Introduction 
Before the public purpose or public interest requirement in section 25(2) of the 1996 
Constitution is analysed, it is necessary to discuss the interpretation given to the public 
purpose requirement before the 1996 Constitution was promulgated. How the public 
purpose requirement was understood pre-1996 might clarify its present understanding, 
since courts often use the terms ‘public purpose’ and ‘public interest’ interchangeably to 
mean the same thing. At present, the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 is the primary statute 
used to effect expropriations.1 In terms of section 2 of this Act, the Minister of Public Works 
may expropriate property for a public purpose. This includes immovable and movable 
property.2 The Expropriation Act of 1975 makes no reference to the public interest, nor 
does any previous expropriation legislation refer to that term. Even the property clause 
(section 28) of the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 referred only to public purpose. 
Since the Expropriation Act of 1975 is still valid,3 the interpretation given to the 
public purpose requirement in terms of this Act is still relevant. However, it must be 
emphasised that this Act must be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and any 
provision in the Act that conflicts with a provision in the Constitution will be invalid.4 It will 
be explained below that the interpretation of the public purpose requirement in the pre-
1996 legislation has had a long development in case law. The understanding of the public 
purpose requirement has been developed consistently through the court cases, 
irrespective of the applicable authorising act. This understanding of the public purpose 
                                            
1
 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) para 2. See also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & 
Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 566. 
2
 S 1 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. In terms of s 3 of the Act, the Minister may expropriate property on 
behalf of juristic persons, but ‘property’ in terms of s 3 is limited to immovable property. See Jacobs M The 
Law of Expropriation in South Africa (1982) 22-25. 
3
 In 2008 the South African government wanted to repeal the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. The Expropriation 
Bill of 2008 B16-2008, which was tabled in parliament on 16 April 2008, was to replace the Expropriation Act 
of 1975, but it was so heavily criticised that the government decided to withdraw the Bill. See Van der Walt 
AJ ‘Constitutional Property Law’ 2008 ASSAL 231-264 at 231-240; Pienaar G ‘Die Grondwetlikheid van die 
Voorgestelde Onteieningsraamwerk vir Suid-Afrika’ 2009 TSAR 344-352; Du Plessis WJ ‘The (Shelved) 
Expropriation Bill B16-2008: An Unconstitutional Souvenir or an Alarmist Memento?’ (2011) 22 Stell LR 352-
275. 
4
 S 2 of the 1996 Constitution states that the ‘Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid’. With the enactment of the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993, South Africa 
moved away from a parliamentary supremacy to constitutional supremacy. S 4(1) of Interim Constitution 
stated that ‘[t]his Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any law or act inconsistent with 
its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication in this Constitution, be 
of no force and effect to the extent of its inconsistency.’ 
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requirement in pre-constitutional law has, or should have, an effect on the understanding 
of the public purpose requirement in the constitutional era. Indirectly, the understanding of 
the public purpose requirement should also have an effect on the understanding of the 
public interest requirement. 
Once the public purpose requirement is understood in terms of pre-1996 law, it 
might be easier to understand the meaning of the ‘public purpose or public interest’ 
requirement in section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution. This will lead to the discussion, in 
subsequent chapters, whether or not an expropriation that involves a third party transfer 
for economic development purposes can be either for a public purpose or in the public 
interest;5 whether the less invasive means argument finds application to the public 
purpose requirement in section 25(2) of the Constitution;6 and whether the public purpose 
should endure beyond the initial act of expropriation.7 
The discussion in this chapter of the pre-1996 cases is divided into three parts. The 
first part includes a discussion of case law before the enactment of the Expropriation Act 
55 of 1965, the first general expropriation act applicable in the Republic of South Africa. 
These cases include especially Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of Western 
Province Agricultural Society8 and Minister of Lands v Rudolph.9 Although the phrase 
‘public purpose’ was not interpreted in terms of expropriation legislation in these cases, the 
meaning attached to the phrase in these decisions is nevertheless important because it 
was adopted in subsequent decisions that dealt specifically with expropriation legislation. 
The Expropriation Act of 1965 was an attempt to unify expropriation legislation in 
the Republic of South Africa. It was also the first general expropriation act after the Union 
of South Africa was established in 1910. Therefore, the second part of the discussion will 
include the cases heard by the courts in terms of the Expropriation Act of 1965. Owing to 
the fact that the 1965 Expropriation Act was ineffective as a general expropriation act, it 
was repealed by the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.10 The Expropriation Act of 1975 is still 
valid, but the discussion in this chapter of the cases decided in terms of the 1975 Act is 
limited to those heard before the Interim Constitution of 1993. The third part of the chapter 
therefore deals with cases decided between 1975 and 1993. 
                                            
5
 See ch 4. 
6
 See ch 5. 
7
 See ch 6. 
8
 1911 AD 271. 
9
 1940 SR 126. 
10
 See Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 44-45. 
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2 2 ‘Public Purpose’ in Expropriation Law before the 1965 Expropriation 
Act 
2 2 1 Introduction 
Before South Africa became a Union in 1910, the two colonies (the Cape Colony and the 
Natal Colony) and the two republics (the South African Republic and the Republic of the 
Orange Free State) each had its own expropriation legislation.11 When the Union of South 
Africa was established in 1910, the expropriation legislation that applied in the different 
areas remained in force. Therefore, legislation was enacted to provide for the expropriation 
of property, mostly for specific purposes such as constructing railways and roads. It was 
only in 1965 that a general expropriation act, namely the Expropriation Act 55 of 1965, was 
promulgated to apply throughout South Africa. In terms of this Act, expropriation could take 
place if it was for a public purpose and if compensation was paid. This Act did not explain 
what was meant by the public purpose requirement.  
However, the phrase ‘public purpose’ was judicially considered by the courts even 
before the passing of the 1965 Expropriation Act. In some of the cases discussed below 
the phrase ‘public purpose’ was not interpreted in terms of legislation that conferred 
expropriation powers. For instance, in Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the 
Western Province Agricultural Society12 the court had to interpret the phrase ‘public 
purpose’ to determine whether the respondent was exempt from paying municipal tax in 
terms of the Municipal Act 45 of 1882. In another decision, Slabbert v Minister van 
Lande,13 the court interpreted the public purpose requirement in terms of the Transvaal 
Expropriation of Land and Arbitration Clauses Proclamation 5 of 1902. The interpretation 
of the phrase ‘public purpose’ in these cases was subsequently adopted in the decision of 
Fourie v Minister van Lande,14 which dealt specifically with the public purpose requirement 
in the 1965 Act. For this reason, the understanding of the ‘public purpose’ before the 
enactment of the 1965 Expropriation Act had an impact on the understanding on this 
requirement in terms of the Act. 
 
                                            
11
 See Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 39-43. See also Davis NM A Comparative Study of the 
History and Principles of South African Expropriation Law with the Law of Eminent Domain of the United 
States of America (LLM thesis University of the Witwatersrand 1987) 16-20. 
12
 1911 AD 271. 
13
 1963 (3) SA 620 (T). 
14
 1970 (4) SA 165 (O). 
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2 2 2 The Influence of English Law 
The argument has been made that English law had a notable impact on the development 
of South African expropriation law, especially in the Cape Colony and Natal, the two 
former British colonies.15 The English Land Clauses Consolidation Act 16 of 1845 is said to 
have had a profound impact on South African expropriation law.16 The influence of English 
law on South African expropriation law as a whole continued even after the Union of South 
Africa was established.17 It has also been stated that the English law of expropriation, or 
compulsory acquisition as it is more commonly known in English law jurisdictions, is a 
highly practical subject and more attention is paid to the payment of compensation than to 
the public purpose requirement.18 This is evident from the general expropriation acts that 
were applicable in the various jurisdictions in Southern Africa, such as the Cape Lands 
and Arbitration Clauses Act 6 of 1882,19 the Natal Lands Clauses and Consolidation Law 
of 1872,20 and the Lands and Arbitration Clauses Ordinance 11 of 1905, applicable in the 
Orange Free State.21 These acts did not confer expropriation powers, but regulated the 
expropriation process and contained extensive provisions regarding the calculation of 
compensation. 
As a result of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty,22 the public purpose served 
by a compulsory acquisition is established during the debates in parliament and not in the 
                                            
15
 Davis NM A Comparative Study of the History and Principles of South African Expropriation Law with the 
Law of Eminent Domain of the United States of America (LLM thesis University of the Witwatersrand 1987) 
13. See generally Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 39-43. 
16
 Davis NM A Comparative Study of the History and Principles of South African Expropriation Law with the 
Law of Eminent Domain of the United States of America (LLM thesis University of the Witwatersrand 1987) 
14; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 33. 
17
 According to Eisenberg A ‘Pubic Purpose and Expropriation: Some Comparative Insight and the South 
African Bill of Rights’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 207-221 at 218 fn 68, the early South African cases relied on ‘British 
Law’ to interpret the public purpose requirement. Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 33 states that 
the English Land Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845 served as a model for many expropriation acts, 
including those adopted in South Africa. See also Davis NM A Comparative Study of the History and 
Principles of South African Expropriation Law with the Law of Eminent Domain of the United States of 
America (LLM thesis University of the Witwatersrand 1987) 13. 
18
 Taggart M ‘Expropriation, Public Purpose and the Constitution’ in Forsyth C & Hare I (eds) The Golden 
Metwand and the Crooked Cord: Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade QC (1998) 91-112 at 
91. See further ch 4 at 4 4 2. 
19
 This Act also provided that disputes concerning the calculation of compensation could be settled by 
arbitration and therefore contained wide-ranging arbitration provisions. See Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg 
(2
nd
 ed 2001) 40. 
20
 This Act was heavily influenced by the English Land Clauses Consolidation Act 16 of 1845. See 
Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 40; Davis NM A Comparative Study of the History and Principles 
of South African Expropriation Law with the Law of Eminent Domain of the United States of America (LLM 
thesis University of the Witwatersrand 1987) 16. 
21
 This Ordinance was also a general expropriation act and although it did not make provision for the 
calculation of compensation, it provided for arbitration in the event that the amount of compensation could 
not be agreed upon. See Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 43. 
22
 The principle of parliamentary sovereignty entails that the parliament is the supreme authority in the 
country and the decisions of parliament cannot be tested by the judiciary. The 1909 Constitution, which 
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courts.23 In this regard the legislature indicated the purposes for which the property might 
be taken. Therefore, even before the Union of South Africa was established specific 
legislation was enacted by the legislature to expropriate property for a specific public 
purpose, such as the construction of railway lines.24 For instance, the Cape Act 16 of 1833 
authorised a company, The Cape Central Railways, to construct a railway line from 
Worcester to Roodewal via Robertson and to use expropriation powers to construct the 
railway line.25 Similarly, in the Orange Free State the Railway Expropriation of Lands 
Ordinance 46 of 1903 was promulgated to specifically allow for the expropriation of the 
property for the construction of railway lines.26 In the Transvaal, the former South African 
Republic haphazardly expropriated land since there was no general act or procedure 
governing expropriation.27 The House of Assembly usually decided to expropriate property 
for a particular purpose and this decision was regarded as the authority for the 
expropriation.28 
As a result of the influence of English law, parliament promulgated legislation 
specifically aimed at expropriating property for a specific public purpose. For this reason, it 
is arguable that there was no need for the acts that authorised the expropriation of 
property for these purposes to refer to a general public purpose requirement. Furthermore, 
as a result of the adoption of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the influence of 
English law on the expropriation law of South Africa, South African courts were rather 
deferential to the decisions of parliament. Case law decided before 1994 illustrate this 
point. However, given that parliamentary sovereignty was replaced with constitutionalism 
in 1994, it is argued in subsequent chapters that courts may no longer be able to continue 
applying a mere rationality test when considering the public purpose requirement. The 
exact meaning of phrases like ‘public purpose’ and ‘public interest’ therefore becomes 
more important than it used to be. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
established the Union of South Africa, was based on the Westminster parliamentary system, of which the 
sovereignty of parliament was a fundamental doctrine. See Dugard J Human Rights and the South African 
Legal Order (1977) 25-26; Carpenter G Introduction to South African Constitutional Law (1987) 77. 
23
 Allen T The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (2000) 201. 
24
 See Jacobs M The Law of Expropriation in South Africa (1982) 3. 
25
 See Jacobs M The Law of Expropriation in South Africa (1982) 4-5; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 
2001) 39-40. 
26
 See Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 43. 
27
 According to Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 41, it was a common feature that the 
expropriation occurred through a decision of the House of Assembly, and then the decision to expropriate 
established both the authority to expropriate and the act of expropriation. 
28
 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 41; Davis NM A Comparative Study of the History and 
Principles of South African Expropriation Law with the Law of Eminent Domain of the United States of 
America (LLM thesis University of the Witwatersrand 1987) 19. 
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2 2 3 Case Law 
2 2 3 1 Introduction 
After the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, the applicable acts, proclamations 
and ordinances granting expropriation powers in each of the four provinces remained in 
force. In fact, the legislature added additional expropriation legislation, adding to the 
existing bulk of expropriation provisions.29 It was only in 1965 that the first comprehensive 
expropriation act, the Expropriation Act 55 of 1965, was promulgated.30 This Act stated 
that property may be expropriated for a public purpose, but did not define this requirement. 
It was therefore up to the courts to interpret and give content to this requirement. However, 
since the phrase ‘public purpose’ had been interpreted in earlier case law, albeit with 
reference to other pieces of legislation, the earlier decisions are analysed since they had a 
bearing on the interpretation of the public purpose requirement in later expropriation 
decisions. 
 
2 2 3 2 Rondebosch v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society 
In Rondebosch v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society31 (Rondebosch) 
the respondents claimed that the Agricultural Society was exempt from paying municipal 
taxes because the land was used for public purposes, namely agricultural shows. The 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court had to interpret the meaning of the phrase ‘public 
purpose’ in terms of the Municipal Act 45 of 1882 in order to determine whether the 
respondents’ claim that they were exempt from paying municipal taxes could be upheld. 
The Appellate Division stated that the word ‘public’ is one of wide significance but it 
can have several different meanings, despite their common origin.32 For instance, in the 
broad sense ‘public’ can include things that affect or pertain to the whole public or a local 
community, such as public opinion, public place or public hall. In the narrower sense it may 
not include things that affect or pertain to the public, but only things related to the state, 
such as public revenue and public lands. Therefore, ‘public purpose’ can mean all 
purposes benefitting the public in contradistinction to private individuals, or it can mean 
                                            
29
 See Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 43-44 at fn 95 for a list of all the legislation passed after 
1910 dealing with expropriation. 
30
 Jacobs M The Law of Expropriation in South Africa (1982) 4; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed) 2001 
44. 
31
 1911 AD 271. 
32
 Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society 1911 AD 271 at 
283. 
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only those purposes that relate to the state, which the court termed ‘governmental 
purposes’. 
In this case the court applied the narrower interpretation of the public purpose 
requirement. Therefore, the property that would be exempt from municipal taxes would be 
limited to property that was used for government purposes. The case is interesting since it 
distinguishes between the narrow and broad meaning of the phrase ‘public purpose’. 
Although the court interpreted the phrase narrowly in the specific context, subsequent 
cases acknowledged and applied the distinction between the broad and narrow meaning 
of the phrase ‘public purpose’ as it was described in this case.33 
 
2 2 3 3 Minister of Lands v Rudolph 
In a later case, Minister of Lands v Rudolph34 (Rudolph), the High Court of the then 
Southern Rhodesia had to decide whether the expropriation of a right of way was for a 
public purpose. In terms of the Deed of Grant that established the Que Que Township, the 
Government inserted a condition that allowed it to resume possession of certain land for 
public purposes. In terms of this condition the government wanted to create a right of way 
over the plaintiff’s land. The government offered compensation and argued that the 
resumption was for a public purpose. 
The plaintiff argued that the creation of the right of way was not for a public 
purpose, since it would not serve the public generally but only a small section of the 
inhabitants of Que Que. The High Court of Southern Rhodesia confirmed the position 
concerning the narrow and broad interpretations of the phrase ‘public purpose’ as 
explained in the Rondebosch35 case. Therefore, the court stated that ‘“public purposes” 
may either be all purposes that pertain to and benefit the public in contradistinction to 
private individuals or they may be the more restricted purposes relating to the State’.36 In 
this decision the court held that the creation of a public right of way was for a public 
purpose in terms of the broad understanding. 
 
                                            
33
 Mostert H The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its Influence on the Reform of 
Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 335. See the discussion below of 
Slabbert v Minister van Lande 1963 (3) SA 620 (T); Fourie v Minister van Lande en `n Ander 1970 (4) SA 
165 (O); White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Community Development 1984 (3) SA 785 (N). 
34
 1940 SR 126. 
35
 Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society 1911 AD 217. 
36
 Minister of Lands v Rudolph 1940 SR 126 at 129. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 23 
 
2 2 3 4 African Farms & Townships v Cape Town Municipality 
In the subsequent case of African Farms & Townships Ltd v Cape Town Municipality37 
(African Farms), the court had to determine whether or not the notice of expropriation of 
the applicant’s property was valid. In terms of the empowering provisions,38 the respondent 
expropriated the applicant’s property ‘for the widening of Riebeeck Street and for the 
implementation of the 1947 Foreshore Plan’.39 
In terms of section 129 of Ordinance 19 of 1951 a council within a municipality can 
expropriate property for municipal purposes, which may include a town-planning scheme 
or any purpose in connection therewith. The applicant argued that the expropriation was 
invalid since only half of the property would be used for purposes of widening the road, 
while the other half would be amalgamated with the respondent’s property and resold in 
whole or in lots to private buyers.40 Therefore, he argued that the expropriation of his entire 
property was not for planning purposes. The court rejected the argument and stated that 
the respondent’s real purpose of expropriation was for the implementation of the town-
planning scheme, which had to be evaluated in its entirety. According to the court the 
legislation permitted the municipal council to expropriate property for planning purposes 
and the court first considered whether the expropriation was for planning purposes or in 
connection with that purposes.41 The court held that expropriation of the applicant’s 
property was for planning purposes and the ‘fact that the respondent will resell the land 
later does not detract from this purpose.’42 
The applicant further argued that the provincial council did not have the authority to 
order the expropriation. In turn, the respondent successfully argued that section 12 of Act 
38 of 1945, read with Item 19 of the second schedule, granted the provincial council the 
authority to expropriate land for ‘public purposes’. Item 19 of the second schedule stated 
that ‘[t]he expropriation of land for public purposes in a province [is] subject to such terms 
and conditions as may be prescribed by proclamation.’ Relying on the Rondebosch43 case, 
the applicant argued that the expropriation was not for a public purpose, since it was 
merely acquired for resale to other private parties. The court was of the opinion that the 
                                            
37
 1961 (3) SA 392 (C). 
38
 The decision of the Cape Town Municipality Council to acquire the property was made in terms of ss 129 
and 130 of Ordinance 19 of 1951 as amended by s 33 of Ordinance 14 of 1953 and s 9 of Ordinance 15 of 
1959, as well as in terms of s 134 of Ordinance 19 of 1951, for which the prerequisite permission was 
obtained from the Administrator. 
39
 African Farms & Townships Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1961 (3) SA 392 (C) 393. 
40
 The question whether a local authority may expropriate more property than that which is necessary for the 
stated public purpose is discussed in ch 5. 
41
 See African Farms & Townships Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1961 (3) SA 392 (C) 395. 
42
 African Farms & Townships Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1961 (3) SA 392 (C) 396. 
43
 Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society 1911 AD 271. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 24 
 
reliance on the Rondebosch case was not helpful since that case was based on different 
legislation and a different set of facts. 
However, the court accepted that the phrase ‘public purposes,’ as discussed in the 
Rondebosch case, is one of very wide significance and that public purposes can affect 
either the whole or the local public. According to the court, the Foreshore Plan was for the 
benefit of the public. As a result, the court stated that the provincial council performed a 
public function in implementing the town-planning scheme and if it needed to expropriate 
the property to fulfil that function it was an expropriation for a public purpose. 
 
2 2 3 5 Slabbert v Minister van Lande 
Slabbert v Minister van Lande44 (Slabbert) dealt with the Transvaal Expropriation of Land 
and Arbitration Clauses Proclamation 5 of 1902. Therefore, this is the first decision where 
the phrase ‘public purpose’ was interpreted specifically in terms of expropriation 
legislation. In this case the applicant owned a portion of the farm Rietfontein adjacent to a 
lot named Libertas, the official residence of the Prime Minister of the Republic of South 
Africa. In terms of the Expropriation of Land and Arbitration Clauses Proclamation as 
amended by section 1 of the Expropriation Amendment Act 31 of 1958, the respondent 
gave notice to the applicant of his intention to expropriate the latter’s property. According 
to the respondent, the purpose of the expropriation was to provide better security and 
privacy to the Prime Minister. The applicant argued that the expropriation was invalid, 
given that the expropriation was not for a public purpose as meant in the Expropriation of 
Lands and Arbitration Clauses Proclamation of 1902. As a result, the issue before the 
court was whether or not the expropriation was for a public purpose. 
Section 2 of the Expropriation of Land and Arbitration Clauses Proclamation of 1902 
as amended by section 1 of the Expropriation Amendment Act of 1958 read as follows: 
‘The governor may for public purposes acquire by voluntary or compulsory sale any land the 
property of private persons situated in the Colony. The expression ‘public purposes’ shall 
include, without limiting in any manner the general meaning of such expression: 
(1) The construction and maintenance of works for the defence of this Colony and the 
erection of buildings for the use of any Police or Defence Force therein. 
(2) The construction and maintenance of railways, tramways, telegraphs, telephones, public 
roads, streets…’45 
                                            
44
 1963 (3) SA 620 (T). 
45
 The emphasised words were inserted by s 1 of the Expropriation Amendment Act 31 of 1958. 
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The court accepted that the interpretation of legislation granting expropriation powers to 
organs of state must be interpreted narrowly, since it has a drastic effect on the affected 
owners’ property rights.46 From the outset the court accepted that the phrase ‘public 
purposes’ was not limited to those purposes mentioned in section 2(1)-(2), but could 
include other considerations. Therefore, the court considered the general meaning of the 
phrase ‘public purposes’. 
Relying on the decisions in Rondebosch47 and Rudolph,48 the court stated that 
‘public purposes’ can have a broad as well as a narrow meaning and that the interpretation 
would depend on the context of each case. The broad meaning would include things 
whereby the whole or local public are affected, while the narrow meaning would be limited 
to government purposes. Furthermore, the court referred to definitions of the phrase 
‘public purposes’ in various dictionaries and came to the conclusion that public purposes 
should be contrasted with private purposes. 
According to the court the safety of the Prime Minister was a public matter, which 
means that the improvement of any security measure relating to the safety of the Prime 
Minster was also a public matter. The court was of the opinion that the expropriation of the 
applicant’s property was not for a private or personal purpose, but for the benefit of the 
country’s administration. Therefore, the court found that the public purpose for which the 
property was expropriated fell within the ambit of what was meant by ‘public purposes’ in 
section 2 of the Expropriation of Land and Arbitration Clauses Proclamation 5 of 1902 as 
amended by section 1 of the Expropriation Amendment Act 31 of 1958. 
In Slabbert the court therefore adopted the interpretation given to the phrase ‘public 
purpose’ in the judgments of Rondebosch and Rudolph, including the distinction between 
the wider and the narrower meaning of that phrase and the principle that the correct 
interpretation must be selected for each individual case on the basis of the facts and the 
context. As stated earlier, these judgments were not decided in terms of legislation that 
granted expropriatory powers, but the court assumed that the same meaning given in the 
Rondebosch and Rudolph cases could be attributed to the public purpose requirement in 
terms of the Expropriation of Land and Arbitration Clauses Proclamation of 1902. 
 
                                            
46
 Slabbert v Minister van Lande 1963 (3) SA 620 (T) 622. 
47
 Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society 1911 AD 271. 
48
 Minister of Lands v Rudolph 1940 SR 126. 
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2 2 4 Conclusion 
The cases discussed in this section illustrate that the public purpose requirement can have 
either a broad or a narrow meaning. Under the broad meaning it would include all things 
that affect or benefit the public at large, while in terms of the narrow meaning it pertains to 
government purposes. While the narrow approach was followed in the Rondebosch49 
decision, the broad approach was adopted in Rudolph50 and confirmed in Slabbert.51 
These early decisions established the principle that the choice between the wide and the 
narrow interpretation will depend on the legislation involved and the facts of each case. 
Therefore, it can be deduced that for an expropriation to be justified by its public purpose it 
does not necessarily mean that the property has to be used by the state for a purely 
government purpose, but that the public purpose is also served when the public derives a 
benefit. Furthermore, on the basis of the African Farms52 decision, it is clear that the public 
purpose requirement does not oblige the expropriating authority to use all of the 
expropriated property; it can be used by or transferred to third parties.53 However, whether 
or not this is justified depends on the specific context of each case.54 
 
2 3 ‘Public Purpose’ in Expropriation Law between 1965 and 1975 
2 3 1 Introduction 
The Expropriation Act 55 of 1965 was the first comprehensive expropriation act since the 
Union of South Africa was established in 1910.55 Since the Republic of South Africa was 
established in 1961, this Act was applicable throughout the Republic of South Africa. The 
aim of this Act was to centralise expropriation on behalf of the central government by 
conferring expropriation powers on the Minister of Lands, who was forthwith responsible 
for the expropriation of property on behalf of the central government.56 In addition to the 
Minister of Lands, the 1965 Act also gave the Administrator of each province and local 
authorities the power to expropriate property.57 Since the 1965 Act did not repeal all 
expropriation legislation that existed at the time it was promulgated, other state organs 
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 Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society 1911 AD 271. 
50
 Minister of Lands v Rudolph 1940 SR 126. 
51
 Slabbert v Minister van Lande 1963 (3) SA 620 (T). 
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 African Farms and Townships v Cape Town Municipality 1961 (3) SA 392 (C). 
53
 See Eisenberg A ‘Public Purpose and Expropriation: Some Comparative Insights and the South African 
Bill of Rights’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 207-221 at 219-220. 
54
 See further ch 4. 
55
 See Gildenhuys A Onteieningreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 44. 
56
 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 44. 
57
 Gildenhuys A Onteieningreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 44. In terms of the Expropriation Act 55 of 1965, the local 
authority could only expropriate property with the authorisation of the Administrator of the relevant province. 
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were still able to expropriate property in terms of different legislation. Therefore, 
expropriation continued to be carried out in terms of other legislation.58 
In terms of section 2 of Act the Minister of Lands (which includes an Administrator 
of a province) may expropriate property for a public purpose and subject to the payment of 
compensation. Unlike the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, the 1965 Act did not define ‘public 
purpose’. Therefore, it was up to the courts to determine the meaning of this requirement 
in terms of the 1965 Act. During the period that the 1965 Expropriation Act was in force the 
public purpose requirement in the Act was considered in one important decision, namely 
Fourie v Minister van Lande.59 
 
2 3 2 Fourie v Minister van Lande 
Fourie v Minister van Lande en `n Ander60 (Fourie) concerned the validity of the 
expropriation of the applicant’s property situated in the town of Vrede. It was undisputed 
that Vrede was an important town in the country’s telephone and telegram network. The 
expansion and continued maintenance of the telephone network in Vrede was important 
for government activities, business enterprises of the private sector as well as for 
individual citizens. To maintain this telephone network, the Department of Post and 
Telegram Services needed to provide affordable accommodation for its technicians in the 
town where such maintenance was required from time to time. For this reason it was the 
department’s policy to purchase dwellings for its technicians. These dwellings remained 
the property of the state and were rented to the technicians at a reduced rate. 
The department and the applicant (Fourie) concluded an agreement that granted 
the department first option to buy Fourie’s erf in Vrede. Fourie was of the opinion that the 
option lapsed because the department had failed to exercise it. Consequently, Fourie 
decided to sell the property to Ferreira. The department, under the impression that the 
agreement between itself and Fourie was still in force, gave notice to Fourie of its intention 
to execute its option. When Fourie refused to accept that the agreement was still valid, the 
department decided to expropriate the property. 
The second respondent (the deputy Postmaster-General) thereupon served an 
expropriation notice on Fourie. The notice concerned the expropriation of Fourie’s land in 
the town of Vrede. Fourie argued that the expropriation of his property was not for a valid 
public purpose as contemplated by section 2(1) of the Expropriation Act 55 of 1965, since 
                                            
58
 See 2 4 below for a detailed discussion. 
59
 1970 (4) SA 165 (O). 
60
 1970 (4) SA 165 (O). 
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the provision of housing for the technicians of the department was a private matter. 
Therefore, he argued that the expropriation could not be for a public purpose and he 
sought an order declaring the expropriation invalid. The respondents, on the other hand, 
argued that the expropriation was for a valid public purpose. In terms of the department’s 
policy, the department had already bought 28 houses in the Orange Free State to be used 
by its technicians. The question that the court had to decide was whether the expropriation 
of Fourie’s property was for a valid public purpose. 
The court stated that the power of expropriation was contained in legislation.61 In 
terms of the 1965 Expropriation Act the state cannot simply expropriate property; it must 
be for a public purpose and compensation should be paid. Furthermore, it is the duty of the 
courts to ensure that the expropriation is done strictly in terms of the Act. According to the 
court, the term ‘public purpose’ was interpreted by courts in terms of previous legislation 
and that interpretation was still in force. The court stated that when a particular meaning 
had been given to a particular word and that word is used in subsequent legislation that is 
in pari materia with the previous legislation, there is a presumption that the meaning in the 
current act is the same as given by the courts in terms of the previous legislation.62 
Therefore, although the term ‘public purpose’ was interpreted by the courts in terms of 
previous legislation, as was the case in Slabbert v Minister van Lande,63 the interpretation 
given there was still applicable since the legislature did not indicate otherwise. In Fourie,64 
the court therefore accepted the Slabbert judgment concerning the broad interpretation of 
the public purpose requirement. 
Section 2(1) of the Expropriation Act 55 of 1965 allowed the Minister to expropriate 
property for public purposes on condition that compensation is paid. According to the 
court, the phrase ‘public purpose’ already had an established meaning when the 
legislature included it in the legislation. Since the legislature did not indicate that this 
requirement should be interpreted differently, the meaning given to this phrase in previous 
case law, decided in terms of different legislation, should also apply in this case. 
                                            
61
 The court, relying on Jooste v The Government of the SA Republic (1897) 4 Off Rep 147 and Pretoria City 
Council v Modimola 1966 (3) SA 250 (A), stated that the state had the power to expropriate property through 
the use of dominium eminens, but since expropriation had such a drastic effect on the property rights of the 
effected landowner, a requirement later developed that expropriation must be for a public necessity and that 
the effected landowner had to be compensated. 
62
 The court relied on an English case, Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v Cameron; Jones v Mersey Docks & 
Harbour Board 11 ER 1405, and on South African decisions including Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In re R v 
Bolon 1941 AD 345 and R v Sharp 1957 (3) SA 703 (C). 
63
 1963 (3) SA 620 (T). See also African Farms and Townships Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1961 (3) SA 
392 (C), discussed above at 2 2 3 4. 
64
 Fourie v Minister van Lande en `n Ander 1970 (4) SA 165 (O). 
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In Fourie, the court stated that ‘public purpose’ should be interpreted broadly, which 
means that the public purpose is established when the expropriation serves either the 
broader public or the local public.65 The broad meaning of the public purpose requirement 
includes the narrow meaning, which is restricted to government purposes. As a result, the 
court had to consider for which purpose the property was expropriated and also what the 
role of the department was in society. 
The court stated that the department’s mandate to effectively maintain and expand 
the country’s telecommunications network was an important government purpose. Not only 
was this mandate given in terms of legislation, but the function of the department was 
important for the safety of the Republic as well as maintaining economic growth. 
Therefore, the court stated that the expropriation could be for government purposes and 
that it could be included in the narrow meaning of the public purpose requirement. 
However, the court further explained the importance of the telecommunications network for 
the public at large and the negative effect it would have on the public if the network were 
not maintained properly. As a result, the court explained that the function of the 
department could also be understood under the broad meaning of the public purpose 
requirement, because it also affected the broader public. Since the maintenance and 
expansion of the communication network was not only a government purpose but also a 
public purpose in terms of the broad understanding of the phrase, the court found that the 
expropriation of the applicant’s property to provide housing for the technicians of the 
department was a public purpose as meant in section 2(1) of the Expropriation Act 55 of 
1965. 
 
2 3 3 Conclusion 
The Fourie decision is the first decision in which a court interpreted the phrase ‘public 
purpose’ in terms of a general expropriation act applicable throughout the Republic of 
South Africa. The court accepted the distinction between the broad and narrow meanings 
of the phrase ‘public purpose’ as established in previous case law. Furthermore, the court 
held that the broad meaning of the public purpose requirement (purposes which affect the 
whole public) includes the narrow meaning of the public purpose requirement 
                                            
65
 Similarly, in African Farms and Townships Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1961 (3) SA 392 (C) the court 
held that the expropriation of the applicant’s property in order to widen the street to serve the residents of 
that particular street fell within the function of the Municipality, which is able to expropriate property for town 
planning purposes. 
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(governmental purposes). In this decision the court evaluated whether both the narrow and 
the broad understanding were satisfied. 
It has been established in previous case law that the public purpose can be 
understood broadly, relating to matters that benefit or affect the public at large. The public 
purpose requirement is therefore not restricted to government purposes. In Fourie, another 
dimension was added, namely that the public purpose is also served when the local public 
derives a benefit from the expropriation. Therefore, in terms of the broad understanding of 
the public purpose requirement it is not necessary that the public at large benefit from the 
expropriation; it is sufficient if only the local public receives the benefit. 
 
2 4 ‘Public Purpose’ in Expropriation Law between 1975 and 1993 
2 4 1 Introduction 
As discussed above, the Expropriation Act 55 of 1965 was the first comprehensive 
expropriation act applicable in the Republic of South Africa. Since the Expropriation Act 55 
of 1965 did not repeal all other expropriation legislation, ministers other than the Minister 
of Lands were still able to expropriate property in terms of other expropriation legislation 
that remained in force. This position was untenable66 and the need arose for a uniform 
expropriation act that could streamline both the procedure of expropriation and the 
calculation of compensation.67 Therefore, after lengthy negotiations between various state 
departments, the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 was promulgated. Due to initial flaws in the 
1975 Act, it has been subjected to numerous amendments.68 The 1975 Expropriation Act 
was substantially amended by the Expropriation Act Amendment Act of 1992.69 
The Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 came into operation on the 1st of January 1977. 
Since the Act is still applicable, the requirements for a valid expropriation and especially 
the public purpose requirement will be discussed here with reference to this Act. In terms 
of section 2(1) of the 1975 Expropriation Act, the Minister of Public Works has the power to 
expropriate immovable and movable property for public purposes. The Minister may also 
temporarily expropriate such property for a public purpose. Property that may be 
expropriated is not limited to immovable and tangible movable property, but is given a 
                                            
66
 According to Gildenhuys A Onteieningreg (2
nd
 2001) 44, this situation was unsatisfactory because the 
procedures and method of calculating compensation differed in the various pieces of legislation, which 
affected legal certainty negatively. 
67
 Jacobs M The Law of Expropriation in South Africa (1982) 4. 
68
 See Jacobs M The Law of Expropriation in South Africa (1982) 4 for a list of amendments to the original 
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
69
 Act 45 of 1992. 
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broad meaning.70 Therefore, in terms of the Act, property includes ‘(i) rights of ownership 
over movable and immovable things; (ii) mineral rights; (iii) existing or new limited real 
rights; or (iv) personal or immaterial property rights.’71 When the Minister expropriates 
property, she has an obligation to pay compensation and the calculation of the 
compensation is regulated extensively and exclusively in terms of this Act, even when the 
expropriation is authorised by other legislation.72 However, the calculation of compensation 
in terms of the 1975 Expropriation Act is now subject to section 25(3) of the 1996 
Constitution.73 
In terms of the Expropriation Act of 1975, there are two prerequisites that have to 
be met before an expropriation can be valid: The expropriation must be for a public 
purpose and compensation must be paid. Unlike the 1965 Expropriation Act, the 1975 Act 
defines ‘public purpose.’ In terms of section 1 of the 1975 Act, ‘“public purposes” includes 
any purpose connected with the administration of the provisions of any law by an organ of 
State.’ It is unclear as to why this vague formulation of the public purpose requirement was 
included in this Act. It is possible to argue that since this Act is regarded as the primary act 
conferring expropriation powers and has to be able to justify the expropriation of property 
for various purposes, the legislature did not want to limit the scope of purposes in the Act. 
Since the public purpose serves as the justification for the expropriation,74 attention is 
given below to cases that involved the public purpose requirement. 
 
2 4 2 White Rocks Farm v Minister of Community Development 
In White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Community Development75 (White 
Rocks) the Minister of Community Development expropriated the plaintiffs’ properties in 
terms of the 1975 Expropriation Act. The purpose of the expropriation was to establish a 
                                            
70
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 559. 
71
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 560 
(footnotes omitted). 
72
 Ss 10-22 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. For discussion of the compensation requirements generally 
see Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 503-520; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & 
Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 568-578. 
73
 In terms of s 25(3) of the Constitution, ‘[t]he amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment 
must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of 
those affected, having regard to all the relevant circumstances…’ The section continues by referring to a 
number of factors, such as the market value of the property, the current use of the property and the purpose 
of the expropriation. The factors mentioned in s 25(3) do not constitute a closed list, since other factors may 
also be considered. 
74
 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 82; Minister of Minerals and 
Energy v Agri SA (CALS Amicus Curiae) (458/11) [2012] ZASCA 93, 31 May 2012 para 18. See the 
discussion in ch 3 at 3 3 2. 
75
 1984 (3) SA 785 (N). The Mountain Catchment Areas Act 63 of 1970 does not provide for expropriation 
but only provides for the conservation, use, management and control of land situated within a declared 
mountain catchment area. 
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mountain catchment area in the Natal Drakensberg. The plaintiffs argued that the land was 
not required for the stated purpose and that the purpose was not a public purpose in 
accordance with section 2(1) of the Act. The purposes for the establishment of the 
mountain catchment area included the protection of the upper catchment of a number of 
rivers flowing from the Drakensberg; protecting the national plants communities within the 
area; and to guarantee the flow of silt free water in and from such areas.76 
The plaintiffs argued that the establishment of a mountain catchment area was not 
a public purpose in terms of the Expropriation Act of 1975 because the establishment of 
such areas is specifically provided for in the Mountain Catchment Areas Act 63 of 1970. 
The plaintiffs further argued that when parliament promulgated the Expropriation Act of 
1975 it must have been aware of the Mountain Catchment Areas Act and must have 
intended that the Expropriation Act should not apply to mountain catchment areas. The 
court rejected this argument and stated that the power to expropriate property in terms of 
section 2 of the Expropriation Act is unlimited, since it refers to ‘any property’. 
Furthermore, the court was of the opinion that if the legislature wanted the Mountain 
Catchment Areas Act to apply instead of the Expropriation Act of 1975, it would have been 
clear from the Mountain Catchment Areas Act. 
Therefore, the court considered whether the expropriation of the plaintiffs’ properties 
was for a public purpose as contemplated by section 2(1) of the 1975 Expropriation Act. 
The court stated that the term ‘public purposes’ had already been interpreted judicially in 
cases such as Slabbert v Minister van Lande77 and Fourie v Minister van Lande.78 In the 
Slabbert judgment, the court decided that the public purpose requirement can have a 
broad or a narrow meaning and that the particular interpretation would depend on the 
context of each case. In the Fourie judgment the court stated that the phrase ‘public 
purposes’ must have the same meaning as the established interpretation and that it should 
be construed broadly. The court in this case agreed with the Fourie79 judgment and stated 
as follows:  
‘There is no difference between the power to expropriate for public purposes granted to the 
Minister in the Expropriation Act 55 of 1965 and the powers to expropriate granted to the 
Minister in the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.’80 
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 White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Community Development 1984 (3) SA 785 (N) 791. 
77
 1963 (3) SA 620 (T). 
78
 1970 (4) SA 165 (O). 
79
 Fourie v Minister van Lande en `n Ander 1970 (4) SA 165 (O). 
80
 White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Community Development 1984 (3) SA 785 (N) 794. 
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Accordingly, the legislature must have had the established interpretation of ‘public 
purposes’ in mind when drafting the 1975 Expropriation Act and intended the present Act 
to bear the same established meaning. As a result, the court accepted the broad meaning 
of the public purpose requirement as it had already been accepted in previous case law. 
The preservation and conservation of the water systems affect the people of South Africa 
as a whole. Therefore, the court decided that the establishment of a mountain catchment 
area falls within the broad meaning of the public purpose requirement and is a public 
purpose as meant by section 2(1) of the 1975 Expropriation Act. 
Another argument brought forward by the plaintiffs was that the reason the 
defendant decided to expropriate the properties in terms of the 1975 Expropriation Act 
rather than declare it a mountain catchment area in terms of the Mountain Catchments 
Areas Act of 1970 was a financial one. It was argued that declaring a mountain catchment 
area would have been more costly. The court rejected this argument on the basis that it 
confused motive with purpose. Since the expropriation was for a valid public purpose, the 
motive behind the decision to expropriate the property in terms of the legislation is 
irrelevant.81 
In terms of the White Rocks82 case the public purpose requirement in section 2(1) of 
the 1975 Expropriation Act has the same meaning as that which was already established 
in earlier case law. Therefore, the public purpose requirement is understood broadly in this 
case, which means that the public purpose requirement is met when the public (even the 
local public) receives a benefit. 
 
2 4 3 Administrator, Transvaal v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd 
A case heard by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court that concerns expropriation 
but that was not decided in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, Administrator, 
Transvaal and Another v J van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd83 (Van Streepen), is 
interesting for the reasons explained below. In this case the Administrator of Transvaal 
expropriated the respondent’s property in terms of section 7(1) of the Transvaal Roads 
Ordinance 27 of 1957. The Administrator of the Province had to ease traffic congestion in 
                                            
81
 In this regard the court referred to LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1969 (2) SA 
256 (C) 270, where it was held that if the expropriation is for a valid public purpose and exercised in good 
faith the motive is irrelevant to the consideration whether the power of expropriation was validly exercised. 
See the discussion of Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality 
[2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 February 2010 with specific reference to the relevance of motive in the decision to 
expropriate property in ch 5 at 5 3. 
82
 White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Community Development 1984 (3) SA 785 (N). 
83
 1990 (4) SA 644 (A). 
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the Kempton Park area. However, undertaking the steps that were necessary to reduce 
traffic congestion was problematic since there was a private railway line running parallel to 
one of the roads earmarked for widening. This railway line was operated by the private 
company Sentrachem (the second respondent) and ran over the property of one of its 
subsidiaries. Sentrachem had secure title to make use of the land on which the railway line 
was originally situated. In order to alleviate the congestion by widening the relevant roads, 
the railway line had to be relocated. The proposed relocation traversed a substantial 
portion of the respondent’s property. The Administrator, by virtue of section 5(1)(b) and 
Notice 2161,84 commenced constructing the new road and railway line.85 
The Administrator was informed that the respondent intended to challenge his 
authority to declare a public road, which included the widening of the road reserve and the 
relocation of the railway line. The Administrator realised that if the respondent succeeded 
in its intended challenge, the administration would suffer serious financial loss due to the 
delay in construction. At the same time, Sentrachem became concerned about its security 
of title to use the new railway line.86 Therefore, in terms of Notice 1909,87 the Administrator 
expropriated Van Streepen’s property in order to transfer it to Sentrachem. 
The respondent challenged the decisions of the Administrator and the matter for 
consideration in the Appellate Division was whether the expropriation of the respondent’s 
land fell within the Administrator’s powers in terms of section 7(1) of the Ordinance.88 
Section 7(1) of the Ordinance authorises the Administrator to acquire any land ‘for the 
construction or maintenance of any road for any purpose in connection with the 
construction or maintenance of any road’.89 
The respondent argued that section 7(1) of the Ordinance does not grant the 
Administrator the authority to expropriate his property and transfer it to another third party 
‘for the latter’s use and benefit’.90 The court rejected this argument, stating that because 
section 7(1) of the Ordinance permits the state to acquire property, it does not necessarily 
mean that it should be acquired to be used by the state. Interpreting the Ordinance strictly, 
the court stated that the fundamental problem was whether section 7(1) of the Ordinance 
permitted the Administrator to acquire the property of one person for the benefit of another. 
                                            
84
 Administrator’s Notice 2161 of 18 December 1983. 
85
 S 5(1)(b) of the Transvaal Road Ordinance 22 of 1957 authorises the Administrator to declare that a public 
road shall exist on any land when certain procedures have been followed. 
86
 Since the railway line formed an integral part of Sentrachem’s business activities, considerable losses 
would have occurred if Sentrachem lost secure title over the railway line. 
87
 Administrator’s Notice 1909 of 4 September 1985. 
88
 The second, but for purposes of this chapter less important matter that the court had to consider, was 
whether Notice 1909 was valid ‘for want of an adequate description of the expropriated land’. 
89
 S 7(1) of the Transvaal Road Ordinance 27 of 1957. 
90
 Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd 1990 (4) SA 644 (A) 661. 
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According to the court, an expropriation must ‘generally speaking’91 be for a public purpose 
or in the public interest. This was the first clear reference to the phrase ‘public interest’ in 
modern South African expropriation case law. In previous case law reference was only 
made to the public purpose requirement, which could either be understood broadly or 
narrowly. In this case the court apparently introduced the notion of ‘public interest’ to refer 
to the broad meaning previously associated with ‘public purpose’. 
According to the court, the Administrator had to consider the ‘practical and 
economic implications of the project as a whole in deciding what would best serve the 
public interest’.92 On the facts of the case the court accepted that Sentrachem’s activities 
were of national importance and that the loss of the railway line that transported the 
necessary raw materials would disrupt Sentrachem’s ‘production of strategically important 
products’.93 Therefore, the court held that the power of the Administrator in terms of 
section 7(1) of the Ordinance can include the acquisition of land for the benefit of a third 
party.94 According to the court, the power to expropriate property and transfer it to another 
private party exists, but the manner in which it was exercised may be open to challenge. 
Such a challenge may be brought if the Administrator acted in bad faith or not in the public 
interest. 
In this decision the court stated that an expropriation must generally be for a public 
purpose or in the public interest. In earlier case law a distinction was made between the 
narrow and broad understanding of the public purpose requirement. The narrow 
understanding was said to relate to government purposes, while the broad understanding 
relates to a purpose that benefits the public at large. Since the court in Van Streepen 
stated that the expropriation of property for the benefit of another private party can never 
be for a public purpose, it is possible to argue that when it referred to the public purpose it 
only referred to the narrow understanding of the public purpose requirement, namely 
government purposes. However, since the expropriation of the property and the transfer of 
it to another third party benefit the public at large, it could be said that it falls within the 
broad understanding of the public purpose requirement. Since the court did not refer to the 
broad and narrow understandings of the public purpose requirement, but to the public 
purpose and the public interest, it is arguable that the court equated the broad 
understanding of the public purpose requirement with the public interest, while the 
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 Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd 1990 (4) SA 644 (A) 662. 
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 Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd 1990 (4) SA 644 (A) 661. 
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 Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd 1990 (4) SA 644 (A) 661. 
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 Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd 1990 (4) SA 644 (A) 661. 
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reference to the public purpose is limited to the narrow understanding of the public 
purpose requirement as it was understood in earlier case law. 
 
2 5 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of South African expropriation law before the Interim 
Constitution of 1993 was promulgated, particularly in relation to the public purpose 
requirement. The case law considered in this chapter is limited to judgments handed down 
before the commencement of the 1993 Constitution, since later case law is discussed in 
the next chapter. The term ‘public purpose’ is investigated not only in relation to 
expropriation legislation, but also in terms of other legislation where the term was used 
and that had a bearing on the understanding of the public purpose requirement in 
subsequent expropriation case law. 
Before the Expropriation Act 55 of 1965 there was specific legislation that 
expropriated property for a specific public purpose and general expropriation legislation 
that set out the expropriation procedure and the manner in which compensation was to be 
calculated.95 The general expropriation acts did not grant expropriation authority, and 
therefore there was no need to include a general public purpose requirement. Therefore, it 
was the duty of the courts to interpret and give meaning of the phrase ‘public purpose.’ 
Generally speaking, the meaning of the public purpose requirement was not a central 
issue in case law because it was assumed, in terms of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, that parliament decided whether a particular expropriation would be for a valid 
purpose and that the courts should defer to that decision unless there was proof of bad 
faith or improper behaviour. 
Furthermore, in earlier case law the courts generally contrasted public purpose with 
private purposes, finding that an expropriation is for a public purpose if it benefits the 
public and not private individuals.96 In other decisions, the court equated public purpose 
with government purposes.97 It eventually became evident that the public purpose 
requirement can have a broad or a narrow meaning depending on the specific facts and 
the context.98 In terms of the broad understanding, the public purpose is fulfilled when the 
expropriation benefits the public at large or even the local public. In terms of the narrow 
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 See Jacobs M The Law of Expropriation in South Africa (1982) 3-4. 
96
 Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society 1911 AD 271; 
Minister of Lands v Rudolph 1940 SR 126. 
97
 Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society 1911 AD 271; 
Minister of Lands v Rudolph 1940 SR 126. 
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 See Slabbert v Minister van Lande 1963 (3) SA 620 (T); Fourie v Minister van Lande en `n Ander 1970 (4) 
SA 165 (O). 
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understanding the expropriation would only be justified if the property would be used for 
government purposes. 
In the 1965 Expropriation Act the phrase ‘public purpose’ was not defined and the 
court in Fourie v Minister van Lande99 held that the established meaning of the phrase 
should also apply to the public purpose requirement in terms of the Act. The 1975 
Expropriation Act defined ‘public purposes’ and the court in White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd 
and Others v Minster of Community Development100 held that the interpretation of the 
phrase ‘public purpose’ before the enactment of the 1965 Act as well as the interpretation 
thereof in the 1965 Act should also apply to the interpretation of the public purpose 
requirement in terms of the 1975 Act. Therefore, the understanding of the phrase ‘public 
purpose’ since the interpretation thereof in Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of 
the Western Province Agricultural101 is also applicable to the understanding of this phrase 
in terms of the 1975 Act. 
Furthermore, it was illustrated that in terms of expropriation law, it is not a 
requirement that the property must be used by the state after expropriation had taken 
place.102 In Fourie,103 although the state acquired the property through expropriation, it 
was to be used by the employees of the Department of Post and Telegram Services. This 
means that the expropriated property can be used by private individuals provided that the 
purpose of expropriation - in this case ensuring the maintenance of the communication 
network - is still a valid public purpose. 
The issue of third party transfers came to light in at least two decisions before the 
1996 Constitution was promulgated. In African Farms & Townships Ltd v Cape Town 
Municipality104 the court indicated that the expropriation would be valid even when the 
property is to be used by another private party. In Administrator, Transvaal and Another v 
Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd105 the court decided that the expropriation of the 
applicant’s property in order to transfer it to another party may be in the public interest 
even if it is not strictly for a narrow public purpose. It was pointed out above that the court 
in Van Streepen did not refer to the broad and narrow understanding of the public purpose 
requirement as was done in earlier case law, but instead referred to the public purpose as 
opposed to the public interest requirement. The court indicated that the public interest is 
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broader than the public purpose. There is no reference to the notion of ‘public interest’ in 
the authorising legislation or in previous case law. Therefore, it seems probable that when 
the court referred to the public interest it referred to the broad understanding of the public 
purpose requirement as it was defined in earlier case law. As a result, the reference to the 
public purpose seems to be limited to the narrow understanding of the public purpose 
requirement. 
With the dawning of the new constitutional dispensation, these cases and the 
interpretation given to ‘public purpose’ pre-1993 should have a bearing on the 
understanding of the requirement post-1993. However, the interpretation given before 
1993 cannot merely be adopted in a democratic South Africa. There are bound to be 
certain adaptations that have, or had, to be made given that the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty was replaced with constitutional supremacy. In the following chapter, the 
public purpose requirement in the 1993 Interim Constitution and the ‘public purpose or 
public interest’ requirement in the 1996 Constitution are discussed. The discussion is 
limited to cases that dealt with the public purpose and public interest requirements and 
does not address the other constitutional factors with regard to expropriation, namely law 
of general application and compensation, in detail. 
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CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC PURPOSE OR PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ERA 
 
3 1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 the public purpose requirement is analysed as it was understood before the 
Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 came into effect in 1994. It is pointed out there that 
the first general and comprehensive expropriation act applicable throughout the Republic 
of South Africa, namely the Expropriation Act 55 of 1965, required an expropriation to be 
for a public purpose. The courts attributed the established meaning of the phrase ‘public 
purpose’ as it developed in earlier case law to the public purpose requirement in terms of 
this Act. The Expropriation Act of 1965 was replaced with the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
The 1975 Act, which is still valid, only refers to ‘public purpose’ as a requirement for a valid 
expropriation. In terms of section 1 of this Act ‘public purpose’ is any purpose that is 
‘connected which the administration of the provisions of any law by an organ of state’. The 
courts have indicated that the established meaning of the phrase ‘public purpose’ should 
also apply to the public purpose requirement in terms of this Act.1 
Although the 1975 Expropriation Act is still valid, both the Interim Constitution of 
1993 and the 1996 Constitution had an effect on the understanding of the public purpose 
requirement in the Act. The Interim Constitution only referred to ‘public purpose’, while 
section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution refers to ‘public purpose or public interest’ as a 
requirement for a valid expropriation. 
It is explained in Chapter 2 that the pre-1994 courts were deferential to the decision 
of the legislature as to what constitutes a public purpose. This can be attributed to the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty that was part of South African law before the 
enactment of the Interim Constitution.2 In this regard courts were unable to test legislation 
that has been duly passed by the legislature.3 Furthermore, the case law discussed in 
Chapter 2 indicates that the public purpose requirement could be interpreted either 
narrowly or broadly.4 In terms of the narrow understanding the public purpose was said to 
                                            
1
 See White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minster of Community Development 1984 (3) SA 785 (N) 
discussed in ch 2 at 2 4 2. 
2
 The principle of parliamentary sovereignty entails that parliament, as the elected representatives, governs 
as the supreme authority in a particular state: Carpenter G Introduction to South African Constitutional Law 
(1987) 77. 
3
 See Carpenter G Introduction to South African Constitutional Law (1987) 77. 
4
 Although the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 was in force from 1994-1997, courts did not have the 
opportunity to evaluate the public purpose requirement in terms of the property clause (s 28) of the Interim 
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relate to government purposes, while the broad meaning includes things that benefit the 
public at large. 
However, case law prior to 1994 also indicates that an expropriation can be justified 
if it is for a public purpose or in the public interest. With reference to Administrator, 
Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd5 (Van Streepen), where 
the then Appellate Division of the Supreme Court stated that the expropriation of property 
for the benefit of another private party cannot be for a public purpose but it can be in the 
public interest, it is concluded in Chapter 2 that the term ‘public purpose’ refers to the 
narrow understanding of the public purpose requirement established in earlier case law, 
namely government purposes. The notion of ‘public interest’ therefore refers to the broad 
understanding of the phrase ‘public purpose,’ namely purposes that benefit the public 
outside of narrow government purposes. 
Similar to the expropriation legislation such as the 1965 and 1975 Expropriation 
Acts, section 28 of the Interim Constitution of 1993 only required that an expropriation be 
for a public purpose. Section 28(3) stated that ‘[w]here any rights in property are 
expropriated … such expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes only’. 
However, if public purpose refers to government purposes only it would have been difficult 
to justify expropriation for land reform purposes, since that is arguably not an expropriation 
for government purposes, although it could be for the benefit of the public. Furthermore, 
since the Interim Constitution abolished parliament supremacy it is possible that 
expropriation for land reform purposes would have been struck down by the courts, since it 
would not have complied with the constitutional provisions. Therefore, because of 
uncertainty regarding the constitutional validity of expropriation of property for land reform 
purposes, the drafters of the Constitution included the reference to the public interest in 
section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution.6 Section 25(2) now states that ‘[p]roperty may be 
expropriated … for a public purpose or in the public interest’. 
As a result, it can be inferred that there is a distinction between public purpose on 
the one hand and public interest on the other in the section 25(2) requirement. The case 
law discussed in Chapter 2 indicates that the public purpose can be understood narrowly 
and broadly. However, based on the Van Streepen decision it is argued here that the 
public purpose refers to the narrow understanding of the public purpose requirement, while 
the public interest refers to the broad understanding of the public purpose requirement. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Constitution during that period. See the discussion of Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at 3 2 
below. 
5
 1990 (4) SA 644 (A), discussed in ch 2 at 2 4 3. 
6
 The reason for the inclusion of the public interest in s 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution is discussed below. 
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Depending on the circumstances of each case, either the public purpose (the narrow 
understanding of the public purpose requirement) or the public interest (the broad 
understanding of the public purpose requirement) can justify expropriation. In this regard it 
is arguable that is it no longer necessary to refer to the narrow or the broad reading of the 
public purpose requirement since the public interest part of the constitutional requirement 
has now replaced the broad reading of the public purpose requirement. 
In terms of section 25(2), expropriation is therefore justified in terms of the public 
purpose or public interest that is served by the expropriation.7 This justificatory 
requirement therefore consists of two elements, but it remains one requirement. Given that 
an expropriation can be for a public purpose or in the public interest, it is not necessary 
that both the public purpose and the public interest need to be served in order to justify an 
expropriation.8 
However, it is unclear where the public purpose ends and where the public interest 
starts, or how far the public interest can justify an expropriation that is not for a public 
purpose. Section 25(4)(a) of the 1996 Constitution provides an indication of what the 
public interest includes,9 but there are still instances where the broad formulation of the 
public purpose requirement creates uncertainty. Because of the potential confusion 
regarding the public purpose or public interest requirement, as is evident from case law, 
this chapter attempts to explain the understanding of the public purpose or public interest 
requirement in section 25(2)(a) of the Constitution, especially with regard to the transfer of 
the property to third parties. 
 
3 2 The Interim Constitution of 1993 and ‘Public Purposes’ 
The Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 was promulgated in 1994. Although the 
protection of property in the bill of rights was a contested subject,10 a property clause was 
eventually included in the bill of rights. Section 28(3) of the Interim Constitution stated that  
                                            
7
 See Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 82 and the discussion below 
at 3 3 2. 
8
 Compare Fourie v Minister van Lande en `n Ander 1970 (4) SA 165 (O) discussed in ch 2 at 2 3 2, where 
the court considered whether the expropriation was justified in both the narrow and the broad understanding. 
9
 S 25(4)(a) states the public interest in s 25(2) ‘includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to 
reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources’. See further 3 2 below. 
10
 See Van der Walt AJ ‘Property Rights, Land Rights, and Environmental Rights’ in Van Wyk D, Dugard J, 
De Villiers B & Davis D (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order (1994) 455-
501 at 478-480; Chaskalson M ‘The Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 131-
139 at 131-132; Chaskalson M ‘Stumbling towards Section 28: Negotiations over the Protection of Property 
Rights in the Interim Constitution’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 222-240; Budlender G ‘The Constitutional Protection of 
Property Rights: Overview and Commentary’ in Budlender G, Latsky J & Roux T Juta’s New Land Law (OS 
1998) ch 1 at 1. 
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‘[w]here any rights in property are expropriated pursuant to a law … such expropriation shall 
be permissible for public purposes only …’ 
The interpretation of the public purpose requirement in the Interim Constitution was a 
contested subject among academics during the short period that the Interim Constitution 
was in force. One of the main issues was whether expropriation for land reform purposes 
would constitute a public purpose.11 The underlying issue was whether the expropriation of 
private property in order to transfer it to another private party would satisfy the public 
purpose requirement.12 
Van der Walt13 is of the opinion that these reservations were not unfounded, since 
similar expropriations have been declared invalid in certain foreign jurisdictions. In the 
Australian decision of Clunies-Ross v The Commonwealth of Australia and Others,14 the 
court held that the compulsory acquisition of the plaintiff’s land to reduce the unequal 
distribution of land was invalid because it was not for a public purpose. The court 
interpreted the public purpose requirement narrowly and consequently held that property 
can only be compulsorily acquired if it is strictly needed or used for a specific public 
purpose. According to the court, land reform does not serve such a purpose.15 Similarly, in 
Trinidad Island-Wide Cane Farmers’ Association Inc and Attorney General v Prakash 
Seereeram,16 the Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal held that the expropriation of the 
property of one person to transfer it to another does not constitute a public purpose.17 
In relation to the issue of third party transfers and land reform in view of section 28 
of the Interim Constitution, various authors relied on Administrator, Transvaal and Another 
v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd18 to explain the public purpose requirement. 
                                            
11
 Chaskalson M ‘The Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 131-139 at 136-
138; Chaskalson M ‘Stumbling towards Section 28: Negotiations over the Protection of Property Rights in the 
Interim Constitution’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 222-240 at 238; Budlender G ‘The Constitutional Protection of 
Property Rights: Overview and Commentary’ in Budlender G, Latsky J, Roux T Juta’s New Land Law (OS 
1998) ch 1 at 48; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 340. 
12
 Expropriating property and transferring it to another private party is also known as third party transfers or 
private-to-private transfers: Gray K ‘Recreational Property’ in Bright S (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law 
Vol VI (2011) 1-38 at 10. 
13
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 463. 
14
 (1984) 155 CLR 193. See further the discussion of this decision in ch 4 at 4 3 3 3. 
15
 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 57-58. 
16
 (1975) 27 WIR 329 (CA). 
17
 Trinidad Island-Wide Cane Farmers’ Association Inc and Attorney General v Prakash Seereeram (1975) 
27 WIR 329 at 329. See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 
386-393 for a discussion of the case. Allen T The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (2000) 
210-211 criticises the Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal for relying on US case law in which the public 
use was viewed narrowly, while ignoring the US Supreme Court’s ‘subsequent repudiation of the narrow use 
doctrine’. See the discussion of Berman v Parker 348 US 26 (1954); Midkiff v Hawaii Housing Authority 267 
US 229 (1984) and Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) in ch 4. 
18
 1990 (4) SA 644 (A). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 43 
 
According to Budlender,19 it might seem as if the Van Streepen decision ‘offers support for 
the proposition that the expropriation of land for the benefit of a private individual cannot 
be for public purposes, even though it may be in the public interest’. However, he argues 
that there are several reasons why this approach should not be followed. Budlender 
argues that in Van Streepen Smallberger JA did not interpret the phrase ‘public purpose’ 
but rather relied on a provincial ordinance which permitted the Administrator to ‘acquire 
any land and cause it to be registered in the name of the state for the construction or 
maintenance of any road or for any purpose in connection with the construction or 
maintenance of any road’.20 Accordingly Budlender argues that the ‘different context of this 
limited power is quite apparent.’21 
Furthermore, the case must be understood in light of its specific facts. The main 
purpose of the expropriation was to establish a railway link for a private entity, while the 
secondary purpose was to reduce the amount of compensation that would have been 
payable. Budlender22 argues that under those circumstances it is understandable that the 
expropriation was not regarded as an expropriation for a public purpose, although it may 
have been in the public interest, since the expropriation was clearly for the benefit of 
another private party. Budlender23 also states that the negotiators and drafters of the 
Interim Constitution intended that there should be a broad constitutional authorisation for 
expropriation. He therefore concludes that land reform would constitute a public purpose in 
terms of section 28 of the Interim Constitution. 
Eisenberg,24 also relying on the Van Streepen25 decision as well as on US26 and 
Indian case law,27 states that the public purpose has not been interpreted literally to mean 
use by the public. She comes to the conclusion that expropriation for land redistribution 
programmes has been held to fall within the definition of public purpose. Therefore she 
states that, given the unusual facts of the Van Streepen decision, it ‘cannot be used as 
                                            
19
 Budlender G ‘The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights: Overview and Commentary’ in Budlender 
G, Latsky J & Roux T Juta’s New Land Law (OS 1998) ch 1 at 49. 
20
 Budlender G ‘The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights: Overview and Commentary’ in Budlender 
G, Latsky J & Roux T Juta’s New Land Law (OS 1998) ch 1 at 49-50. 
21
 Budlender G ‘The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights: Overview and Commentary’ in Budlender 
G, Latsky J & Roux T Juta’s New Land Law (OS 1998) ch 1 at 50. 
22
 Budlender G ‘The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights: Overview and Commentary’ in Budlender 
G, Latsky J, Roux T Juta’s New Land Law (OS 1998) ch 1 at 50. 
23
 Budlender G ‘The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights: Overview and Commentary’ in Budlender 
G, Latsky J, Roux T Juta’s New Land Law (OS 1998) ch 1 at 48. 
24
 Eisenberg A ‘Public Purpose and Expropriation: Some Comparative Insights and the South African Bill of 
Rights’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 207-221 at 221. 
25
 Administrator, Transvaal v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd 1990 (4) SA 644 (A). 
26
 Mt Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Power Co v Alabama Interstate Power Co 60 L ed 507 (1916); 
Berman v Parker 348 US 26 (1954); Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984). 
27
 Hamabal Framjee v Secretary of State for India; State of Bihar v Sir Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952 SC 252. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 44 
 
authority that the expropriation of private property and transfer to another private party 
cannot constitute a public purpose’.28 
Chaskalson29 argues that interpreting section 28(3) as a prohibition against land 
reform would run counter to chapter 8 of the Interim Constitution30 and the principles of 
restitution and reconstruction. If a third party transfer for land reform purposes was held to 
be invalid, Chaskalson31 argues, it would also be contrary to foreign law, given that foreign 
courts are generally hesitant to declare an expropriation invalid on the basis that it is not 
for a public purpose.32 
Before the Van Streepen decision, the phrase ‘public purpose’ was interpreted 
either in broad or in narrow terms. It is possible to argue that expropriation for land reform 
purposes would be valid in terms of the broad understanding of the phrase ‘public 
purpose.’ However, Van Streepen - as indicated in Chapter 2 - differentiated between the 
public purpose (the narrow understanding of the public purpose requirement) and the 
public interest (broad understanding of the public purpose requirement). Because the 
Interim Constitution of 1993 only referred to ‘public purpose,’ there was concern that 
expropriation would only be allowed if it satisfied a narrow public purpose, namely 
government purposes. As a result, several authors argued that Van Streepen should not 
be used as authority that expropriation for land reform purposes, which involves 
transferring expropriated land to other private parties, is not for a public purpose. 
The only decision heard in terms of section 28 of the Interim Constitution, Harksen v 
Lane NO33 (Harksen), did not address this issue, since the Constitutional Court held that it 
did not involve an expropriation. Therefore, it did not deal with the public purpose 
requirement, nor did the case involve land reform. In Harksen the constitutionality of 
section 21 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 was attacked on the basis that it conflicted with 
                                            
28
 Eisenberg A ‘Public Purpose and Expropriation: Some Comparative Insights and the South African Bill of 
Rights’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 207-221 at 220. 
29
 Chaskalson M ‘The Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 131-139 at 137. 
30
 Ss 121-123 in ch 8 of the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 made provision for land reform. Chaskalson 
M ‘The Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 131-139 at 137, referring to s 
123(1)(b), states that provision is made for ‘expropriating for the purposes of satisfying individual land claims 
of private individuals and communities.’ 
31
 Chaskalson M ‘The Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 131-139 at 137, 
relying on Berman v Parker 348 US 26 (1954); Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984); 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v De Benedictis 480 US 470 (1987). 
32
 Chaskalson M ‘The Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 131-139 at 137 
emphasises that even the US Supreme Court, which vigorously protects property rights, has upheld 
expropriation for land reform purposes that involves a third party transfer. Chaskalson states that Hawaii 
Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984) is of particular relevance, because it involved the 
expropriation of property for urban land reform. 
33
 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
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section 28 of the Interim Constitution.34 In terms of section 21 of the Insolvency Act the 
assets of a solvent spouse are subject to attachment by the Master of the High Court upon 
the sequestration of the insolvent spouse’s estate. The applicant argued that section 21(1) 
of the Insolvency Act constituted an expropriation of her property without making provision 
for the payment of compensation. Therefore, she argued that section 21(1) was in conflict 
with section 28(3) of the Interim Constitution. For purposes of this judgment, the Court 
accepted that section 21 results in the passing of full ownership in the solvent spouse’s 
property to the trustee of the insolvent estate.35 
After considering the difference between a deprivation and an expropriation the 
Court found that section 21(1) of the Insolvency Act does not constitute an expropriation of 
property.36 According to the Court an expropriation involves the ‘acquisition of rights in 
property by a public authority for a public purpose’, while a deprivation of property falls 
short of such an acquisition.37 Therefore, the Court found it unnecessary to consider 
whether the vesting of the property in the Master was for a public purpose. As a result, it 
remained unclear whether the expropriation of private property for transfer to other private 
parties would constitute a public purpose. 
Therefore, during the period that the Interim Constitution was in force it remained 
uncertain whether the expropriation and transfer of property to third parties in terms of the 
land reform programme would be justified in terms of the public purpose requirement. The 
decision in Van Streepen, where the court stated that an expropriation for the benefit of a 
third party can never be for a public purpose but it can be in the public interest, led to this 
uncertainty. For this reason several authors argued that the Van Streepen decision should 
be read in its specific context and that it cannot be used as authority for prohibiting 
expropriation for land reform purposes, since it would also be contrary to foreign law and 
                                            
34
 The constitutionality of s 21 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 was attacked on the basis that it was in 
conflict with s 28(3) (the expropriation provision) and s 8 (the equality clause), but for purposes of this 
chapter the challenge based on equality is not addressed, even though the case was ultimately decided on 
the equality clause. 
35
 In this regard the Court relied on De Villers NO v Delta Cables (Pty) Ltd 1992 (1) SA 9 (A). 
36
 Although s 21(1) has the effect that the property of the solvent spouse is transferred to the Master or 
trustee of the insolvent spouse’s estate, the Court held that it does not constitute an expropriation since such 
a finding would ignore the purpose of the Act as a whole. The purpose of the Act is not to divest the solvent 
spouse of property without compensation, but to ensure that the insolvent estate is not deprived of property 
to which it is entitled. Furthermore, the transfer of property to the Master or the trustees is not of a permanent 
nature but to determine whether such property is in fact that of the insolvent estate: Harksen v Lane NO 
1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) paras 36-38. See further Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 337. 
37
 To draw this distinction the Court relied on Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 (4) SA 510 
(T) and two decisions of the Zimbabwean Supreme Court, namely Hewlett v Minister of Finance and Another 
1982 (1) SA 490 (ZSC) and Davies v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development 1997 (1) SA 228 
(ZSC). See also Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 336-337. 
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the constitutional principle of restitution.38 Nevertheless, the uncertainty persisted since the 
courts never had an opportunity to decide this matter. 
 
3 3 Section 25 of the 1996 Constitution 
3 3 1 Introduction 
After the promulgation of the Interim Constitution in 1994, the debate concerning the 
desirability of a property clause in the bill of rights came to an end and attention shifted 
towards the ‘content and meaning of the property clause’.39 A differently worded property 
clause, section 25, was included in the 1996 Constitution. The objections that were raised 
against the formulation of the property clause in the case of Ex Parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the South Africa, 199640 
were rejected by the Constitutional Court.41 
Section 25 protects property against arbitrary deprivation (section 25(1)); sets out 
the requirements for a valid expropriation (section 25(2)) and principles regarding the 
calculation of compensation (section 25(3)); and makes provision for land reform (section 
25(5)-(9)). Section 25(4) of the Constitution is an interpretation provision that applies to 
both the protective (section 25(1)-(3)) and land reform (section 25(5)-(9)) provisions.42 It 
has been argued that the courts can give effect to these seemingly contradictory 
provisions by interpreting section 25 purposively.43 
 
3 3 2 Section 25 and ‘Public Purpose or Public Interest’ 
Section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution reads as follows: 
                                            
38
 Budlender G ‘The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights: Overview and Commentary’ in Budlender 
G, Latsky J & Roux T Juta’s New Land Law (OS 1998) ch 1 at 48-50; Eisenberg A ‘Public Purpose and 
Expropriation: Some Comparative Insights and the South African Bill of Rights’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 207-221 at 
220-221; Chaskalson M ‘The Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 131-139 at 
137. 
39
 Van der Walt AJ The Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 3. 
40
 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
41
 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 4-5. 
42
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 16. 
43
 In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 49-50, 
the Constitutional Court stated that s 25 cannot be viewed in isolation, but should be interpreted in the 
context of the whole of s 25, the rest of the Constitution and the historical context. Furthermore, the Court 
stated that ‘[t]he purpose of section 25 has to be seen both as protecting existing private property rights as 
well as serving the public interest … and also as striking a proportionate balance between these two 
functions’. See Du Plessis L ‘Interpretation’ in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) CLoSA Vol II (2
nd
 ed 
OS 2008) ch 32 at 52-56; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 523-524; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 29-31. 
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‘Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application –  
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation…’ 
In terms of this section an expropriation is valid if it takes place pursuant to a law of 
general application, is for a public purpose or in the public interest and if compensation is 
paid. The requirement ‘law of general application’ includes original and delegated 
legislation, rules of the common law,44 and customary law.45 It has been stated that 
internal administrative policy documents will probably not qualify as ‘law of general 
application’.46 Given that all expropriations are effected in terms of legislation,47 the ‘law of 
general application’ requirement seldom gives rise to difficulties.48 
In terms of section 25(2)(b) the amount of compensation can either be agreed upon 
by the concerned parties or decided or approved by a court. Section 25(3) states that the 
                                            
44
 S v Thebus 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) para 65; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 93. Van der Walt 
AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 453, relying on Roux T ‘Property’ in Cheadle MH, Davis DM & 
Haysom NRL South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 429-472 at 458, argues that since 
the power of the state to expropriate property stems exclusively from legislation, the common law will 
probably not be ‘invoked or become the source of controversy in expropriation cases’. 
45
 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 93; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (1999) 334. 
46
 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 93; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 
233. 
47
 In Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and 
Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA), the Supreme 
Court of Appeal left the question open whether a court can effect the expropriation of property. However, in 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Dada NO and Others 2009 (4) SA 463 (SCA), the Supreme Court of 
Appeal reversed the order of the high court (Dada and Others NNO v Unlawful Occupiers of Portion 41 of the 
Farm Rooikop and Another 2009 (2) SA 492 (W)) in which it ordered the municipality to purchase the land 
that the occupiers were occupying unlawfully. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that such an order is too 
technical for a court to make and therefore should be made by the properly authorised administrators. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that courts should not replace the administrator’s decision 
with its own unless it is of the opinion that the administrator’s decision cannot be upheld on rational grounds. 
According to Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 385-386, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Dada NO and Others is correct, since the courts 
do not have the inherent power to effect the expropriation of property. See also Van der Walt AJ 
‘Constitutional Property Law’ 2009 (2) JQR at 2.4; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 49. 
48
 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 542 explain that the Constitutional Court in 
both First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) and Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and Others; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) had no difficulty in finding that the legislation in 
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role to play in s 25 cases’. Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 232-233 adds that law 
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be invalid. See also Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 93; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 565-566. 
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compensation must be just and equitable and lists certain factors that could be considered 
in determining the amount.49 
The public purpose or public interest requirement in section 25(2)(a) of the 
Constitution is considered to be the justification for expropriation, while the payment of 
compensation is merely a result of (and not justification for) a valid expropriation.50 The 
public purpose or public interest must be strong enough to justify an infringement of an 
individual’s constitutionally protected property right. Therefore, the public purpose or public 
interest, which serves as the justification for the compulsory loss of the previous owner’s 
property, needs to be analysed carefully to ensure that the state does not abuse its 
expropriation power. 
It is generally accepted that the function of a public purpose requirement is to 
ensure that the expropriated property is used to the advantage of the public.51 If the 
property is expropriated for the sole purpose of benefitting an individual there is no 
justification for the expropriation and the expropriation is unlawful.52 Therefore, an 
expropriation must be for a public purpose and not a private purpose. An expropriation that 
is for an improper purpose, such as enriching the state or for the primary benefit of a third 
party, will be invalid in any case. 
                                            
49
 For a discussion on the compensation requirement in terms of the 1996 Constitution, see Gildenhuys A 
Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 161-179; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s 
The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 568-578; Du Plessis WJ Compensation for Expropriation under the 
Constitution (LLD thesis Stellenbosch University 2008); Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 
2011) 503-520. 
50
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Energy v Agri SA (CALS Amicus Curiae) (458/11) [2012] ZASCA 93, 31 May 2012 para 18. Van der Merwe 
CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 291 states that the advancement of the public interest is the ratio for 
expropriation. See also Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 458-461. In German law, 
to which the court referred in Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP), the 
property guarantee in art 14 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 1949 is regarded as a 
guarantee of the property itself and not of its equivalent in money: Currie DP The Constitution of the 
Republic of Germany (1994) 291. Similarly, it is accepted in Irish law that the payment of compensation does 
not validate an interference with property rights that is not justified as being for the common good: Hogan G 
& Whyte G (eds) JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4
th
 ed 2003) para 7 7 88; Clinton v An Bord Pleanála and 
Others [2005] IEHC 84. 
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 Murphy J ‘Interpreting the Property Clause in the Constitution Act of 1993’ (1995) 10 SAPL 107-130 at 
125; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 95. See also generally Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land 
Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 1388-1389; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 459-460. 
52
 In Fourie v Minister van Lande en `n Ander 1970 (4) SA 165 (O) at 171 the court stated that the 
expropriator has no authority in terms of the empowering legislation to expropriate property for the sole 
purpose of promoting the private interests of individuals. Furthermore, in Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 
and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 114, the court - after considering the law of expropriation in various 
foreign jurisdictions - concluded that expropriation must serve some ‘greater common good of the public, as 
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Property Clause in the Constitution Act of 1993’ (1995) 10 SAPL 107-130 at 125; Gildenhuys A 
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nd
 ed 2001) 95; Roux T ‘Property’ in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) CLoSA Vol III 
(2
nd
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 ed 2006) 566. 
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According to Van der Walt, the public purpose requirement further ensures that 
‘expropriations are strictly necessary’ and prevents the state from using its power of 
expropriation arbitrarily.53 The public purpose requirement can also be understood as 
having both a limiting and a controlling function. The state’s power of expropriation is 
limited, because it prevents or stops the expropriation of private property for an improper 
or unlawful purpose.54 The public purpose also controls expropriation by the state by 
ensuring that it exercises its expropriation power legitimately.55 
Furthermore, Van der Walt56 argues that the public purpose requirement in section 
25 has a double function. It controls the justification and authority for expropriation, while 
at the same time ensuring that expropriation for land reform is not hindered. Therefore, to 
ensure that this double function is served Van der Walt states that  
‘the public purpose requirement in section 25(2) should be interpreted strictly to ensure that 
the power of expropriation is not abused, but it also has to be interpreted leniently in 
recognition of the fact that much-needed and constitutionally legitimated land reform may, in 
certain reasonably well-defined instances, require expropriation of private property in favour 
of other private beneficiaries’.57 
This does not mean that the courts should be completely deferential to the decisions of the 
state, but courts should not frustrate essential reforms unnecessarily either. An 
expropriation that benefits a private third party may still be for a public purpose or in the 
public interest. However, in those cases the courts should ensure that the property is 
strictly needed for the public purpose in question and not for any other illegitimate purpose 
and that the specific legislation duly authorises the expropriation and, if it is applicable, any 
third party transfer that follows upon the expropriation.58 
The uncertainty that existed during the time that the Interim Constitution was in 
force regarding the expropriation of property involving a third party transfer for land reform 
purposes was overcome by the inclusion in section 25(2) of the additional phrase ‘or in the 
public interest’ and the explanation of that phrase in section 25(4)(a) of the Constitution of 
1996.59 Section 25(4) of the Constitution states that 
                                            
53
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 459. 
54
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 459. 
55
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 459. 
56
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 459-460. 
57
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 460. 
58
 This strict yet lenient approach is also evident in German expropriation law: Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 476-483. See also the discussion on German law in ch 4. 
59
 According to Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
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‘the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring 
about the equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources … and [that] property is 
not limited to land’. 
According to Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert,60 the public interest in section 25(2) is a 
broader category than public purpose. Therefore, transferring land to individuals for land 
reform purposes would be in the public interest even if it is not for a public purpose.61 It 
has also been argued that section 25(4)(a) was specifically included to ensure that 
expropriation in the area of land reform is not invalidated simply because it involves a third 
party transfer.62 
Although section 25(4) of the Constitution indicates that the expropriation of 
property for land reform purposes (which may include the transfer of the expropriated land 
to a third party) is in the public interest, there are certain aspects of the public purpose or 
public interest requirement that still present difficulties of interpretation. These include 
expropriation of property for a public purpose where there is an alternative to expropriation 
that would achieve the same result; the question whether expropriated property should be 
returned to its original owner when the public purpose for which the property is used falls 
away; and the transfer of expropriated property to third parties for economic development 
purposes not involving land reform. 
 
3 3 3 Understanding the Phrase ‘for a Public Purpose or in the Public Interest’ with 
regard to Third Party Transfers 
In Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd63 the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court stated that an expropriation for the benefit of a 
third party cannot be for a public purpose but it can be valid if it is in the public interest. 
Given this distinction between the public purpose or public interest requirement in pre-
1996 law and the inclusion of both phrases in the 1996 Constitution, it is evident that there 
is a difference between these two provisions. The public purpose refers to the narrow 
understanding of the public purpose requirement, while the public interest refers to the 
broad understanding of the public purpose requirement, as this distinction was established 
                                                                                                                                                 
by reformulating the purposes for which property can be expropriated, and secondly by inserting a new 
subsection to ensure that land reform would not be hindered unduly. 
60
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 591-
592. See also Chaskalson M ‘Stumbling towards Section 28: Negotiations over the Protection of Property 
Rights in the Interim Constitution’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 222-240 at 237. 
61
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 592. 
62
 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 462-463. 
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 Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd 1990 (4) SA 644 (A). 
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in early case law. However, although section 25(4) of the Constitution indicates what the 
public interest might include, it remains unclear precisely what would qualify as an 
expropriation in the public interest.64 Furthermore, with regard to third party transfers it 
seems unclear how the notions of public purpose and public interest are to be 
distinguished, since in some instances it seems as if these two notions overlap. 
However, what can be deduced from the discussion above is that the public interest 
is a wider category than public purpose.65 In Van Streepen the court held that the 
expropriation of property for the benefit of a third party cannot be for a public purpose, but 
because the third party’s business enterprise in that case was important for the public as a 
whole it was accepted that it was in the public interest and consequently valid. This was 
also accepted in Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung 
Municipality.66 In this decision the court accepted that the expropriation of property for the 
benefit of a third party cannot be for a public purpose, but ‘it could qualify as a valid act of 
expropriation if it could be brought within the realm of an act performed in the public 
interest.’67 On the basis of these decisions it is arguable that the public purpose is not able 
to justify an expropriation that is undertaken for the benefit of a third party. However, this 
should be distinguished from situations where the expropriated property is transferred to a 
third party to enable the third party to realise a public purpose. In Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 
and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others68 (Offit) the Supreme 
Court of Appeal stated that ‘[t]here is no apparent reason why the identity of the party 
undertaking the relevant development as opposed to the character and purpose of the 
development should determine whether it is undertaken for a public purpose.’ Therefore, in 
cases where the property is transferred to a third party for the fulfilment of a public purpose 
- such as the building of roads or railways - the expropriation and subsequent transfer 
                                            
64
 The phrase ‘public interest’ also appears in various other areas of the of law: Du Plessis LM Re-
Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 167-168; Du Plessis WJ ‘`n Regsteoretiese Ondersoek na die Begrip 
“Openbare Belang”’ (1987) 50 THRHR 290-298 at 290. Although this term seems to be indeterminable, Du 
Plessis WJ ‘`n Regsteoretiese Ondersoek na die Begrip “Openbare Belang”’ (1987) 50 THRHR 290-298 at 
293-294 identifies certain aspects that can be used to determine the public interest. These include state 
security, economic interests, individual interests as collective interest, legal interests, administrative interests 
and strategic interests. At 298 she comes to the conclusion that ‘the public interest’ is a generic term used to 
describe interests worthy of protection that have crystallised over time and that are determined both 
objectively and subjectively to ensure that the proper balance is struck between the interest of the 
community and the interest of the individual who is part of the community. 
65
 See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
592; Chaskalson M ‘Stumbling towards Section 28: Negotiations over the Protection of Property Rights in the 
Interim Constitution’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 222-240 at 237. 
66
 [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 February 2010. 
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 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 
February 2010 para 5 2. 
68
 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA). 
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would be for a public purpose; the mere fact that the property is transferred to a third party 
does not automatically invalidate the expropriation.69 
As a result, certain expropriations that also involve a third party transfer are deemed 
to be for a public purpose. The purpose of the expropriation is for the fulfilment of a public 
purpose and the fact that the purpose is to be realised by a third party does not detract 
from the legitimacy of the expropriation. In this regard the third party may also receive a 
benefit, but because the benefit is merely incidental to the fulfilment of the public purpose it 
is irrelevant. The purpose of the expropriation is not to benefit the third party but to allow 
the third party to fulfil its obligation, usually in terms of a legislative scheme, on behalf of 
the state. In these cases the purpose of the expropriation would qualify as an expropriation 
in terms of the narrow understanding of the public purpose requirement. 
For example, in terms of section 3 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 the Minister 
of Public Works may expropriate immovable property on behalf of a juristic person that is 
incorporated in terms of a law for the fulfilment of a public purpose.70 If the Minister is 
satisfied that the juristic person requires the property for the achievement of that purpose, 
she may expropriate the immovable property if it cannot be acquired on ‘reasonable 
terms’.71 Although the Minister of Public Works expropriates the property, the juristic 
person becomes owner of the property on the date of expropriation.72 
In order to meet its constitutional obligations the state may expropriate property for 
the purposes of building public utilities such as roads, schools, hospitals or schools.73 
Therefore, if the state expropriates property for purposes of these public utilities, the 
justification is not questioned. However, it often occurs that a third party is responsible for 
constructing, providing for, or managing the utilities on behalf of the state. In the event that 
property is expropriated to enable the third party to build the necessary infrastructure it is 
deemed to be for a public purpose, provided that the third party fulfils a public function on 
behalf of the state.74 It is also accepted that the state must rely on private or semi-private 
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companies to aid in the building of infrastructure.75 Therefore, in Offit the Supreme Court of 
Appeal stated that the ‘expropriation of land in order to enable a private developer to 
construct low-cost housing is as much an expropriation for public purposes as it would be 
if the municipality or province had undertaken the task itself ...’76 
Therefore, if the expropriation is for a public purpose the expropriation would be 
valid regardless of the fact that a third party is responsible to fulfil the purpose. However, 
even if the expropriation does not serve a public purpose (as defined narrowly) but 
benefits a third party the expropriation can still be valid if it can be ‘brought within the realm 
of an act performed in the public interest.’77 In other words, it should be evaluated whether 
the expropriation of the property is valid in terms of the broad understanding of the public 
purpose requirement, or in the ‘public interest’ as it was termed in Van Streepen and to 
which section 25(2) of 1996 Constitution refers. 
Land reform is an example where the expropriation of the property for purposes of 
transferring the land to a third party does not serve a narrow public purpose, since the 
property is to be transferred to and used exclusively by the third party post-expropriation. 
In other words, none of the advantages that usually accompany an expropriation for a 
public purpose, such as the building of necessary infrastructure and ensuring the safety of 
the country’s administration, is present. The expropriation of property for transfer to 
another third party resembles a private expropriation that should generally be invalid.78 
However, third party transfers for land reform purposes are explicitly allowed for in the 
1996 Constitution and are, therefore, prima facie justifiable in terms of the public interest 
element of the requirement. This kind of expropriation also forms part of a legislative 
scheme, which is an important consideration when determining the justification for third 
party transfers.79 
However, it should be established when an expropriation moves beyond the point 
where it is no longer even in the public interest to expropriate the property and transfer it to 
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third parties. It is questionable whether such an expropriation is justified without any 
legislative indication authorising the expropriation and third party transfer. This question is 
especially controversial when the property is expropriated and transferred to a private 
party for economic development purposes, such as building a shopping mall or 
establishing an exclusive residential area. The expropriation of property that also involves 
a third party transfer for economic development purposes has been a contested subject in 
foreign jurisdictions.80 This issue is addressed more fully in Chapter 4. 
 
3 4 Other Public Purpose or Public Interest Issues in Case Law 
Apart from third party transfers for economic development, there are also other areas in 
which the public purpose requirement recently received the attention of the courts. In some 
recent decisions the question was not whether the expropriation was for a public purpose 
or in the public interest, but whether the court could invalidate the expropriation on the 
basis that there are arguably less invasive means to achieve the required public purpose.81 
In these cases, either the property owner accepts that the expropriation is for a public 
purpose or the court has already decided that the expropriation is for a public purpose, but 
the plaintiff argues that the expropriation is unlawful (in terms of the public purpose 
requirement) since there is a less drastic option than expropriation available to the state to 
fulfil the (admittedly valid) public purpose. In this case the expropriation is deemed to be 
valid, in other words for a public purpose or in the public interest, and the only question is 
whether the expropriation can be set aside simply because there is an alternative and less 
invasive means to fulfil the public purpose or public interest. 
In Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works,82 the court held that once it 
is established that an expropriation is for a public purpose, the question whether there are 
less intrusive means to fulfil the purpose is irrelevant to the question whether the 
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 For example, in Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) the US Supreme Court upheld the taking of 
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expropriation is for a public purpose. Although it was accepted in pre-constitutional case 
law that the courts will not easily question the decision of the expropriator to expropriate 
property if it is for a public purpose and if the decision was taken in good faith,83 it remains 
unclear whether this pre-constitutional position of the courts is still valid in terms of section 
25(2) of the Constitution if other means were available to the expropriator to fulfil the public 
purpose. 
In Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung 
Municipality84 the applicant argued that the expropriation of his entire parcel of land was 
unlawful since the expropriator only needed a portion of the property to construct the 
necessary road. Therefore, the applicant argued that the expropriation of excess property 
not strictly needed for the public purpose was unlawful. The court dismissed the 
applicant’s claim on the basis that the applicant confused motive with purpose. When an 
expropriation is for a valid public purpose, the motive behind the decision is irrelevant 
when considering whether the expropriator validly exercised its powers.85 The question 
whether the deferential approach, in terms of which the courts apply a mere rationality test 
to the decision of the expropriating authority to expropriate the property and do not 
investigate further whether the public purpose could have been achieved by less intrusive 
means, can still be accepted in post-1996 constitutional property law is discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
Another matter concerning the public purpose requirement that recently received 
the attention of the courts relates to the enduring nature of the public purpose requirement. 
In Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality86 the court had to consider whether it is possible to 
grant an order effecting the re-transfer of property to its original owner if the purpose for 
which the property was originally expropriated is no longer possible. The court held that 
there is no legislative basis on which such an order can be made. Therefore, the court 
refused to order re-transfer of the property to the previous owner simply because the 
purpose for which the property was expropriated failed to materialise or was abandoned. 
Furthermore, the court did not investigate whether the new purpose for which the property 
was in fact to be used was also a valid public purpose, but merely relied on the 
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expropriator’s good faith at the time of the initial expropriation.87 This decision holds 
significant implications for the law of expropriation and particularly for the public purpose 
requirement. If the expropriating authority can expropriate property for a public purpose but 
later changes its use to a purpose that is not a public purpose, the state can easily abuse 
its power of expropriation. This issue is addressed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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 See also Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional Property Law’ 2010 ASSAL at 251-294 at 292; Van der Walt AJ 
& Slade BV ‘Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 
2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)’ 2012 (129) SALJ 219-235 at 225-226. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 57 
 
CHAPTER 4: THIRD PARTY TRANSFERS FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
4 1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3 the ‘public purpose or public interest’ requirement in section 25(2) of the 1996 
Constitution is briefly evaluated in relation to third party transfers. A third party transfer 
occurs when the state expropriates property from one party and transfers it to a different 
party; also known as a private to private transfer.1 It is generally accepted that the state 
may not expropriate property and transfer it to another party solely for the latter’s benefit.2 
However, it is argued that the expropriation of property for transfer to another private party 
to make it possible for the third party to realise a public purpose is justified in terms of the 
public purpose requirement.3 Furthermore, it is possible to expropriate and transfer 
property to another private party even if the expropriation is not for a narrow public 
purpose, provided that it is in the public interest more broadly speaking and is authorised 
in terms of a legislative scheme.4 The classic example of such an expropriation is land 
reform, which for South African law purposes is authorised by the 1996 Constitution5 and 
regulated in terms of legislation. Therefore, land reform is one example of an expropriation 
that is exclusively for a third party’s benefit, but is nevertheless justified in terms of the 
public interest requirement. 
In this chapter it is investigated whether economic development constitutes a public 
interest so as to legitimise both the expropriation and the transfer of the property to 
another third party for purposes of economic development. It is argued that both the 
purpose of the expropriation and the subsequent transfer of the property to a third party for 
the fulfilment of the purpose of the expropriation should be evaluated in cases of this kind. 
Van der Walt argues that 
‘[t]he question whether the public purpose requirement excludes instances where the 
expropriated property is transferred to another private person only comes up once it has 
been established that the transfer is properly authorised by valid legislation that forms part 
                                            
1
 Gray K ‘Recreational Property’ in Bright S (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol VI (2011) 1-38 at 10. 
2
 See Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 1388-1389; Gray K ‘Recreational Property’ in 
Bright S (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol VI (2011) 1-38 at 10. 
3
 See the discussion in ch 3. 
4
 See the discussion in ch 3 at 3 3 3. 
5
 S 25(2) read with s 25(4) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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of a legitimate state programme that serves a legitimate public purpose, such as land 
reform, provision of public housing, or private provision of public utilities’.6 
For this reason the relevant question for purposes of South African law is whether 
expropriating property for economic development purposes satisfies the public interest 
requirement. Furthermore, it is considered whether the public interest excludes the transfer 
of the expropriated property to a third party for economic development. Expropriating 
property for economic development purposes would exclude instances where the 
expropriated property is needed for a government or a public use or for the primary benefit 
of the public. In other words, the property should not be needed by the state (or a third 
party) to construct necessary infrastructure such as roads, administration buildings, 
hospitals and schools. It should not be needed for the primary benefit of the public, such 
as establishing water catchment areas to ensure the sustainability of safe water reserves 
or securing the safety of the State President, either. 
In South African law the courts consider an increase in employment opportunities,7 
increased revenue,8 ‘strategic economic advantages,’9 and development regarding a major 
sporting event10 as constituting economic development that might justify an expropriation. 
Compared to the building of roads or hospitals, increased employment opportunities and 
revenue as well as strategic economic advantages seem to be ill-defined justificatory 
factors since their eventual realisation depends on a prior development or project that 
brings about increased employment and revenue. Once a public road is built the public 
purpose is met and the expropriation of the property is justified. However, since increased 
employment opportunities and revenues depend on the success of a preceding project the 
courts’ focus on the benefits, rather than on the project that will bring about these benefits, 
seems misguided. 
However, as is argued below, once the courts accept that the expropriation of 
property in order to increase employment opportunities and revenue is for a valid public 
purpose, they do not always consider whether the transfer of the property to third parties 
for these purposes is justified. Economic development, made possible by expropriating 
property and transferring it to a third party, is also said to include ‘any situation in which the 
                                            
6
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 465. 
7
 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (5) SA 
661 (SE); 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA). 
8
 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (5) SA 
661 (SE); 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA). 
9
 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 
February 2010 para 5 2. 
10
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state transfers non-blighted property from one private party to another in order to increase 
the number of jobs, the size of the tax base, or the effective utilization of property.’11 Even 
though it seems as if the expropriation and transfer can be justified in terms of the public 
interest requirement since the public will benefit from an increase in jobs, the benefits that 
the public will receive is perceived as incidental to the primary purpose, namely to 
generate profit for a different party at the expense of the loss of property for a different 
owner. Therefore, economic development could include purposes primarily aimed at 
generating profit for a third party. 
In foreign law, the courts approach the purpose for which property can be 
expropriated differently. In certain jurisdictions, such as German law, the purpose for which 
property can be expropriated is evaluated strictly and the expropriation of property to 
realise this purpose must be absolutely necessary. In other jurisdictions, such as the 
United States (US), the courts adopt a deferential attitude towards the decision of the state 
to expropriate property for a public purpose and allow an expropriation that might be 
vaguely beneficial to the public more easily. Furthermore, the transfer of expropriated 
property to third parties is also approached differently in foreign jurisdictions. In some 
jurisdictions it is allowed more easily, while in others stricter scrutiny is applied.12 Since the 
question of the justifiability of an expropriation involving a third party transfer for economic 
development has been answered differently in the foreign jurisdictions, the varying 
approaches in foreign law are described below. This will lead to the subsequent discussion 
of the South African case law where the issue of a third party transfers for economic 
development purposes has surfaced. 
It is argued below that when the purpose is a narrow public purpose, there is 
generally no problem with a third party transfer. In that sense the expropriation is deemed 
to be for a valid public purpose, as defined narrowly, and the third party transfer does not 
retract from the validity of the expropriation. Even if the purpose is not a public purpose as 
defined narrowly, but nevertheless in the public interest, the expropriation and transfer can 
also be justified. Transfer of property to third parties for broader public purposes or in the 
public interest is usually made possible in terms of legislation aimed at a specific purpose, 
such as promoting public health and safety. The transfer of property for narrow public 
purposes and broader public purposes (public interest) is discussed separately below 
before third party transfers for economic development purposes are discussed. 
                                            
11
 Kelly DB ‘The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchase 
and Private Influence’ (2006) 92 Cornell LR 1-65 at 50. 
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 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 491-492. 
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4 2 Transfer of Expropriated Property to Third Parties for Narrow Public 
Purposes 
In Chapter 3 it is argued that in South African law certain expropriations that also involve a 
third party transfer are nevertheless deemed to be for a public purpose. If the purpose of 
the expropriation is a valid public purpose as understood narrowly to refer to a government 
purposes, such as constructing roads or an electricity plant, the private identity of the party 
responsible for realising the purpose is less relevant. Therefore, the purpose can be 
realised either by the state or by third parties. If the purpose is realised by the state, the 
expropriation of property for a public purpose - as defined narrowly - is not subjected to 
rigorous scrutiny. Similarly, if a third party is responsible for fulfilling the public purpose, the 
expropriation and the transfer of the property to the third party is not subjected to strict 
scrutiny, provided the third party is tasked to perform the public function in terms of 
legislation or in terms of a contract with the state. 
It is widely accepted that the state has to rely on private or semi-private parties to 
construct and manage necessary infrastructure. In Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another 
v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others13 (Offit) the Supreme Court of 
Appeal indicated that a third party transfer is justified if the third party is responsible for 
rendering a public function on behalf of the state. The court used the example of the state 
constructing low-cost housing in order to meet its constitutional obligation of providing 
access to adequate housing in terms of section 26(1) of the 1996 Constitution. According 
to the court the ‘expropriation of land in order to enable a private developer to construct 
low-cost housing is as much an expropriation for public purposes as it would be if the 
municipality or province had undertaken the task itself using the same contractors.’14 
Therefore, according to the Supreme Court of Appeal, once the purpose of the 
expropriation is a valid public purpose, the fact that a third party is responsible for the 
realisation of the purpose and that the property is therefore transferred to that party does 
not detract from its validity. 
Furthermore, provision is made in South African law for the expropriation of 
property on behalf of third parties. Section 3 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 authorises 
the Minister of Public Works to expropriate immovable property on behalf of a juristic 
person. The juristic person has to prove that the immovable property is needed for an 
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 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA). 
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objective of public importance, in which case the Minister will expropriate the property. If 
the Minister expropriates property in terms of this section, it is deemed to have been 
expropriated for a public purpose. The juristic person will have to pay all the charges, fees 
and duties as if it had purchased the property itself. On the date of expropriation the juristic 
person will become owner of the property. 
In terms of the Act the juristic person includes educational institutions such as 
universities, colleges and technikons as well as any other juristic person ‘established by or 
under any law for the promotion of any matter of public importance’.15 In the Offit16 
decision, the applicants argued that the Coega Development Corporation is not a juristic 
person for purposes of promoting a matter of public importance. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal stated that it is irrelevant whether the company was incorporated for the specific 
objective of public importance or whether it was a dormant company whose purposes 
changed to include a matter of public importance. According to the court, the industrial 
development that brings about benefits such as increased employment opportunities and 
economic stimulation is a matter of public importance and therefore also for a public 
purpose. Therefore, the expropriation of the property to realise this objective was 
permissible in terms of section 3(2)(h) of the Act. 
In terms of section 3 of the Expropriation Act, the Minister can therefore expropriate 
property on behalf of a juristic person for the achievement of a public objective. The juristic 
person to whom the Act specifically refers is usually, but not limited to, educational 
institutions whose purpose is undoubtedly a public purpose. Furthermore, legislation such 
as the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 sets out certain regulations with regard to the 
management of higher education institutions. Therefore, the expropriation of property for 
purposes of an objective of public importance is lawful, irrespective of whether the property 
is expropriated in favour of a third party. This can also be distinguished from the transfer of 
expropriated property to third parties for economic development purposes in that the 
primary aim of the third parties in terms of section 3 is a matter of public importance, such 
as education, and not to generate profit. 
It is also accepted in foreign jurisdictions that property may be expropriated and 
transferred to third parties for the fulfilment of a narrow public purpose. For instance, in 
German law it is trite that property cannot be expropriated and transferred to a third party 
solely for the third party’s benefit. However, the expropriation and transfer can be valid if 
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the expropriation would allow the third party to fulfil a public function, which should be for a 
narrow public purpose, such as supplying electricity.17 In situations where the third party’s 
business is specifically aimed at the fulfilment of a particular public purpose, the scrutiny 
as to the justifiability of the transfer is not as strict as in situations where the fulfilment of 
the particular public purpose is just one, or an ancillary, function of the third party’s 
business concern. Nevertheless, German courts are strict in evaluating whether the 
legislation authorises the expropriation and transfer of the property and whether the 
purpose of the expropriation and transfer complies with the public good requirement in 
terms of article 14.3 of the German Basic Law.18 
In the United States, the condemnation and transfer of property to a third private 
party was initially regarded as being ‘against all reason and justice’.19 A taking, coupled 
with a transfer to a third party, was therefore regarded as being against the principles of 
social contract and could not be regarded as a legitimate ‘exercise of legislative 
authority’.20 However, it was always regarded as acceptable that a taking and transfer of 
property to third parties could be valid if the third party was regarded as a public agent that 
required the property for a public good.21 To ensure the constitutionality of the taking it was 
assumed that the third party, usually a utility company such as a railway or electricity 
company, held the property in ‘quasi public trust’ to ensure that each citizen equally 
received ‘fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory service.’22 Therefore, it seems probable 
that expropriated property that is transferred to a third party will not be invalidated as long 
as the expropriation facilitates the achievement of a public purpose, as defined narrowly, 
by the third party.23 
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4 3 Transfer of Expropriated Property to Third Parties for Broader Public 
Purposes or in the Public Interest 
4 3 1 Introduction 
Above it was argued that if property is expropriated for a narrow public purpose the fact 
that a third party is responsible for the fulfilment of that purpose and that the property is 
therefore transferred to that party does not detract from the legitimacy of the expropriation. 
However, an expropriation that involves a third party transfer has also been upheld on the 
basis that it is in the public interest.24 This includes cases where the property is not 
expropriated for a public purpose (as defined narrowly) but for a purpose that benefits the 
public in a broader sense. In other words, the property is not expropriated for a 
government purpose and not necessarily for use by the public but for a purpose that is 
nevertheless deemed to be in the public interest. 
An example of an expropriation that involves a third party transfer that is not for a 
narrow public purpose but considered to be in the public interest is the expropriation of 
property for the purposes of slum clearance. In the US various programmes aimed at 
eliminating slum neighbourhoods were set in motion during the Great Depression with the 
purpose of promoting commercial development.25 Some courts were reluctant to allow the 
state to use the power of eminent domain for these purposes, since the projects led to the 
condemned property being transferred or occupied by different private parties.26 However, 
it was argued that the removal of blighted areas, which led to the improvement of public 
health, welfare and safety, falls within the government’s police power.27 As a result, the US 
Supreme Court held in Berman v Parker28 that because the object falls within the authority 
of the legislature, the use of the power of eminent domain to achieve the purpose is 
acceptable.29 
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A different example of a third party transfer where the purpose of the expropriation 
is not a narrow public purpose, but still in the public interest is the expropriation and 
transfer of property to third parties in terms of a land reform programme.30 In this regard, 
the property is usually expropriated and transferred to third parties for the third parties’ 
exclusive use and enjoyment. Therefore, in this sense there is no government or public 
use of the property post-expropriation. Nevertheless, the purpose of land reform is 
deemed to be in the public interest, thus legitimising the transfer of the expropriated 
property to third parties. 
 
4 3 2 Slum Clearance: Berman v Parker 
Berman v Parker31 (Berman) concerned the taking and transfer of property to third parties 
for slum clearance. In Berman, one of the petitioners - an owner of a non-blighted 
department store - objected to the taking of his property in terms of the District of Columbia 
Development Act of 1945. The District of Columbia passed the Act for the purpose of 
erasing slums in a district of Washington DC in order to enhance the health, safety, morals 
and general welfare of citizens residing in the district. Under the redevelopment plan, 
property taken would be used to erect public facilities such as schools, churches and 
parks, which would in turn be sold or leased to other private parties. The development plan 
would also include the construction of low-cost housing. 
The owner argued that his property, although forming part of the area, could not be 
classified as blighted property and should therefore not be condemned. He also argued 
that his property was commercial and not residential in nature; that after the taking the 
property would be managed by a private agency; and that the property would be 
developed for private and not public use. Therefore, he argued that if the property was 
condemned and transferred to other private parties and developed for private use it would 
not be for a public use as required by the Public Use Clause of the Federal Constitution.32 
The Supreme Court deferred to the legislature and stated that if the purpose of the 
condemnation is within the authority of Congress, the state may exercise its power of 
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eminent domain for the achievement of that purpose.33 In this regard the power of eminent 
domain is regarded simply as the means to an end. According to the Court, it can review 
the legislature’s decision as to what is in the public interest, but its ability to do so is 
limited.34 Since the Court agreed that the redevelopment plan has to be considered as an 
integrated whole, it is not open to the courts to decide which property should or should not 
be taken. The Court therefore refrained from interfering in the manner in which the state 
exercised its discretion in terms of the legislation, and given that the petitioners received 
compensation it held that their property rights in terms of the Public Use Clause were not 
violated. 
The Berman35 decision also shows that property can be condemned and transferred 
to private parties to eradicate slums in an attempt to increase the general welfare of the 
area. Furthermore, it illustrates that the literal interpretation of the Public Use Clause has 
been abandoned. Therefore, the Court now accepts that broad-ranging purposes comply 
with the Public Use Clause. The Court is also deferential towards the legislature when 
reviewing the determination of the relevant authority to expropriate for a public purpose. 
This position was clear in Berman v Parker where the Court reasoned as follows: 
‘Subject to certain constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public 
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases, the legislature, not 
the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation.’36 
It has been argued that the Berman decision had two effects on eminent domain law.37 
Firstly, it expanded the public use requirement to include the transfer of condemned 
property to private parties for redevelopment purposes. Secondly, it restricted the ‘scope of 
judicial review.’38 As seen below, the Berman decision served as the basis for the later 
decisions in Midkiff v Hawaii Housing Authority39 and Kelo v City of New London.40 
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4 3 3 Land Reform 
4 3 3 1 South African Law 
Above it was argued that third party transfers for land reform purposes would generally 
satisfy the public interest requirement. The purpose of certain land reform legislation, such 
as the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, is specifically aimed at authorising the 
expropriation of land for land restitution purposes. Section 42E(1) of the Act41 states that 
‘[t]he Minister may purchase, acquire in any other manner or, … expropriate land, a portion 
of land or a right in land’ in respect of a claim that has been lodged in terms of this Act. 
The property expropriated in terms of this Act is to be transferred to the private parties who 
have lodged a claim for restitution in terms of this Act. Therefore, this Act effectively 
authorises the state to expropriate property in order to transfer it to another private party. 
There is explicit authority in section 25(2), read with section 25(4)(a), of the 
Constitution for the expropriation of property for purposes of transferring it to other private 
parties in terms of the land reform programme.42 Section 25(4)(a) states that the public 
interest referred to in section 25(2) ‘includes the nation’s commitment to land reform’. 
Therefore, in South African law there is ‘little doubt that the restitution process, including 
transfer of the property to another private person, is authorized by the Constitution and 
that land may be expropriated for it.’43 The fact that the expropriation and transfer of 
property is legitimised by the Constitution and regulated by statute is therefore an 
important consideration in the determination of whether the transfer of expropriated 
property is justified in land reform cases. To date there have been no challenges against 
the constitutionality of transferring expropriated property to third parties for land reform 
purposes. 
 
4 3 3 2 US Law 
The taking and transfer of expropriated property for land reform purposes has also been 
upheld by the US Supreme Court in Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff44 (Midkiff). Midkiff 
concerned the condemnation of property for the purpose of eradicating an existing land 
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oligopoly on Hawaii whose existence allegedly perpetuated unfavourable social and 
economic problems. This decision followed the Berman v Parker45 decision and was in 
turn used as the basis for condoning the taking of property for economic development 
purposes in Kelo v City of New London.46 In Midkiff the Supreme Court had to consider 
whether the state of Hawaii was prevented from taking, with just compensation, the 
property of the lessors and transferring it to the lessees in order to reduce the oligopoly of 
land ownership in the area. It was estimated that 47% of the land was owned by 72 private 
landowners and this resulted in inflated land prices and deteriorated public welfare and 
tranquillity.47 Previous attempts by the legislature to force the property owners to break up 
their estates and sell off some of their lands had failed. The property owners refused to sell 
their land partly due to the significant tax that accompanied the sale of immovable 
property. Therefore, the legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1976, which 
authorised the Hawaii Housing Authority to expropriate land and sell it to the lessees of the 
land. This Act also reduced the tax that became payable upon the sale of the land. 
Justice O’Connor, who wrote for a unanimous Court, relied on Berman v Parker48 
and stated that the courts have a limited role to play in reviewing the legislature’s decision 
as to what constitutes a public use. The Court confirmed that the mere fact that the 
expropriated land is transferred to a different private party does not necessarily mean that 
the taking is for a private purpose, since the literal interpretation of the public use 
requirement has long since been abandoned. It held that a purely private taking, one that 
is undertaken simply to benefit a third party, would not withstand the public use enquiry, 
but since the purpose of the legislation in this case was for the benefit of the public it 
served a legitimate public purpose.49 Therefore, the Court found that the taking of the 
property was rationally connected to the public purpose of eradicating the oligopoly in 
relation to land ownership, and since it was accompanied by compensation, the taking was 
not prohibited by the Takings Clause. 
 
4 3 3 3 Australian Law 
The compulsory acquisition of property for land reform purposes has been rejected by the 
Australian High Court in Clunies-Ross v The Commonwealth of Australia and Others.50 In 
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this case the compulsory acquisition and transfer of land was not for a specific government 
or public use, but for purposes of breaking down the ‘social and political relationship’51 
between the plaintiff and the inhabitants of the Cocos Islands. It was the respondents’ aim 
to exclude the plaintiff from the Cocos Islands to ensure that he and his family would not 
be able to vote or be able to influence the voting process in conflict with the Island 
inhabitants’ right to self-determination. As a result, the respondent expropriated the 
plaintiff’s land. According to the majority of the Australian High Court the purposes for 
which property can be expropriated is limited to purposes where the land is specifically 
needed to be used for the fulfilment of a specific public purpose, and this will exclude 
expropriating property for land reform.52 Therefore, in terms of Australian law a narrow 
interpretation of the public purpose was adopted.53 However, it has been argued that this 
narrow interpretation of the public purpose requirement cannot be applied to other 
jurisdictions, such as South Africa and the United States, where the public purpose is said 
to justify the expropriation of and transfer of property for purposes of land reform 
purposes.54 
 
4 3 4 Conclusion 
In this section it was argued that the expropriation and transfer of property to third parties 
can be valid in situations where the property is not needed for a narrow public purpose 
such as state or public use or even the provision of public services, but for a purpose that 
serves a wider public interest. In this regard the property is expropriated for neither 
government or public use, nor for allowing a third party to fulfil a public function. Instead, 
the property is expropriated and transferred to a third party for the third party’s own use 
and benefit, but the expropriation and transfer are still deemed to be in the public interest 
because they serve some other valid state goal that is in the public interest. In the slum 
clearance examples the public interest that is served relates to the removal of blighted 
areas with all its concomitant social problems, such as health and safety concerns. In the 
area of land reform the public interest is to allow designated groups the opportunity to 
reclaim property that they originally lost through unfair, discriminatory practices. In both the 
slum clearance and land reform programmes the relevant legislation specifically authorises 
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the expropriation and transfer of property for the relevant purposes, or at least foresees 
that the property will be used by different parties after it has been expropriated. 
In the next section it is considered how foreign jurisdictions evaluate the legitimacy 
of an expropriation and transfer of property for economic development purposes against 
the public purpose requirement. Expropriation of property for purposes of economic 
development is not an expropriation for a narrow public purpose. It is also not apparent 
that the expropriation and transfer of the property for economic development would 
necessarily qualify as an expropriation for a broader public purpose or in the public interest 
in the same sense as the slum clearance or land reform examples discussed above. 
 
4 4 Transfer of Expropriated Property to Third Parties for Economic 
Development in Foreign Jurisdictions 
4 4 1 US Law 
4 4 1 1 Introduction 
In the United States of America, the Fifth Amendment read with the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the 1787 Federal Constitution of the United States embodies the property 
clause.55 This property clause consists of two parts, namely the ‘Due Process Clause’ and 
the ‘Takings Clause’. The Due Process Clause entails that no one may be deprived of 
property without due process of law, while the Takings Clause provides that property shall 
not be taken for public use without just compensation.56 The Takings Clause has two 
requirements that apply to both formal takings and regulatory takings.57 The taking has to 
be for a public use and just compensation must be paid. 
The public use requirement is said to prevent property from being taken for a 
private use.58 In principle, the public use requirement in terms of the Federal Constitution 
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 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 398. 
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 See Singer JW Introduction to Property (2
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 ed 2005) 743. See also Walsh R ‘“The Principles of Social 
Justice” and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for Redevelopment in the United States and 
Ireland’ (2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23 at 1. However, private takings - taking property for the 
benefit of another private party - have been allowed, especially in the so called ‘Mills Acts’. These Acts 
usually allowed upper riparian owners to build dams that sometimes led to the flooding of neighbouring land 
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can be understood in two ways. First, a very literal interpretation would require that the 
property must be used by the public.59 A general example would be where property is 
expropriated in order to build a road.60 The second, broader understanding of the public 
use requirement necessitates the taking to be for a public purpose in a wider sense, 
meaning that a public advantage or public benefit would justify the taking.61 It is accepted 
that the second, broader understanding of the public use requirement currently prevails.62 
In Midkiff v Hawaii Housing Authority63 Justice O’Connor stated as follows: 
‘The [Supreme] Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be 
put into use for the general public.’64 
In terms of this broad or wider understanding of the public use requirement property may 
be taken ‘for future use by the public’65 or taken and transferred to another private party, 
provided the taking still satisfies a public purpose.66 While it has been stated that the 
government is not allowed to take the property of X to give it to Y,67 the US Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 195-234 at 201 states that the ‘Mills Acts gave new meaning to 
“public use” by allowing states to use eminent domain as an economic development tool, even when the 
property taken was not transferred to the public.’ However, opposition towards private takings in terms of the 
Mills Acts increased, since it was felt that the economic benefit used as a justification for the taking was too 
vague. Therefore, many states opted to repeal the Mills Acts. See Waring EJL ‘The Prevalence of Private 
Takings’ in Hopkins N (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol VII (forthcoming 2013) (copy of paper on file 
with the author) 6-8; Waring ELJ Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings (PhD thesis Cambridge 
University 2009) 57-60; Cohen CE ‘Eminent Domain after Kelo v City of New London: An Argument for 
Banning Economic Development Takings’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Policy 491-568 at 501-502. 
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 ed 2005) 743; Berger L ‘The Public Use Requirement in Eminent 
Domain’ (1978) 57 Oregon LR 203-246 at 205; Merrill TW ‘The Economics of Public Use’ (1986) 72 Cornell 
LR 61-116 at 67-68. Rubenfield J ‘Usings’ (1993) 102 Yale LJ 1077-1163 advocates an extreme version of 
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UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 195-234 at 199. 
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Economics of Public Use’ (1986) 72 Cornell LR 61-116 at 67; Schultz D ‘What’s Yours Can be Mine: Are 
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 267 US 229 (1984). 
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 Midkiff v Hawaii Housing Authority 267 US 229 (1984) 244. 
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Development Takings (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Policy 491-568 at 494. 
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usually upholds such takings if they are for a public purpose.68 Furthermore, the Court 
generally defers to the legislature in condemnation cases.69 The decisions discussed 
below not only illustrate the US Court’s lenient approach to the meaning of the public use 
requirement but also its attitude of judicial deference towards the decision of the legislature 
as to what constitutes a public use.70 
 
4 4 1 2 Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit 
The Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit71 (Poletown) decision is not a US 
Supreme Court decision, but it is important since it involved the condemnation of land to 
enable a third party to develop the property economically. The Detroit Economic 
Development Corporation Act 1974 PA 338 was promulgated to provide for the general 
health and safety of the State of Michigan, to alleviate poverty, and to stimulate the 
economies of distressed areas. In terms of the development plan the Detroit Economic 
Development Corporation wished to provide General Motors with sufficient property to 
construct a new assembly plant in an attempt to prevent the company from moving to a 
different city. In terms of the development plan a residential neighbourhood in Detroit and 
several small businesses had to be expropriated and relocated to different areas to make 
the land available to General Motors. Therefore, the question in this case was whether the 
Corporation could condemn property and transfer it to General Motors to construct and 
manage an assembly factory. 
The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the relevant legislation that provided 
for the condemnation of their properties to transfer it to another private party for economic 
development. They argued that the condemnation would be invalid since it served a 
private purpose irrespective of the benefits that may accrue to the public. The court stated 
that a taking for private use by a third party is unconstitutional regardless of the fact that 
certain benefits may accrue to the public. Therefore, the court considered ‘whether the 
proposed condemnation is for the primary benefit of the public or a private user.’72 
The court adopted a deferential attitude and stated that the determination of what 
constitutes a public purpose is mainly determined by the legislature and only reviewable by 
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 See Berman v Parker 348 US 26 (1954); Singer JW Introduction to Property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 743. 
69
 See Merrill TW ‘The Economics of Public Use’ (1986) 72 Cornell LR 61-116 at 63; Goodin AW ‘Rejecting 
the Return to Blight in Post-Kelo State Legislation’ (2007) 82 NYU LR 177-208 at 180. 
70
 In this regard see especially the discussion of Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) below at 4 4 
1 4. See also Goodin AW ‘Rejecting the Return to Blight in Post-Kelo State Legislation’ (2007) 82 NYU LR 
177-208 at 180-182. 
71
 410 Mich 616 (Mich, 1981). 
72
 Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit 410 Mich 616 (Mich, 1981) 632. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 72 
 
the courts if the power of eminent domain was abused or if its effect was arbitrary.73 Since 
the condemnation in this decision was part of a larger legislative regeneration scheme, the 
court was of the opinion that its power to review the condemnation was limited even 
further. The court accepted the evidence presented by the City of Detroit relating to the 
harsh economic situation, which would be alleviated through the development of the 
particular area, and was satisfied that the City was justified in using the power of eminent 
domain to achieve this aim. According to the court the purpose of the taking was to 
alleviate unemployment and to revitalize the local economy and therefore it constituted a 
taking for a public purpose. Since the taking was not primarily for the benefit of the private 
party and the benefits that the private party would receive were, according to the court, 
incidental to the achievement of the purpose, the majority of the court upheld the taking 
and the transfer of the property. 
Justice Fitzgerald wrote a dissenting opinion. He distinguished the taking in this 
decision from the clearing of slums, which had been held to be for a public purpose even 
though the property was transferred to private parties. The clearing of slums is meant to 
benefit public health and welfare and the fact that the taking benefits private parties is 
incidental. However, in the instant case the taking that benefited the third party could not 
be incidental, since the private party needed the property before the purpose of the taking, 
namely alleviating poverty and increasing employment, could be achieved. Therefore, 
Justice Fitzgerald argued that ‘it is the economic benefits of the project that are incidental 
to the private use of the property’74 and not the benefit to the third party. 
Justice Fitzgerald thus disagreed with the majority of the court in their opinion that 
the concept of public use is an evolving one.75 In his view, if increased employment, 
increased tax revenue and general economic stimulation can justify the taking of property 
and the transfer of it to another private party, there is practically no limit on the use of the 
power of eminent domain to assist private business, since all businesses generate some 
public benefit.76 As a result, Justice Fitzgerald argued that the taking was for a private use 
and should be set aside. 
Justice Ryan also wrote a dissenting opinion. After an examination of case law, 
Justice Ryan stated that three indicators have crystallised where the taking of land - with 
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economic development inferences - can be upheld on the public use requirement even 
though the property is transferred to private parties. Firstly, he identified the taking of land 
where it is needed by the private party in order to perform a public function such as 
constructing or maintaining highways and railroads. In this regard Justice Ryan noted that 
the property needed for the construction of railways and highways are for ‘public necessity 
of the extreme sort otherwise impracticable.’77 Therefore, if the power of eminent domain 
was not available to these private parties, the construction of railway lines, which requires 
narrow and ‘generally straight’ parcels of land, would be impossible. 
Secondly, he argued that the retention of public accountability after the property 
was transferred to a private party can justify the transferring of condemned property to 
private parties.78 As an example, Justice Ryan referred to railroad companies, which are 
subject to numerous regulations. These regulations include the guaranteed use of the 
railroad by the public in a fair and equitable manner. In this regard, Gray79 argues that 
corporations responsible for railroad and telegraph systems were regulated in terms of 
statute, since they were committed to serving a public purpose. As a result, the state often 
delegated the power of eminent domain to these corporations to further their objectives 
and in return, these corporations were obliged to ‘serve the public in a fair, reasonable and 
impartial manner’.80 Furthermore, in a previous decision of the Michigan Supreme Court it 
was held that ‘[l]and cannot be taken, under the exercise of the power of eminent domain, 
unless, after it is taken, it will be devoted to the use of the public, independent of the will of 
the corporation taking it’.81 However, a natural consequence of delegating condemnation 
powers to private corporations meant that it could take property for the benefit of the 
corporation and its shareholders. To justify such takings, it was said that the property was 
condemned for the primary benefit of the public, and not exclusively for the benefit of the 
private corporation.82 Therefore, it was accepted that the corporation could only be given 
the power of condemnation in legislation if its primary purpose was to realise a public 
purpose.83 
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Thirdly, Justice Ryan maintained that when property is condemned on behalf of a 
private party, the determination as to whether that specific land is to be condemned is 
made taking into account the interest of the public and not the interest of the private party. 
In this regard it would seem as if the negative effect that the condemnation of the Poletown 
community’s properties would have on the community should carry more weight than the 
potential benefits that would arise as a result of the condemnation. According to Justice 
Ryan the taking in this case did not fall into any of these categories and therefore it should 
be set aside. 
In the Poletown decision, the legislation authorised the Development Corporation to 
condemn property to stimulate the economy. The majority of the court accepted that its 
power to review the decision of the state to expropriate property within an authorising 
scheme is limited and therefore a low level of scrutiny is required. As a result, the 
condemnation of property for the purposes of alleviating unemployment and stimulating 
the economy was held to be a valid public purpose. Regarding the third party transfer the 
majority took the view that since the primary purpose of the condemnation was for the 
benefit of the public and not the third party, the transfer was warranted. According to the 
majority the benefit that the third party would receive was incidental to the benefits to the 
public that arose as a result of the taking. 
According to Justice Fitzgerald this logic is flawed since the benefits that would 
accrue to the third party were not incidental. The third party required the property before 
any of the public benefits would materialise. Justice Ryan emphasised that public 
accountability over the use of the condemned property can indicate that the transfer of the 
condemned property to a third party should be allowed. However, in this case no provision 
was made for public accountability. As a result, Justice Ryan argued that the 
condemnation should be set aside. 
 
4 4 1 3 County of Wayne v Hathcock 
In County of Wayne v Hathcock84 (Hathcock) the Michigan Supreme Court had to consider 
whether the condemnation of the respondent’s property to construct a 1300 hectare 
business park was for a public use. In terms of article 10 of the Michigan Constitution of 
1963 property ‘shall not be taken for public use without just compensation’. The purpose of 
this business park was to stimulate the struggling economy in the area. Based on the 
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previous decision in Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit85 both the Wayne 
Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals allowed the taking. 
However, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the taking and transfer of property 
to private parties are inconsistent with the understanding of the public use requirement in 
the 1963 State Constitution. Justice Young, delivering the opinion of the court, stated that 
the public use requirement prevents takings for a private use. Relying on the three 
indicators formulated by Justice Ryan in the Poletown decision to determine whether a 
taking and transfer of property for economic development should be upheld, Justice Young 
determined whether the taking and transfer of property in this decision was for a public 
use. Firstly, Justice Young held that the establishment of the business park did not depend 
on the use of the specific property earmarked for condemnation. There was therefore no 
public necessity that required that specific property to be condemned. Secondly, the 
business park, which would be operated by private entities, excluded any form of public 
accountability to guarantee that the property would be used for the advancement of the 
public purpose after it had been sold to private parties. Thirdly, the act of condemnation 
did not primarily serve a public benefit; it was only after the property had been put to 
private use that certain public benefits might come into existence. The court concluded 
that the understanding of the public use requirement does not permit the taking of property 
for purposes of erecting a business park owned by a different private party. The court 
referred to slum clearance where the condemnation and transfer of property is for a public 
purpose. However, in that regard the act of condemnation for purposes of slum clearance 
is a public purpose; the purpose to which the property is put after condemnation is 
irrelevant. 
The court effectively overruled the Poletown decision on the basis that the 
acceptance of factors such as alleviating unemployment and stimulating the economy to 
constitute a public use had no basis in the court’s eminent domain jurisprudence. The 
court effectively placed a categoric ban on economic development takings, except if any of 
the three exceptions as indicated by Justice Ryan in Poletown is present.86 As a result, 
property can be condemned and transferred to third parties if it can be justified in terms of 
the public use requirement in the 1963 Michigan Constitution. The circumstances under 
which it can be valid is when the property is strictly needed by the third party to fulfil a 
public function; if there is some sort of public accountability to ensure that the private party 
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perform the task for the benefit of the public; and if the publics’ interest outweighs the 
private interest of the third party. 
 
4 4 1 4 Kelo v City of New London 
In 2005, the US Supreme Court gave judgment in Kelo v City of New London87 (Kelo). Due 
to economic decline in the area state officials identified New London, specifically the area 
of Fort Trumbull, for economic revitalisation. To this end the New London Development 
Corporation (NLDC), a private non-profit entity, set up an integrated development plan for 
the area that was approved by the City of New London. The City approved the 
development plan that included 115 privately owned properties, as well as the construction 
of a shopping mall, a waterfront development with shops and restaurant, a hotel, and office 
and research facilities. The city council gave the NLDC permission to purchase or acquire 
property by using the power of eminent domain in the City’s name. After the property had 
been acquired by the NLDC it would lease the property for a period of 99 years to a private 
developer for an amount of $1 per year. 
The NLDC successfully purchased the majority of the properties it required for its 
purposes. However, nine petitioners - Susette Kelo and others - refused to sell their 
properties. Therefore, the NLDC used the power of eminent domain to condemn their 
properties. The petitioners first approached the New London Superior Court on the basis 
that the taking was a violation of the public use requirement. The Superior Court granted a 
permanent restraining order prohibiting the taking of some of the properties. On appeal, 
the majority of the Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the taking of all the properties. 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court had to decide ‘whether the city’s 
decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfied the “public 
use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment’.88 
Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion for the Court, confirmed that property 
cannot be taken for the purposes of conferring a private benefit on a particular third party. 
Furthermore, he stated that the narrow view, constricting the public use requirement to 
mean actual use by the public, is no longer tenable. Therefore, to satisfy the Fifth 
Amendment it has to be considered whether a taking is for a public purpose. According to 
Justice Stevens, the public purpose has been defined broadly and its interpretation reflects 
the ‘longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field’.89 In this regard 
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he referred to the earlier decisions of Berman v Parker90 and Midkiff v Hawaii Housing 
Authority.91 
According to Justice Stevens the development plan in this case warranted 
deference on the part of the Court. The city implemented the integrated development plan 
to rejuvenate a distressed area by, amongst others, creating new jobs and increasing the 
tax base. To achieve these aims the city endorsed the NLDC to use eminent domain in its 
name to encourage the economic development of the area. Accordingly, the plan served a 
public purpose and the taking of property for these purposes satisfied the public use 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.92 
The petitioners argued that the Court must adopt a ‘bright-line rule that economic 
development does not qualify as a public use’.93 According to Justice Stevens, it is 
impossible to distinguish economic development from other recognized public purposes. 
The court referred to Berman and Midkiff and concluded that it was unwise to distinguish 
the development of the Fort Trumbull area on the basis that it had less of a public 
character than those identified in Berman and Midkiff. Therefore, Justice Stevens held that 
there was no plausible reason to justify the exclusion of economic development from the 
understanding of public purpose. 
The petitioners argued that the use of eminent domain for economic development 
purposes might blur the distinction between public and private takings. Justice Stevens 
dismissed this argument, stating that it often occurs that the achievement of a public 
purpose inevitably results in a private party receiving a benefit. Referring to Berman, 
Justice Stevens stated that it is plausible that a public purpose can be more effectively 
implemented when undertaken by a private party than by a government department.94 
Accordingly, Justice Stevens held that the taking of the petitioner’s land for 
economic development purposes was a public purpose that satisfies the public use 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. He took cognisance of the fact that many states have 
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additional restrictions on the use of the power of eminent domain, such as limiting the 
instances for which private property may be taken. However, in this decision the Court was 
only concerned with the question whether the taking complied with the public use 
requirement in the Fifth Amendment. 
Justice O’Connor - who wrote the opinion in the Midkiff decision - wrote a dissenting 
opinion in Kelo.95 According to Justice O’Connor the majority ruling has the effect that all 
properties are vulnerable to be taken and transferred to another private party if it can be 
put to better use.96 She argued that the acceptance of takings for economic development 
purposes indeed blurs the distinction between public and private takings and effectively 
renders the public use requirement useless.97 Justice O’Connor approved of the Court’s 
deferential stance towards the decision of the legislature whether takings benefit the 
public, but argued that restraint is called for to save the public use requirement from total 
irrelevance. 
Justice O’Connor identified three categories of takings that would comply with the 
public use requirement.98 Firstly, the state may transfer expropriated property to public 
ownership for the construction of roads and hospitals. Secondly, the state may transfer 
expropriated property to private parties who are responsible for providing railroads or other 
public utilities.99 According to Justice O’Connor the first two examples are ‘relatively 
straightforward and uncontroversial.’100 Thirdly, takings have been upheld even if the 
property was earmarked for private use, such as in the Berman and Midkiff decisions. 
However, Justice O’Connor doubted whether an economic development taking is for a 
public use. Justice O’Connor clearly distinguished between the condemnation in the 
Berman and Midkiff cases and the taking in the Kelo decision and found that the taking of 
property for economic development purposes does not constitute a public use.101 In both 
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Berman and Midkiff the circumstances were such that before condemnation the areas 
were rife with social and economic problems. The areas were, therefore, adequately 
described as blighted areas. In the Kelo decision the petitioner’s property was well-
maintained and was not the source of any social harm.102 According to Justice O’Connor, 
the Court’s confirmation of the taking of the petitioner’s property for economic development 
purposes means that the government can take any private property and transfer it to 
another private party for private use as long as the latter uses the property in a manner 
that generates secondary benefits, such as increased tax revenue or more job 
opportunities.103 
Justice O’Connor concluded by referring to Poletown, where Justice Fitzgerald 
stated that no ‘homeowner’s, merchant’s or manufacturer’s property, however productive 
or valuable to its owner, is immune from condemnation for benefit of another private 
interests that will put it to “higher” use.’104 According to Justice O’Connor any property can 
now be taken for the benefit of a private party. The private party that stands to gain will 
almost always surely be those with the power to influence the political process, which 
includes large corporations and development firms. Accordingly, Justice O’Connor 
concluded that the taking of the petitioners’ properties was unconstitutional. 
Justice Thomas agreed with Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion but felt that the 
‘Court’s error runs deeper.’105 Justice Thomas argued that the move away from the literal 
interpretation of the public use requirement as it was originally intended and applied is due 
to two factors. Firstly, the phrase ‘public purpose’ was adopted and applied instead of the 
public use requirement. Secondly, the courts deferred to the legislature to decide what 
would constitute a valid public purpose, as is evident from the Berman and Midkiff 
decisions. 
Justice Thomas made some interesting remarks concerning the Court’s deference 
to the decision of the legislature as to what constitutes a public use in condemnation 
cases. He argued that it is unthinkable to leave it up to the legislature to decide under 
which circumstances the searching of a home would be possible. It is even more 
unthinkable ‘to adopt a searching standard of constitutional review for non-traditional 
                                                                                                                                                 
Development, and Eminent Domain (2008) 1-14 at 12 and the discussion of Justice Thomas’ dissenting 
opinion below. 
102
 Malloy RB & Smith JC ‘Private Property, Community Development, and Eminent Domain’ in Malloy RB 
(ed) Private Property, Community Development, and Eminent Domain (2008) 1-14 at 12 point out that the 
department store in the Berman decision was not a blighted building, nor did it add to the presence of the 
blight. 
103
 Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) 501. 
104
 Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit 410 Mich 616 (Mich, 1981) 645. 
105
 Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) 506. 
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property interests, such as welfare benefits … while deferring to the legislature’s 
determination as to what constitutes a public use when it exercises the power of eminent 
domain, and thereby invades individuals’ traditional rights in real property’.106 Justice 
Thomas came to the conclusion that the Court has always respected the sanctity of the 
home and it is therefore unthinkable that the Court would so easily allow an even more 
intrusive infringement, like taking the petitioners’ homes and demolishing them.107 
Accordingly, Justice Thomas argued that he would prefer to revert to the original meaning 
of the public use clause, which obliged the government to actually use the property or give 
the public a ‘legal right to use the property.’108 
The US Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo generated a fair amount of criticism.109 
However, some authors argue that the Kelo decision was decided correctly.110 Cohen 
agrees that the Kelo decision is correct in terms of judicial precedent but advocates a 
pragmatic solution, namely a complete ban on economic development takings.111 Cohen 
also notes his uneasiness with the absence of any ‘legally binding assurances that the 
                                            
106
 Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) 518. 
107
 Justice Thomas in Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) 518 stated that ‘[t]hough citizens are 
safe from the government in their homes, the homes themselves are not.’ Various authors argue that the 
condemnation of property that is used for residential purposes should be subjected to heightened scrutiny. 
See Gray K ‘Human Property Rights: The Politics of Expropriation’ (2005) 16 Stell LR 398-412 at 407-408; 
Goodin AW ‘Rejecting the Return to Blight in Post-Kelo State Legislation’ (2007) 82 NYU LR 177-208 at 191; 
Fee J ‘Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of the Home’ (2006) 81 Notre Dame LR 783-819 at 799-801. 
108
 Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) 521. In this regard Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ 
(2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 82-83 notes his unease with the Kelo decision, since the 
private developer would hold the expropriated property on exclusionary terms. The developer would, apart 
from not being publicly accountable with regard to the use of the land, also be able to select the ‘tenants, 
occupiers and users of the redeveloped site’. See further Malloy RB & Smith JC ‘Private Property, 
Community Development, and Eminent Domain’ in Malloy RB (ed) Private Property, Community 
Development, and Eminent Domain (2008) 1-14 at 12 and the discussion below at 4 7. 
109
 See Wolf MA ‘Hysteria versus History: Public Use in the Public Eye’ in Malloy RB (ed) Private Property, 
Community Development and Eminent Domain (2008) 15-33 for an overview of the reaction to the Kelo 
decision in the popular media. See also Gray K ‘Human Property Rights: The Politics of Expropriation’ (2005) 
16 Stell LR 398-412; Cohen CE ‘Eminent Domain after Kelo v City of New London: An Argument for Banning 
Economic Development Takings (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Policy 491-568; Gray K ‘There is no 
Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-86; Somin I ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: 
Economic Development Takings after Kelo’ (2007) 15 Supreme Court Economic Review 183-271. 
110
 Bell A & Parchomovsky G ‘The Uselessness of Public Use’ (2006) 106 Col LR 1412-1449 at 1415 argue 
that Kelo was decided correctly and that the criticism against this decision are ‘ill conceived and misguided.’ 
Cohen CE ‘Eminent Domain after Kelo v City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic 
Development Takings’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Policy 491-568 at 496 states the ‘Kelo decision 
was correct as a matter of law … and consistent with American judicial and legislative approaches to the 
public use question … ’. See also Merrill TW ‘Six Myths about Kelo’ (January-February) 20 Probate and 
Property 19-23; Van der Walt AJ ‘Housing Rights and the Intersection between Expropriation and Eviction 
Law’ in Fox-O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA (eds) The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and Dispossession 
(2011) 55-100 at 68-70. 
111
 Cohen CE ‘Eminent Domain after Kelo v City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic 
Development Takings’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Policy 491-568 at 498. Similarly, Somin I 
‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo’ (2007) 15 Supreme Court 
Economic Review 183-271 at 187, 210-223 also advocates for a complete ban on economic development 
takings, but also cautions against the overextensions of the exceptions to this rule. At 210-223, Somin 
argues that alternative measures to a complete ban on economic development takings, such as heightened 
security and increased compensation for property owners, are not effective. 
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projected economic benefits actually will occur’112 in the legislation that permits takings for 
economic development purposes. This adds to the reservations about the sustainability of 
the economic development after the property has been condemned. In this respect the 
concerns are not ill-founded, especially if one considers the fact that the development plan 
that gave rise to the dispute in Kelo has since the condemnation not yet been 
implemented.113 Gray states that he is ‘deeply troubled’114 by the Kelo decision and 
wonders ‘whether there remains any content at all in the concept of property’.115 Therefore, 
it seems unsurprising that many states in the United States of America have promulgated 
legislation that prevents condemning of property for the purposes of economic 
development or increasing the tax base, but allowing condemnation for the redevelopment 
of slums or blighted areas.116 
 
4 4 2 English Law 
4 4 2 1 Introduction 
In English law the compulsory acquisition of land is regulated by statute, particularly the 
Acquisition of Land Act of 1981, the Land Compensation Act of 1961, the Town and 
Country Planning Act of 1990 and the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act of 2004.117 
Therefore, parliament grants the power to compulsorily acquire property to the authorities 
identified in legislation and modern legislation offers authorities ‘a broad range of powers 
                                            
112
 Cohen CE ‘Eminent Domain after Kelo v City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic 
Development Takings’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Policy 491-568 at 545. See also Somin I 
‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo’ (2007) 15 Supreme Court 
Economic Review 183-271 at 192-197. 
113
 Similarly Somin I ‘Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, 
and the Future of Public Use’ 2004 Mich State LR 1005-1039 at 1014, with reference to the condemnation in 
the Poletown decision, indicates that of the 6150 projected employment opportunities only about 3600 have 
materialised. 
114
 Gray K ‘Human Property Rights: The Politics of Expropriation’ (2005) 16 Stell LR 398-412 at 406; Gray K 
‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 82. 
115
 Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 82. See also Gray 
K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 1392. 
116
 See Somin I ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (2009) 93 Minnesota LR 
2100-2178 for a general overview of the federal and state legislation (as well as its effectiveness) that was 
passed after Kelo to prevent economic development takings. Goodin AW ‘Rejecting the Return to Blight in 
Post-Kelo State Legislation’ (2007) 82 NYU LR 177-208 argues against legislation that disallows 
condemnation for economic development purposes but allows it for the redevelopment of slums, since the 
former can have a disproportionate effect on low-income households. See also Cohen CE ‘Eminent Domain 
after Kelo v City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings’ (2006) 29 
Harvard Journal of Law and Policy 491-568 at 558-566; Van der Walt AJ ‘Housing Rights and the 
Intersection between Expropriation and Eviction Law’ in Fox-O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA (eds) The Idea of 
Home in Law: Displacement and Dispossession (2011) 55-100 at 65-66. See further the discussion below at 
4 7. 
117
 See Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 1388. 
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for the compulsory acquisition of land for a variety of purposes’.118 For instance, in terms of 
section 226(1)(a) of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act, as amended by section 99 
of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act of 2004, a specified authority can 
compulsorily acquire land if it ‘facilitate[s] the carrying out of development, redevelopment 
and improvement on or in relation to the land’.119 The courts generally adopt a deferential 
approach towards the decision of the authority to compulsorily acquire property.120 
However, they will not allow a compulsory acquisition if the power is used for an improper 
purpose.121 
In English law compulsory acquisition is regarded as a highly practical subject.122 
Land is usually acquired in terms of a compulsory purchase order (CPO) made by the 
authority authorised to do so in terms of the relevant legislation.123 The CPO then has to 
be confirmed by the relevant government minister, which in the case of land development 
is the Deputy Prime Minister. If there are any objections to the CPO, an Inspector is 
appointed to conduct a public inquiry. After the public inquiry the Inspector makes a 
recommendation to the Minister. Based on this recommendation, the Minister may either 
confirm, reject of amend the CPO.124 If the owner of the land still objects the CPO’s validity 
may also be challenged in court once the notice of confirmation has been published, but 
only on limited grounds. The objection basically boils down to determining whether the 
                                            
118
 Allen T ‘Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative Overview’ in 
Malloy RB (ed) Private Property, Community Development and Eminent Domain (2008) 75-100 at 86. See 
also Waring ELJ Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings (PhD thesis Cambridge University 
2009) 123-124; Waring EJL ‘Private Takings from Across the Pond’ (2010) 
www.law.syr.edu.media/paper/2010/3/private_takings_from_across_the_pond.pdf (accessed 15 March 
2012) 5. 
119
 However, in terms of s 226(1)(A) the acquisition should not proceed if it will promote or improve the 
economic, social or environmental well-being of the area. See Waring EJL ‘The Prevalence of Private 
Takings’ in Hopkins N (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol VII (forthcoming 2013) (copy of paper on file 
with the author) 12-13. See also the discussion of Regina (Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd) v Wolverhampton 
City Council [2010] UKSC 20 below. 
120
 See Waring EJL ‘The Prevalence of Private Takings’ in Hopkins N (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law 
Vol VII (forthcoming 2013) (copy of paper on file with the author) 22. 
121
 Allen T The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (2000) 201. It is accepted that the 
compulsory acquisition of property for the benefit of another private person is impermissible: Gray K & Gray 
SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 1388-1389. 
122
 According to Taggart M ‘Expropriation, Public Purpose and the Constitution’ in Forsyth C & Hare I (eds) 
The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord: Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade QC 
(1998) 91-112 at 91 more attention is paid to the payment of compensation than to the principle of public 
purpose. Similarly, Waring EJL ‘Private Takings from Across the Pond’ (2010) 
www.law.syr.edu.media/paper/2010/3/private_takings_from_across_the_pond.pdf (accessed 15 March2012) 
1 also states that ‘[t]raditionally … [English law] relating to compulsory purchase has centred on procedural 
and compensatory matters; threshold questions about the constitutionality and desirability of taking land has 
rarely been a matter of wide public debate.’ 
123
 See Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 1388. 
124
 See Waring ELJ Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings (PhD thesis Cambridge University 
2009) 116-117. 
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acquisition took place outside the scope of the relevant statutory power.125 Given the 
broad scope of instances for which property can be acquired it is difficult to succeed in 
challenging the compulsory acquisition based on the public interest requirement.126 
Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the power of compulsory acquisition can 
only be exercised in the public interest.127 The 2004 Circular on Compulsory Purchase and 
the Crichel Down Rules states that ‘[a] compulsory purchase order should only be made 
where there is a compelling case in the public interest’.128 Various court decisions129 and 
commentaries130 also illustrate the fact that the public purpose requirement has a role to 
play in compulsory acquisition cases. Gray and Gray131 state that as a result of 
privatisation, compulsory acquisition is no longer solely directed towards the realisation of 
a public purpose that benefits all citizens.132 Given the ‘complacency in English law’133 
regarding this matter it is possible that the power of compulsory purchase may be abused 
to take property from one private party and transfer it to another private party. However, 
with the advent of the Human Rights Act of 1998, which made the European Convention 
                                            
125
 Allen T ‘Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative Overview’ in 
Malloy RB (ed) Private Property, Community Development and Eminent Domain (2008) 75-100 at 86. See 
Ainsdale Investments Ltd v First Secretary of State and Another [2004] EWHC 1010 (Admin) para 22. 
126
 Allen T ‘Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative Overview’ in 
Malloy RB (ed) Private Property, Community Development and Eminent Domain (2008) 75-100 at 86. 
127
 For instance, in Prest v Secretary of State for Wales (1982) 81 LGR 193 at 198, Lord Denning stated that 
property can only be taken against the will of the owner if it is in the public interest and if adequate 
compensation is paid. This was also confirmed by the UK Supreme Court in Regina (Sainsbury’s 
Supermarket Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council [2010] UKSC 20. See also Waring EJL ‘Private Takings 
from Across the Pond’ (2010) 
www.law.syr.edu.media/paper/2010/3/private_takings_from_across_the_pond.pdf (accessed 15 March 
2012) 6-7. 
128
 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Compulsory Purchase and the Crichel Down Rules Circular 06/2004 
(31 October 2004) 6 para 17 (own emphasis). 
129
 For example, in Ainsdale Investments Ltd v First Secretary of State [2004] HLR 956 the defendant 
claimed that the compulsory acquisition was in the wider public interest and should, therefore, be upheld. 
The court confirmed that a compulsory purchase order should only be made if there is a sufficient public 
interest and the authority should ensure that the interest justifies an interference with art 1 of Protocol 1 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 222. 
However, the court accepted that an appropriate balance had been struck between the protection of property 
and the public interest and upheld the compulsory acquisition. See also Alliance Spring Co Ltd v First 
Secretary of State [2005] EWHC 18; Sole v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and Others [2007] 
EWHC 1527; and Lord Walker’s judgment in Regina (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton CC 
[2010] UKSC 20. See further Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 1388-1389. 
130
 As Taggart M ‘Expropriation, Public Purpose and the Constitution’ in Forsyth H & Hare I (eds) The Golden 
Metwand and the Crooked Cord: Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade QC (1998) 91-112 at 
102-103 explains: ‘[P]arliamentary private bill procedures in relation to expropriation powers ensured that a 
public case had to be made out before a Parliamentary Committee justifying the bestowal of those powers 
(often on private companies) in the public interest.’ 
131
 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 1389. See also Gray K ‘Recreational Property’ in 
Bright S (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol VI (2011) 1-38 at 29. 
132
 Therefore, Waring EJL ‘The Prevalence of Private Takings’ in Hopkins N (ed) Modern Studies in Property 
Law Vol VII (forthcoming 2013) (Copy of paper on file with the author) 11 states that ‘[t]oday … private 
takings occur most frequently as part of urban redevelopment and regeneration schemes rather than 
transport and infrastructure projects.’ 
133
 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 1389-1390. 
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for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms134 binding in English Law, 
English courts are urged to apply a proportionality test instead of the more limited 
reasonableness test.135 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention makes it clear that a taking of property may 
only occur if it is in the public interest.136 However, it does not impose severe restrictions 
on the purposes for which property can be acquired.137 This can be attributed to the wide 
margin of appreciation given to the national states to decide whether an acquisition is in 
the public interest.138 Therefore, Allen argues that the European Court of Human Rights 
allows the relevant state to interpret the public interest requirement broadly, making it 
difficult to perceive how a redistribution of property from one private party to another would 
not be in the public interest.139 In James v United Kingdom,140 the European Court of 
Human Rights accepted that the compulsory transfer of property from one private party to 
another may constitute a valid means of promoting the public interest, depending on the 
specific circumstances.141 
The public interest requirement in article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights142 concerning the justification for the compulsory acquisition 
is not the subject of many disputes.143 However, the question whether the compulsory 
                                            
134
 (1950) 213 UNTS 222. 
135
 See Crow S ‘Compulsory Purchase for Economic Development: An International Perspective’ 2007 
Journal of Planning and Environmental Law 1102-1115 at 1106. 
136
 Art 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 222, states that ‘[e]very legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions [and] [n]o one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and 
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.’ The reference 
to deprivation of possession is usually associated with the regulation of property, but it is clear that in this 
context, ‘deprivation’ means the compulsory acquisition of property. In this regard, see Allen T Property and 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 112-113. 
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 See Allen T ‘Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative Overview’ 
in Malloy RB (ed) Private Property, Community Development and Eminent Domain (2008) 75-100 at 76-77. 
138
 See Allen T Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005) 125-126, 131-132. 
139
 Allen T ‘Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative Overview’ in 
Malloy RB (ed) Private Property, Community Development and Eminent Domain (2008) 75-100 at 78. 
140
 [1986] 8 EHRR 123. 
141
 James v United Kingdom [1986] EHRR 123. In this decision the applicant’s secondary argument was that 
the compulsory acquisition of his property did not serve a public purpose, but a private purpose. In this 
decision, the legislation that allowed long lease tenants to buy the property they occupied was challenged. 
The applicant argued that the power to take property is narrower than the power to regulate property, given 
the public interest requirement that is applicable to acquisition of property and the general interest 
requirement that applies to the control of property. The European Court of Human Rights held that in this 
instance there is no fundamental difference between these two concepts. See also Allen T ‘Controls over the 
Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative Overview’ in Malloy RB (ed) Private Property, 
Community Development and Eminent Domain (2008) 75-100 at 79; Waring ELJ Aspects of Property: The 
Impact of Private Takings (PhD thesis Cambridge University 2009) 53. 
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 First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, signed in Paris on 20 March 1952; 213 UNTS 222, ETS 5. 
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 See Allen T ‘Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative Overview’ 
in Malloy RB (ed) Private Property, Community Development and Eminent Domain (2008) 75-100 at 78. 
Waring ELJ Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings (PhD thesis Cambridge University 2009) at 
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acquisition of property for economic development purposes is in the public interest and, 
therefore, justified has recently received attention from the English courts. Furthermore, 
English courts have considered whether the compulsory acquisition and transfer of 
property to third parties for economic development purposes is justified. Therefore, an 
overview of English jurisprudence concerning the questions whether economic 
development is in the public interest, and whether the transfer of the property to third 
parties for purposes of economic development is justified, follows below. 
 
4 4 2 2 Acquisition of Property for Economic Development Purposes 
4 4 2 2 1 Smith v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
In Smith v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry144 (Smith), the London Development 
Agency made a compulsory purchase order in terms of section 20(1) of the Regional 
Development Agencies Act of 1998,145 which caused the compulsory acquisition of the 
claimants’ leases. The claimants were Romani gypsies and Irish travellers who would find 
it difficult to find alternative accommodation to maintain their lifestyle once evicted from the 
property.146 The purpose of the acquisition was to facilitate and secure economic 
development, regenerating the land, and promoting employment in an effort to ensure the 
sustainable development of the area. The land was to be developed for purposes of 
providing facilities for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.147 After a public inquiry 
was held the Inspector recommended that the CPO should be confirmed, but only if the 
displaced persons were given suitable relocation sites. The Secretary of State confirmed 
the CPO without identifying suitable relocation sites on the basis that the need to develop 
the area for the Olympic Games required the whole area to be under the control of the 
state as soon as possible, even if relocation sites were not immediately available. 
The claimants argued that the confirmation of the CPO by the defendant violated 
their rights in terms of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.148 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
49-50 argues that the incorporation of art 1 of Protocol 1 does not provide additional protection given the 
‘breadth of the provision and the deference accorded to State decisions’. 
144
 [2007] EWHC 1013 (Admin). 
145
 S 20(1) of the Regional Development Agencies Act of 1998 authorises a regional development agency to 
acquire land for its purposes or for purposes incidental thereto by agreement or compulsorily. In terms of s 
1(a) of the Act one of the purposes of a Regional Development Agency is the furtherance of ‘economic 
development’. 
146
 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 467. 
147
 Smith v Secretary of States for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 1013 (Admin) para 5. The area was 
specifically targeted because of economic decline due to a high unemployment rate. 
148
 Art 8(1) of the Convention states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence’ and art 8(2) states that there shall be no interference with this right except if it 
is in ‘accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 86 
 
Secretary of State argued that the infringement was justified, since it was in accordance 
with domestic law and necessary for the economic well-being of the country.149 The court 
pointed out that the intrusion on the claimants’ rights must be proportionate in order for it to 
be justified. According to the court, the test for proportionality requires a balancing 
exercise. If the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the public interest it would be 
justified. Furthermore, it is not strictly necessary that the least intrusive measure should be 
adopted.150 The court held that the decision of the defendant to expropriate the properties 
in question was proportionate to its purpose, namely the advancement of economic 
development that would benefit the whole country, even if no alternative site had been 
identified for occupation by the claimants. Therefore, in this instance the violation of the 
claimants’ right in terms of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights was 
justifiable. 
 
4 4 2 2 2 Sole v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
Similarly, in Sole v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry151 (Sole) a compulsory 
purchase order was issued in terms of section 20(1) of the Regional Development 
Agencies Act of 1998 for the purpose of facilitating the necessary development for the 
2012 Olympic Games. The purpose of the acquisition was to construct the Athletes’ Village 
and other sport facilities that would be used by the competing athletes during the Games. 
The applicant did not deny the benefits of developing the area for the stated purposes but 
argued that the interference with his rights in terms of article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights was disproportionate, since the CPO should have been delayed until a 
relocation strategy could be finalised. 
The court held that the Secretary adequately proved that the interference with the 
applicant’s rights was proportionate. The Secretary argued that the loss suffered by the 
applicant was outweighed by the benefits that would arise from hosting the Olympic 
Games, which was ‘in the interest of the economic well-being of the country.’152 Therefore, 
the Secretary - by showing that an appropriate balance had been struck between the 
protection of human rights and the public interest - proved that the interference was 
proportionate and the court rejected the applicant’s case. 
                                                                                                                                                 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
149
 Smith v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 1013 (Admin) para 28. 
150
 Smith v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 1013 (Admin) para 38. 
151
 [2007] EWHC 1527 (Admin). 
152
 Sole v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 1527 (Admin) para 42. See also Gray K 
‘Recreational Property’ in Bright S (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol VI (2011) 1-38 at 21. 
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Both Smith v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry153 and Sole v Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry154 dealt with the compulsory acquisition of land for economic 
development purposes. In neither case was there a post-acquisition third party transfer of 
the property. The compulsory acquisition in both the Smith and the Sole decisions was 
made in terms of section 20(1) of the 1998 Regional Development Agencies Act that, read 
with section 1 of the Act, authorises the Regional Development Agency to compulsorily 
acquire land to further economic development. Therefore, legislation specifically allows for 
the acquisition of property for economic development purposes and, given the courts’ 
limited role to review the decisions of parliament, the compulsory acquisition of property for 
economic development purposes was upheld in both decisions. 
 
4 4 2 3 Transfer of Compulsorily Acquired Property to Third Parties for Economic 
Development Purposes 
4 4 2 3 1 Alliance Spring Co Ltd v The First Secretary of State 
In Alliance Spring Co Ltd and Others v The First Secretary of State155 the local authority 
issued a compulsory purchase order in terms of section 226 of the 1990 Town and 
Country Planning Act. The purpose of the acquisition, which included 134 parcels of land, 
was to secure the acquisition of land for the completion of a development scheme that 
included a new football stadium, a replacement Arsenal Sports and Community Centre, 
refurbished houses, health clubs and community health facilities. In terms of the CPO the 
property was to be transferred to Arsenal Football Club to build a new stadium. The 
property that was not needed by Arsenal for the new stadium was to be sold for purposes 
of housing and commercial development and the profits derived from this sale was to be 
used to fund the construction of the new stadium and the various facilities.156 
After a public inquiry was held the Inspector recommended that the CPO should not 
be confirmed. One of the reasons put forward for this recommendation was that the 
scheme was rooted in Arsenal Football Club’s need for a larger stadium. The Inspector 
stated that the arguments based on the redevelopment scheme (to ensure that the 
compulsory purchase complies with the relevant legislation) were abused to effect ‘a 
privately motivated redevelopment scheme’.157 The Inspector also stated that 
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 [2007] EWHC 1013 (Admin). 
154
 [2007] EWHC 1527 (Admin). 
155
 [2005] EWHC 18 (Admin). 
156
 See Gray K ‘Recreational Property’ in Bright S (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol VI (2011) 1-38 at 
24. 
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‘[o]pportunism in matters concerning regeneration is understandable and not necessarily 
wrong. However, in the absence of objectives that are informed by local needs, there is a 
danger that the benefits of the community will be overly constrained by private interest.’158 
The First Secretary of State rejected the Inspector’s recommendation and confirmed the 
CPO. According to the First Secretary of State the main purpose of the CPO was for the 
implementation of a regeneration scheme. Furthermore, he argued that the regeneration 
scheme was in the public interest and thus authorised in terms of the Town and Country 
Planning Act. The applicants instituted court proceedings on the basis that the real 
purpose of the acquisition was to make it possible for Arsenal Football Club to erect a new 
football stadium and that this purpose could not be included under the ambit of the 
regeneration scheme. Furthermore, the applicants argued that the power of compulsory 
purchase cannot be used to provide Arsenal Football Club with a new stadium on property 
that it could not obtain on the open market. 
The court held that the acquisition constituted an interference with article 1 of 
Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights but that the interference was 
proportionate.159 The court upheld the CPO, thereby also dismissing the claim that the 
acquisition was primarily for the benefit of Arsenal Football Club and stated that many 
regeneration schemes are undertaken by private parties.160 In this decision, the acquisition 
was allowed for in terms of legislation, which provided for very wide discretionary powers. 
What is evident from this decision is that it is irrelevant who performs (and even who 
benefits from) the development or redevelopment, as long as the overall purpose is 
authorised and can be justified in terms of the relevant legislation.161 
 
4 4 2 3 2 Regina (Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council 
In Regina (Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council162 a compulsory 
purchase order was also issued in terms of section 226 of the 1990 Town and Country 
Planning Act. The CPO related to the property owned by Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd at 
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the Raglan Street site. Sainsbury owned or controlled 86% of the Raglan Street site, while 
its competitor - Tesco Stores Ltd - owned the remaining 14%. Both Sainsbury and Tesco 
wanted to develop the Raglan Street site. The development plans included the 
construction of a supermarket, a petrol station, small shops and private flats. 
Sainsbury’s 86% share in the Raglan Street site was compulsorily acquired to allow 
Tesco the opportunity to develop the site. The local authority was persuaded to grant the 
CPO in favour of Tesco since Tesco undertook to develop the Royal Hospital site if it was 
given the opportunity to develop the Raglan Street site. The Royal Hospital site, owned by 
Tesco, was situated about 850 metres from the Raglan Street site and was in a poor, 
dilapidated condition. The local authority had on several occasions been unsuccessful in 
urging Tesco to redevelop the Royal Street site. In an effort to ensure that it would be 
allowed to develop the Raglan Street site, Tesco agreed to also develop the Royal 
Hospital site by means of cross-subsidising. 
Sainsbury, who also submitted plans to develop the Raglan Street site, argued that 
it was illegitimate for the local authority to consider the regeneration of the Royal Hospital 
site when issuing a CPO with respect to the Raglan Street site. From the facts it was clear 
that Tesco would not develop the Royal Hospital site if it could not also develop the Raglan 
Street site.163 The local authority accepted a report which concluded that a CPO in favour 
of Tesco would contribute to the economic, social and environmental well-being of the 
area and that it would be in the public interest. Therefore, the CPO issued in terms of 
section 226(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act in favour of Tesco was confirmed. 
Sainsbury argued that the local authority could not take the promised 
redevelopment of the Royal Hospital site by Tesco into account in considering who should 
redevelop the Raglan Street site.164 Tesco, on the other hand, argued that it was a 
relevant consideration and both the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal found in 
favour of Tesco. 
In the UK Supreme Court, Lord Collins gave the lead majority judgment. Lord 
Collins held that a local authority may take off-site benefits into account, but there must be 
a ‘real rather than fanciful or remote, connection between the off-site benefits and the 
development for which the compulsory acquisition is made’.165 Lord Collins was of the 
opinion that a real connection was not established in this case and held that the local 
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authority was not justified in taking into account the development of the Royal Hospital site 
when it considered the development of the Raglan Street site.166 
Lord Walker agreed with Lord Collins but gave the reasons for his opinion in his 
own words.167 According to Lord Walker, this case concerned the compulsory acquisition 
of land for planning purposes. However, the land would end up in private ownership (not in 
public ownership) and would be used for retail and residential purposes.168 Section 226(4) 
of the Town and Country Planning Act authorises the local authority to make the land 
available to a private party to allow the private party to realise the purposes in terms of 
section 226(1).169 Therefore, Lord Walker accepted that economic regeneration facilitated 
by urban redevelopment is a public good, but argued that private to private acquisitions 
should be dealt with cautiously since it often generates large profits for big businesses.170 
Accordingly, Lord Walker stated that private to private acquisitions constitute a 
serious infringement on an individual’s property interest. As a result, these types of 
acquisitions should be subjected to stricter control. It was for this reason that Lord Walker 
agreed with Lord Collins that a real connection must be established between the off-site 
benefits and the proposed development.171 
 
4 4 3 Irish Law 
4 4 3 1 Introduction 
In Irish law, it is accepted that expropriation of property results in a serious interference 
with property rights and it is therefore the role of the courts to carefully scrutinise the power 
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to expropriate so that the power is not abused.172 Articles 43 and 40.3.2 of the Irish 
Constitution of 1937 constitute the property clause. The right to private property is 
guaranteed in article 43 of the Irish Constitution, while article 40.3.2 states that property 
rights, amongst other personal rights, are protected from unjust attack.173 Expropriation 
may only take place in terms of legislation.174 However, the expropriation of property is 
subject to the provisions of article 43.2 and has to be in the public interest.175 Therefore, 
property is protected from unjust attack by the ‘principles of social justice’176 and ‘the 
exigencies of the common good’.177 
In a series of cases, which Rachael Walsh describes as ‘the Irish development 
cases,’ Irish courts have upheld the expropriation of property for purposes of 
redevelopment and regeneration by private parties.178 Although the Irish courts accept that 
property can only be expropriated for a public good, they are easily satisfied that 
redevelopment and regeneration of land satisfy that requirement.179 
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4 4 3 2 Central Dublin Development Association v The Attorney General 
The Central Dublin Development Association v The Attorney General180 decision is 
regarded as the first modern decision involving the expropriation of property for 
development purposes.181 In terms of section 77 of the Local Government (Planning and 
Development) Act of 1963, a planning authority can expropriate property for the purpose of 
redeveloping obsolete areas. The applicant argued that the legislation that permits the 
expropriation of its property for redevelopment purposes undertaken by a private party is 
unconstitutional. 
In terms of the development scheme the development company would develop the 
expropriated properties and would lease it from the planning authority at a fixed rate.182 
Although the planning authority would retain ownership of the expropriated properties, the 
profits flowing from the development would accrue to both the development company and 
the local authority. The court dismissed the applicant’s case, stating that in certain 
circumstances the best way to redevelop an obsolete area would be through private 
developers and that it would not be unconstitutional, especially when the local authority 
also receives the gains from the development.183 Therefore, Walsh argues that this 
decision indicates that private property may be expropriated for redevelopment purposes 
even if the private party undertaking the development does so for profit.184 
 
4 4 3 3 Crosbie v Custom House Docks Development Authority 
A similar issue arose in Crosbie v Custom House Docks Development Authority185 
(Crosbie). In 1988, the respondent wanted to expropriate the plaintiff’s land in terms of 
section 5 of the Urban Renewal (Amendment) Act of 1987 for purposes of erecting a 
National Sports Centre. To bring about this development the Custom House Dock 
Development Authority was appointed as the development agent on behalf of the Minister 
of Education. Although the applicant resisted the compulsory acquisition on the basis of 
his own development plans relating to the property,186 he later agreed to sell his property 
to the authority. However, the plaintiff - after learning that the project had been abandoned 
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- instituted proceedings to set aside the sale of his property. The property was no longer to 
be used for a public purpose but developed by other private parties for commercial 
purposes.187 
The court rejected the plaintiff’s plea. Relying on section 9 of the Urban Renewal 
Act of 1986 the court held that the land can be used by private parties for economic 
development purposes. Section 9 of the Act authorises the relevant authority to ‘acquire, 
hold and manage land in that Area for its development, redevelopment or renewal either 
by the Authority or by any other person’. Therefore, the court recognised that the 
development of the plaintiff’s land fell within the ambit of the Act since the compulsory 
purchase order did not expressly specify that the property was to be used for the building 
of a National Sport Centre, but merely stated that it was acquired for renewal purposes.188 
Since the property was still to be used for renewal purposes, the court dismissed the case. 
As a result, the court deferred to the expropriating authority to expropriate for purposes of 
urban renewal made possible by private development.189 
 
4 4 3 4 Clinton v An Bord Pleanála 
Clinton v An Bord Pleanála190 concerned a compulsory purchase order to regenerate the 
area of Upper O’Connell Street. The appellant company, the Carlton Partnership, obtained 
the necessary planning permission to develop Upper O’Connell Street, which would have 
fulfilled the Dublin City Council’s regeneration scheme of the area. However, it later 
emerged that the redevelopment by the Carlton Partnership would not take place and the 
local authority issued a compulsory purchase order in respect of the property. The 
appellant claimed that the statutory purpose of development was ‘unacceptably general’; 
for the validity of the compulsory purchase order a specific purpose must be clearly 
established. 
The high court held that compulsory acquisition, which constitutes an interference 
with the property owner’s constitutionally protected property rights, must serve the public 
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good.191 This interference is not justified by the payment of compensation.192 The court 
held that the local authority was entitled, in terms of the legislation, to acquire the property 
for the statutory purpose of ‘development’. According to the court, reliance on a statutory 
purpose is sufficient to justify the compulsory purchase order, even if the property is 
transferred to a private party.193 Therefore, if the acquisition is in the public interest the 
means adopted to realise that public interest is a matter to be decided by the relevant 
authorities.194 
The Supreme Court195 stated that ‘because the property was required for the 
legitimate purpose of regeneration of the O’Connell Street area, the precise nature of the 
specific development was not required to be proved even if it be the case that in some 
other situations it might have to be done.’196 According to the Court the local authority’s 
regeneration purpose in terms of the compulsory purchase order was expressly authorised 
by the national parliament. However, the national parliament could not have envisaged 
how the local authority would realise this purpose. In this instance, the Court accepted that 
the acquisition was for regeneration purposes and the local authority adequately proved 
that it was in the public interest, even if no detailed plans regarding the regeneration were 
in place.197 Therefore, the Supreme Court accepted that since the appellant’s property was 
acquired for the regeneration of O’Connell Street, which was in the public interest, the 
acquisition was justified. 
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4 4 4 German Law 
4 4 4 1 Introduction 
In German law, the expropriation provision is found in article 14.3 of the Basic Law. It 
states that: 
‘Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. It may only be ordered by or 
pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation.’198 
It is accepted in German law that expropriation must be authorised by legislation.199 In this 
regard expropriation can be effected in two ways, namely through statutory expropriation 
or administrative expropriation.200 In the case of statutory expropriation the legislation 
promulgated by the legislature brings about the expropriation automatically and directly, 
while in the case of administrative expropriation the expropriation takes place as a result of 
an administrative act based on powers granted in legislation.201 The former occurs only in 
exceptional cases and is subject to stricter scrutiny.202 Furthermore, the legislation that 
authorises the expropriation must also make provision for compensation.203 
The German courts interpret the public interest requirement strictly, requiring that 
expropriation must be the only possible way of achieving the required result (which must 
be in the public interest) and the expropriation must be strictly necessary to satisfy that 
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need.204 Therefore, the purpose of the expropriation must be in the public interest and it 
must be in the public interest to expropriate the property to realise the purpose. It has been 
argued that although the German approach can be characterised as strict, it is still lenient 
enough to ensure that the courts’ limitation of the state’s power does not unnecessarily 
frustrate social and economic reform.205 Van der Walt states that an expropriation that 
benefits a third party would be constitutional if the expropriation would allow the private 
party to provide a public necessity in the public interest and is not intended to simply 
benefit the third party.206 The examples usually include a third party that is responsible for 
providing public transport or generating electricity.207 However, in these instances the 
courts carefully scrutinise the public purpose and interpret it narrowly.208 Even in instances 
where it is clear that the expropriation serves a justifiable public purpose, the courts will 
still consider whether the legislation properly authorises the expropriation and transfer in 
fulfilment of the stated public purpose.209 
 
4 4 4 2 Dürkheimer Gondelbahn210 
Teufelstein is a popular holiday destination in Germany. Members of the community and 
the local authority incorporated a company to build and manage a cableway that would 
grant easier access to the Teufelstein area. However, the cableway would have to extend 
over several properties. Attempts on the part of the company to purchase the necessary 
servitudes to allow it to traverse the relevant properties failed. Consequently, the company 
applied to the provincial authorities to expropriate the properties or servitudes over them 
which the cableway would traverse, but this request was denied. 
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In terms of the legislation pertaining to the building of public railroads, the local 
authority implemented a development plan necessitating the expropriation of servitudes for 
purposes of erecting the cableway. According to the local authority the cableway would be 
in the public interest since it would contribute to public transport. On this basis the 
provincial authority gave permission to expropriate the necessary servitudes over the 
properties to enable the company to construct the cableway. 
The majority of the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed that an expropriation 
must be for a public purpose and must be authorised by legislation. The legislation should 
also grant the power to the expropriating authority to expropriate property for the specific 
purpose. Furthermore, the Court accepted that the payment of compensation does not 
justify an infringement of the right to property. It held that the local authority was not 
authorised to expropriate the property in terms of the relevant legislation for the stated 
purpose. Therefore, the majority of the Court invalidated the expropriation, not on the basis 
that it is not for a public purpose but because of the absence of a legislative basis that 
allows the local authority to expropriate the specific property for the specific purpose for 
which it was to be used. 
Böhmer J wrote a separate concurring judgment in which he explained this finding 
on the basis of the public purpose requirement.211 According to Böhmer J, the public 
purpose requirement is the central feature of expropriation since it justifies the 
expropriation. Therefore, a sufficient public purpose must be established before the 
expropriation would be constitutional. A public action that serves a public interest or that 
benefits the public is not necessarily enough to satisfy the public interest requirement in 
article 14.3 of the Basic Law.212 Therefore, not everything that benefits the public is in the 
public interest as required by article 14.3. According to Böhmer J, the expropriation of the 
property in this case was unconstitutional because it was not in the public interest to create 
easy access to the Teufelstein area, even though it would benefit the public. Furthermore, 
the expropriation was undertaken for the benefit of a third party that was not rendering a 
public service on behalf of the state. 
Böhmer J acknowledged that in certain instances the expropriation of property for 
the benefit of a third party can be justified in terms of article 14.3 of the Basic Law. The 
expropriation of property to allow a third party to fulfil its duty would be legitimate if the 
third party fulfils a public function, such as supplying electricity or building roads.213 
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Therefore, property can be expropriated and made available to a third party, but the third 
party should require the property to fulfil the public purpose and the legislation should 
specifically authorise the expropriation for that purpose. 
 
4 4 4 3 Boxberg 
In the Boxberg214 decision the local authority expropriated several properties in terms of 
federal planning legislation. It was the aim of the local authority to consolidate the 
expropriated properties and transfer it to another private party, Daimler Benz AG, for 
economic development purposes. The towns of Boxberg and Assamstadt had a high 
unemployment rate and a suffering economy. It was argued that the development of a 
testing ground by Daimler Benz AG in the area would be in the public interest because it 
would create employment opportunities and stimulate the economy and that expropriation 
of land for that purpose would therefore comply with article 14.3 of the Basic Law. The 
affected property owners argued that the expropriation would be in conflict with article 14.3 
of the Basic Law. Referring to Gondelbahn215 they argued that the legislation that 
authorises the expropriation, in this case the federal planning legislation, does not 
authorise the expropriation of property for economic development purposes. Furthermore, 
they argued that expropriation powers cannot be used in favour of a third party. 
The Federal Constitutional Court held that the expropriation was invalid due to a 
lack of statutory authority. It found that the legislation did not authorise the expropriation 
for the specific purpose for which it was used in this case and that the expropriation was 
therefore inadmissible.216 Since the planning legislation only permits expropriation for 
planning purposes, the court held that the authority to expropriate was limited to planning 
purposes and did not justify expropriation for other purposes. 
The Court acknowledged that an expropriation that also benefits a third party may 
be valid if the third party performs a public function that is in the public interest, but even 
then the expropriation must be authorised by legislation and strictly necessary for the 
fulfilment of the public purpose.217 According to the Court, if the expropriation is authorised 
by legislation and satisfies the public purpose requirement, the identity of the party to 
realise the public purpose is less relevant; it can be the state or a private party. However, 
even in such an event strict control should be exercised over the legitimacy of the purpose 
and the exercise of the expropriation in terms of the legislation to ensure that the purpose 
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of the expropriation is realised. Furthermore, if the primary objective of the third party’s 
enterprise does not involve providing a public utility, legislation should provide stricter 
conditions for the validity of the expropriation, and the courts will scrutinise the 
expropriation more strictly compared to instances where the main objective of the third 
party’s business is the provision of a specific public necessity.218 
 
4 5 Evaluation of Foreign Law Overview regarding Third Party Transfers 
for Economic Development Purposes 
Regardless of the different terminology that is used in foreign jurisdictions with regard to 
the justificatory requirement for an expropriation, the foreign case law discussed above 
indicates that an expropriation must be for a public purpose.219 In the previous section it 
was considered how the foreign courts deal with the issue of third party transfers for 
economic development purposes. It is said that an expropriation involving a third party 
transfer for purposes of economic development is the most contentious issue of third party 
transfers.220 The public reaction to the US Supreme Court decision in Kelo v City of New 
London221 adequately illustrates that.  
It is clear in all the jurisdictions discussed above that the courts require some sort of 
legislative basis that authorises the expropriation. However, the level of scrutiny applied 
towards the purposes for which the legislature may grant condemnation powers and the 
deference towards the decision of the expropriating authority to expropriate property for 
the purposes laid down in legislation, differs. Regarding third party transfers for economic 
development purposes, the discussion shows that foreign courts do not always distinguish 
between an expropriation for purposes of economic development and the transfer of 
expropriated property to third parties for economic development purposes. In certain 
jurisdictions it is accepted that once the legislation authorises the expropriation of property 
for development or redevelopment purposes the courts easily find that the expropriation is 
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for a valid public purpose and does not even question the third party transfer for achieving 
the public purpose, even if the legislation does not provide for it. 
The legislation that authorised the taking in the US decision of Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit222 specifically authorised the condemnation for 
purposes of redeveloping an economically distressed area. Evaluating whether the 
benefits of the condemnation, namely the increased employment opportunities and 
alleviation of the harsh economic conditions, constitute a public purpose the court stated 
that it should be deferent towards the decision of the legislature to condemn private 
property. Furthermore, the court stated that in the event that the condemnation forms part 
of a larger regeneration plan, additional deference is called for. As a result, the court 
upheld the taking on the basis that it complies with the public use requirement. Similarly, in 
Kelo v City of New London223 the purpose of the condemnation was to revitalize a 
struggling local economy. The majority of the US Supreme Court accepted that the 
development plan, which would create jobs and increase the tax base, constitutes a valid 
public purpose. The Court also stated that deference is called for towards the decision of 
the legislature to condemn properties. As a result, the Court upheld the taking for purposes 
of economic development. 
Given this deferential attitude towards the legislature’s decision regarding purposes 
for which the property can be condemned in terms of legislation, the US courts are also 
deferent as to how this purpose is realised. If the purpose is a valid public purpose, the 
manner in which the purpose is realised is not easily questioned by the courts since the 
state’s power of eminent domain is regarded merely as a means to an end. Therefore, the 
courts do not seriously consider whether the legislation itself enables or at least foresees 
that a third party may be in a better position to realise a public purpose. Once the court 
decides that the purpose of the condemnation is a valid public purpose, the decision of the 
authority to condemn the property and transfer it to another private party is not evaluated 
strictly. 
To the contrary, in the County of Wayne v Hathcock224 decision the court evaluated 
more strictly whether the taking and the transfer of the property to a third party complies 
with the public use requirement in the 1963 Michigan State Constitution. Relying on the 
dissent of Justice Ryan in the Poletown decision the court in Hathcock evaluated whether 
the taking and transfer of property for economic development, namely building a business 
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park, was justifiable. Accordingly, the court would not allow a taking and transfer of 
property unless the property is needed by the third party to fulfil a public function such as 
building a railway line; or if there is some sort of public accountability that ensures that the 
anticipated benefits materialise; or if the benefits that the use of the specific property will 
outweigh the private interest of the property owner. 
In her dissenting opinion in Kelo, Justice O’Connor also attempted to limit the 
purposes for which property can be condemned. According to Justice O’Connor, there are 
three categories of takings that comply with the public use requirement in the Federal 
Constitution. Firstly, if property is condemned and transferred to public ownership for the 
building of roads or similar public facilities the taking is justified. Secondly, if the 
condemned property is transferred to a third party for the building of roads or other public 
utilities, both the taking and the transfer are justified. In cases where the condemned 
property is transferred to third parties for private use, the condemnation and transfer may 
also be justifiable. However, in Berman v Parker225 and Midkiff v Hawaii Housing 
Authority,226 where the US Supreme Court upheld such takings, the public purpose that 
was served was the elimination of harm to society. Therefore, since the condemnation 
directly led to the achievement of a public purpose, the fact that the property was turned 
over to third parties warranted deference on the part of the Court.227 However, in Kelo the 
purpose of the condemnation was not eliminating any form of social harm but for purposes 
that would directly benefit a private party. As a result, Justice O’Connor argued that stricter 
scrutiny was called for, since leaving it up to the legislature to impose restrictions on 
economic development takings would be an abdication of the Court’s responsibility.228  
Similarly, Justice Thomas, who also wrote a dissenting opinion in Kelo argued for a 
restricted interpretation of the public use clause to include only matters where the public 
has access to use the condemned property or if the public has a legal right to use the 
property post-condemnation. Furthermore, Justice Thomas stated that the Court should be 
less deferent to the decision of the legislature as to what constitutes a public use. As a 
result, the Kelo minority argued that stricter scrutiny should be applied when they 
evaluated the purposes for which property can be condemned. 
In English law, the purpose of the compulsory acquisition is also determined by 
parliament as contained in the authorising legislation. Due to the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy, the courts’ power to review legislation is severely limited. In the English 
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decisions of Smith v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry229 and Sole v Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry,230 the legislation - section 20(1) of the Regional Development 
Agencies Act of 1998231 - specifically allowed for the compulsory acquisition of property to 
stimulate economic development. In Smith and Sole, the courts held that the purpose of 
sustained economic development of the area was important enough to justify the 
compulsory acquisition of the claimants’ properties even if it meant that the plaintiffs would 
not be given alternative sites to use for residential purposes. In this regard the courts 
applied a low level of scrutiny. The courts accepted that when the interference with the 
claimants’ rights is proportionate to the purpose, the interference is justified. 
In Alliance Spring Co Ltd and Others v First Secretary of State232 (Alliance Spring) 
and Regina (Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council233 (Sainsbury’s 
Supermarket) the plaintiffs’ properties were compulsorily acquired and transferred to third 
parties to ensure the development of the relevant areas in terms of section 226 of the 1990 
Town and Country Planning Act. Section 226(4) of the Act specifically legitimises the 
transfer of the acquired property to a third party to fulfil the purposes of the Act. In Alliance 
Spring the property was to be used by Arsenal Football Club to erect a larger stadium. In 
this decision the court held that the development by Arsenal Football Club formed part of a 
regeneration scheme and was authorised in terms of the legislation. As a result, the court 
held that the acquisition and transfer of the property to realise the regeneration of the area 
was justified in terms of the Act, and the fact that the property was transferred to a third 
party was irrelevant since many regeneration schemes are undertaken by private parties. 
This decision indicates that where a compulsory purchase order is made in terms of 
legislation and effected in terms of a larger regeneration scheme, the transfer of the 
acquired property is not subjected to rigorous scrutiny. 
In the Sainsbury’s Supermarket decision the compulsorily acquired property was to 
be used by a different company to erect a supermarket and other smaller shops. The 
majority of the Court held that there was no real connection between the off-site benefits 
that the city took into account when it decided to grant the CPO and the development for 
which the compulsory acquisition was made. As a result, the majority of the Court held that 
the need for making the compulsory acquisition order was not proved. Lord Walker, who 
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wrote a separate concurring judgment, stated that section 226 of the Town and Country 
Planning Act allows the relevant authority to acquire property for planning purposes and 
permits the transfer of the property to a third party for these purposes. Lord Walker 
therefore accepted that the economic regeneration facilitated by urban redevelopment is 
for a public purpose. However, in view of the courts’ deferential approach towards the 
decision of the relevant authority to compulsorily acquire property in terms of legislation, 
Lord Walker argued that stricter scrutiny should be applied in cases where property is 
compulsorily acquired and transferred to third parties, even if the purpose of the 
acquisition is authorised by legislation and for a public purpose. Therefore, Lord Walker 
accepted that legislation can in principle authorise the compulsory acquisition and transfer 
of property to different third parties, but that the courts should carefully scrutinise the 
ultimate purpose for which the property is acquired. 
Although a deferent attitude is evident in the Smith, Sole and Alliance Spring 
decisions the judgment of Lord Walker in the Sainsbury’s Supermarket decision calls for 
stricter scrutiny when property is compulsorily acquired and transferred to third parties for 
economic regeneration,234 suggesting that the English courts might be moving away from 
the earlier apparently completely deferential approach towards a slightly more controlled 
approach. Lord Walker argued that even if economic development is for the public good, 
‘private to private’ acquisitions generally produce profits for private companies and should 
therefore be regarded as a sensitive matter.235 As a result, the compulsory acquisition in 
these circumstances constitutes a serious invasion of an owner’s property rights that 
should be evaluated strictly.236 
Irish courts initially indicated that they would apply heightened scrutiny in the 
context of compulsory acquisition, since they accept that property can only be compulsorily 
acquired for a public good.237 However, the Irish decisions discussed above indicate that 
the courts are willing to accept broad development purposes such as ‘regeneration’ and 
‘development’ as valid reasons for an acquisition, even if the development is carried out by 
                                            
234
 Waring EJL ‘The Prevalence of Private Takings’ in Hopkins N (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol 
VII (forthcoming 2013) (copy of paper on file with the author) 15. 
235
 Regina (Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council [2010] UKSC 20 at 81. See also 
Waring EJL ‘The Prevalence of Private Takings’ in Hopkins N (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol VII 
(forthcoming 2013) (copy of paper on file with the author) 15. 
236
 However, Waring EJL ‘The Prevalence of Private Takings’ in Hopkins N (ed) Modern Studies in Property 
Law Vol VII (forthcoming 2013) (copy of paper on file with the author) 23 suggest that it is difficult to see how 
a stricter approach would work. See 4 7 below. 
237
 Walsh R Private Property Rights in the Irish Constitution (PhD thesis Trinity College Dublin 2011) 238-
242. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 104 
 
or benefits private parties.238 Therefore, Walsh argues that Irish courts accept that broad 
public purposes, such as regeneration and development, are sufficient to justify the 
compulsory acquisition of private property, which means that the heightened scrutiny to 
which the courts initially referred to has lost most of its value.239 
Legislation such as the Urban Renewal (Amendment) Act of 1987 allows the 
compulsory acquisition of property for regeneration purposes carried out by the state or 
another private party. In Central Dublin Development Association v The Attorney 
General240 the court upheld the acquisition of the plaintiff’s land for purposes of 
redeveloping obsolete areas, even though a private party was developing the land for 
profit.241 This decision was reinforced in Crosbie v Custom House Docks Development 
Authority242 where the court held that it is irrelevant whether the private party benefits from 
the acquisition of the plaintiff’s land.243 In Crosbie, the legislation that permitted the 
acquisition of property for development purposes was held to be valid, even if a third party 
is tasked to develop the property (in this case by building a sports centre). In Clinton v An 
Bord Pleanála and Others244 the court relied on the statutory purpose of development to 
justify the compulsory purchase order even when the property was transferred to a private 
party.245 
Accordingly, the Irish courts accept that broad purposes such as redevelopment or 
regeneration - as permitted by legislation - are in the public interest and that the means 
adopted to realise the specific public interest is a matter to be decided by the relevant 
authorities.246 As a result, the courts do not seem to pay much attention to the fact that the 
property is transferred to a third party especially if the legislation, such as the Urban 
Renewal (Amendment) Act of 1987, foresees it. Therefore, Irish courts are deferent 
towards the decision of the authority to compulsorily acquire property in terms of the 
purposes laid down in the legislation. However, it is questionable whether the factors of 
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‘regeneration’ and ‘redevelopment’ can include purposes such as economic development, 
where the primary purpose is to benefit the third party and the benefits that may accrue to 
the public is merely incidental.247 
In German law, the public purpose requirement is interpreted strictly in terms of the 
authorising legislation. The legislation must specifically authorise the expropriation of 
property for a specific public purpose and the courts can test it against the constitutional 
requirement since it cannot be amended by legislation or administrative decisions.248 The 
purpose of the expropriation is evaluated in every case and the expropriation for the public 
purpose must be absolutely necessary to justify the infringement with an individual owner’s 
property rights.249 
In Dürkheimer Gondelbahn250 the Federal Constitutional Court held that the 
expropriation of the plaintiff’s land was invalid, since the legislation did not authorise the 
expropriation for the specific purpose for which it was used. Similarly, in Boxberg251 the 
legislation did not authorise the expropriation of property for economic development 
purposes, but only for planning purposes. As a result, the Court in Boxberg invalidated the 
expropriation for lack of statutory authority to expropriate the property for economic 
development purposes. These decisions show that the purpose of the expropriation must 
be clearly authorised in the authorising legislation. It is therefore possible that legislation 
can provide for the expropriation of property for economic development purposes, but the 
courts will still strictly evaluate whether the purpose of economic development is in the 
public interest and whether the expropriation of property to realise this purpose is strictly 
necessary. 
Given the strict approach towards the expropriation of property for a public good, an 
expropriation that benefits a third party is generally not allowed. However, this does not 
mean that an expropriation that benefits a third party will automatically be invalid, but only 
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that it will be subjected to strict scrutiny.252 Therefore, if the expropriation involves a third 
party transfer stricter scrutiny is applied as to the purpose of the expropriation, the 
authorising legislation, as well as the nature of the third party’s business enterprise.253 In 
this sense the expropriation must be primarily for a public purpose and that public purpose 
must necessitate the expropriation of the particular property and its transfer to the third 
party to realise the purpose. The expropriation should not be predominantly for the benefit 
of the third party, since that would invalidate the expropriation. The legislation in question 
must also clearly authorise the expropriation and the purpose for which the property is to 
be used. Furthermore, it is argued that the nature of the business will play an important 
role in the justification for the expropriation. If the third party’s primary business is not 
related to the fulfilment of the purpose, the courts will scrutinise the purpose of the 
expropriation as well as the authorising legislation more strictly. 
As a result, the German courts will firstly consider whether the purpose of the 
expropriation is authorised in terms of legislation and whether the purpose, as laid down in 
legislation, is for a public good as required by article 14 of the Basic Law. If the 
expropriation is not authorised the expropriation would be invalid. Similarly, if the purpose 
of the expropriation is not for a public good, the expropriation will also be invalid. When the 
expropriation involves a third party transfer, it is also considered whether the transfer of 
the property to a third party is necessary so that the third party can perform a function that 
is for a public good. Furthermore, the legislation should also specifically authorise the 
expropriation for the fulfilment of that particular public good. 
Based on the overview of foreign law it is possible to argue that the purpose of 
expropriating property for economic development or redevelopment of a specific area must 
be authorised in terms of legislation. In the US, English and Irish decisions discussed 
above the economic development or redevelopment was specifically mandated in terms of 
the authorising legislation. The manner in which the legislation is judged against the 
constitutional requirement of public purpose, public use or public good differs from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the US, the courts accept that when the legislature decides 
that a particular purpose is for a public use, the courts’ role in testing and possibly setting 
aside the condemnation is severely limited. Therefore, condemnation of property for 
purposes of economic development is allowed more easily. In the English tradition, where 
the decision on the legitimacy of the compulsory acquisition is taken in parliament, the 
purpose of the expropriation was not traditionally tested by the courts in terms of 
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constitutional review, but rather in terms of administrative review and the interpretation of 
the particular legislation.254 Even though the European Convention on Human Rights also 
applies to the law of the United Kingdom, it is argued that the ‘English tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty and administrative review nevertheless largely preclude strict 
judicial review of expropriation decisions on the basis of the public purpose 
requirement.’255 Therefore, the courts still easily defer to the purposes for which a local 
authority may compulsorily acquire property. However, recent case law suggests that 
stricter scrutiny may be in order if the property is transferred to a third private party for 
economic development. In Irish law there is also specific legislation that authorises the 
compulsory acquisition of property for economic development or for the redevelopment of 
a particular area. Irish courts easily accept that the regeneration and redevelopment of an 
area are for a public purpose and therefore do not strictly scrutinise these purposes 
against the Irish Constitution of 1937. When Irish courts accept that the purposes of 
regeneration, as authorised in terms of legislation, is lawful they do not seriously question 
the means adopted to achieve the purposes. In this regard they accept that the parliament 
could not have envisaged how the regeneration was to be implemented.256 Therefore, it is 
arguable that the courts defer to the expropriating authority when it decides to expropriate 
property for the purposes laid down in legislation. 
In German law, the expropriation of property for economic development is invalid if 
there is no authority to expropriate for that specific purpose in terms of legislation. In the 
German decisions discussed above the legislation did not authorise the expropriation of 
property for the specific purpose for which it was expropriated and the Court held that the 
expropriation was invalid. As a result, the legislation must state explicitly that the property 
is expropriated for economic development and this purpose would still be judged strictly 
against the constitutional requirements. 
With regard to the transfer of expropriated property to third parties for economic 
development purposes, foreign law indicates two opposing views. In US, English and Irish 
law, the courts do not always consider seriously whether the transfer of property to a third 
party is legitimate once they have decided that the purpose of the expropriation is lawful 
and for a public purpose. To the contrary, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
indicated that apart from the purpose of the expropriation that must be specifically 
                                            
254
 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 466. 
255
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 466. 
256
 See Clinton v An Bord Pleanála and Others [2007] IESC 19; Walsh R ‘“The Principles of Social Justice” 
and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for Redevelopment in the United States and Ireland’ 
(2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23 at 10. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 108 
 
authorised in terms of the authorising legislation, the transfer of the property to a third 
party to realise the purpose must also be authorised in terms of the legislation. Therefore, 
both the purpose and the transfer of the property to realise this purpose must be clearly 
authorised in terms of legislation and both the expropriation and the transfer of the 
property to realise the purpose are judged strictly against the public purpose requirement 
in article 14 of the German Basic Law. 
 
4 6 Transfer of Expropriated Property to Third Parties for Economic 
Development in South African Law 
4 6 1 Introduction 
South African courts have recently considered whether the transfer of property to a third 
party generally is for a public purpose or in the public interest. The courts have also 
considered whether economic development constitutes a valid public interest and whether 
it is justified to transfer the property to a third party for the fulfilment of this purpose. The 
decisions discussed below indicate that the courts do not seriously consider whether the 
transfer of the property to another third party is also justified. Once they have decided that 
the purpose of the expropriation is in the public interest, the means of realising the public 
interest is not subjected to rigorous scrutiny. Therefore, the courts have not always 
separated the two questions that arise, namely whether economic development constitutes 
a public interest and is therefore justified in terms of the Constitution, and whether the 
public interest excludes the transfer of the property to a third party for economic 
development purposes. 
The question regarding the justifiability of an expropriation that involves a third party 
transfer for economic development purposes can and should be separated into two 
discrete issues. The first question relates to whether economic development is in the 
public interest. In this regard it should be considered whether economic development is 
specifically authorised in terms of the authorising legislation and if so, whether the 
authority to expropriate for economic development purposes complies with the public 
purpose or public requirements in section 25(2) of the Constitution. If the legislation does 
not specifically provide for the expropriation of property for purposes of economic 
development it should still be considered whether expropriation for that purpose is for a 
public purpose or in the public interest as understood in earlier case law and in terms of 
the understanding of these requirements in terms of the Constitution. It is arguable that in 
cases where the legislation does not specifically provide for the expropriation of property 
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for economic development purposes the determination as to whether it complies with the 
constitutional requirements should be stricter than in cases where legislation specifically 
authorises it. 
Secondly, it should be considered whether the transfer of expropriated property to 
third parties for economic development purposes is for a public purpose or in the public 
interest. Therefore, on the assumption that economic development constitutes a valid 
public purpose or is in the public interest it should be considered independently whether 
the transfer of the property to third parties is also authorised in terms of legislation and if 
so, whether it complies with the public purpose or public interest requirement in section 
25(2) of the Constitution. If the legislation does not provide for the transfer of the 
expropriated property to third parties for the realisation of the purpose it should be 
evaluated strictly whether the transfer is justified in terms of the public purpose or public 
interest requirement. 
 
4 6 2 Case Law 
4 6 2 1 eThekwini Municipality v Sotirios Spetsiotis 
The question whether the expropriation of property for economic development purposes 
would be for a public purpose or in the public interest came up in eThekwini Municipality v 
Sotirios Spetsiotis.257 The eThekwini municipality was the owner of a building on the 
Beachfront area from which the respondent operated a restaurant business. The 
respondent signed a lease agreement with the municipality that was due to expire towards 
the end of 2014. In preparation for the 2010 Soccer World Cup the municipality wanted to 
demolish the building to realise its redevelopment plan of the Beachfront area. To achieve 
this goal the municipality expropriated the respondent’s lease. The respondent argued that 
the expropriation of his lease was not rationally connected to a public purpose or in the 
public interest as required by section 25(2)(a) of the Constitution.258 
The court did not address the question of whether the expropriation of the 
respondent’s lease for purposes of developing it for the World Cup was for a public 
purpose or in the public interest.259 It therefore missed an opportunity to decide whether 
economic development (that does not involve a third party transfer) is for a valid public 
                                            
257
 [2009] ZAKZDHC 51, 6 November 2009. 
258
 The respondent also argued that the demolition of the building was unnecessary since the relocation of 
some of his restaurants’ outside seating area would have allowed the development to continue. See further 
the discussion in ch 5. 
259
 Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional Property Law’ 2009 ASSAL 231-264 at 254. 
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purpose or in the public interest. The court merely held that the applicant proved the need 
to demolish the building, therefore establishing ‘a rational connection between the 
expropriation and the redevelopment of this part of the beachfront which is for a public 
purpose’.260 
 
4 6 2 2 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung 
Municipality 
In Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality261 
(Bartsch) the applicant sought to review and set aside the decision of the respondent to 
expropriate his property. The respondent decided to expropriate the applicant’s land for 
the purpose of constructing municipal roads. The applicant argued that the court should 
set aside the expropriation on the basis that part of his land would not be used for the 
construction of municipal roads, but for the ulterior purpose of making the land available to 
a private land developer. The applicant alleged that it was the private developer’s aim to 
erect a shopping complex on the property. Therefore, the applicant argued that the 
expropriation of his entire parcel of land was unlawful since the expropriation was not for a 
public purpose as required by section 2 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.262 
The court first considered the meaning of the phrase ‘public purpose’ in pre-1996 
decisions. Referring to Fourie v Minister van Lande263 and Rondebosch Municipal Council 
v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society,264 the court accepted that the 
public purpose requirement should be interpreted broadly. According to the court, ‘[t]he 
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 limits the power to expropriate to public purpose while section 
25(2) of the Constitution extends that power to incorporate expropriation in the public 
interest’.265 Therefore, in terms of the Act an expropriation must be either for a public 
purpose or in the public interest.266 
                                            
260
 eThekwini Municipality v Sotirios Spetsiotis [2009] ZAKZDHC 51, 6 November 2009 para 7. See Van der 
Walt AJ ‘Constitutional Property Law’ 2009 ASSAL 231-264 at 254. 
261
 [2010] ZAFSHC 11 (4 February 2010). 
262
 The applicant also argued that since the proposed road would only traverse a part of his property, it was 
unnecessary to expropriate the whole of the property. This issue, together with other expropriation related 
issues is addressed in ch 5. 
263
 1970 (4) SA 165 (O), discussed in ch 2 at 2 3 2. 
264
 1911 AD 271, discussed in ch 2 at 2 2 3 2. 
265
 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 
4 February 2010 para 4 3. 
266
 The court accepted the approach adopted in Du Toit v Minster of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) and 
subsequently followed in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 
and Others 2009 (5) SA 661 (SE) that the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 must be interpreted by reading in the 
‘public interest’ requirement. 
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Although the applicant argued that the respondent expropriated its property solely 
for the benefit of the third party, the court was of the opinion that the dispute was 
comparable to the issue in Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen 
(Kempton Park) (Pty)267 (Van Streepen). In the Van Streepen decision, the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court clearly distinguished between the primary purpose 
(construction of roads) and the secondary purpose (doing anything necessary relating to 
the construction or maintenance of any road) of the expropriation. Similarly, the court in 
Bartsch distinguished between the primary purpose (construction of roads) and the 
secondary purpose (the development of a shopping complex) of the expropriation.268 Since 
the secondary purpose related to ‘all things necessary in connection with the construction 
of the road’,269 referred to as the primary purpose, the court held that both the primary and 
secondary purpose were provided for in the respondent’s expropriation notice. According 
to the court, the use of the applicant’s land for the building of the shopping complex fell 
within the ambit of the secondary purpose. 
The court accepted that the expropriation of the applicant’s land for the construction 
of roads (the primary purpose) was for a valid public purpose. However, it is a different 
question whether the building of the shopping complex (the secondary purpose) was for a 
valid public purpose. Although it was argued that the building of a shopping complex is 
causally connected to the primary purpose, it is not immediately clear how the building of a 
shopping mall is causally connected to the building of a road. According to the court, the 
expropriation of the applicant’s land for the benefit of the private third party can never be 
for a public purpose.270 However, if it can be shown that the expropriation would be in the 
public interest, it may be valid. Given the economic advantages that the development 
would bring the court in Bartsch accepted that the expropriation of property for the benefit 
of a third party is in the public interest. 
 
                                            
267
 Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd 1990 (4) SA 644 (A), 
discussed in ch 2 at 2 4 3 and ch 3 at 3 3 3. 
268
 Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional Property Law’ 2010 ASSAL 251-294 at 282-285. 
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 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 
4 February 2010 para 1 2. 
270
 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 
4 February 2010 para 5 2. However, in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA), discussed below, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
stated that an expropriation that benefits a third party may still be for a public purpose since the character 
and purpose of the development is more important to the consideration whether the expropriation is for a 
valid public purpose than the identity of the party undertaking the development. 
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4 6 2 3 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation 
Similarly, in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd and Others271 (Offit) the applicants argued that the intended expropriation of their 
property to transfer it to a third party was not for a valid public purpose. The applicants 
were the owners of a piece of land situated in the Coega Industrial Development Zone (the 
‘IDZ’). The first respondent was the Coega Development Corporation, which operated the 
IDZ in terms of a permit issued in terms of the Manufacturing and Development Act 187 of 
1993. The second, third and fourth respondents were the Premier of the Eastern Cape 
Province, the Minister of Public Works and the Minister of Trade and Industry respectively. 
The second respondent attempted to expropriate the applicant’s land on behalf of 
the first respondent in 2005 and again in 2007. The high court confirmed that the second 
respondent does not have the authority in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 or the 
Eastern Cape Land Disposal Act 7 of 2000 to expropriate property.272 The third and fourth 
respondents have expropriating authority but indicated that they had no intention of 
expropriating the applicant’s land. The applicant argued that the (intended) expropriation of 
its property would be unlawful because it would be for the benefit of the first respondent 
and therefore not for a public purpose. As the case progressed through the various courts, 
several arguments were raised by the applicants.273 The discussion in this chapter is 
limited to the argument that the expropriation of the applicant’s land would not be for a 
public purpose because the intended expropriation was undertaken to benefit a third 
party.274 
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 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (5) 
SA 661 (SE); 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA); 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC). 
272
 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (5) 
SA 661 (SE) 666-667. 
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 In the high court decision (Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) 
Ltd and Others 2009 (5) SA 661 (SE)) the applicant argued that the expropriation of its property for the 
benefit of another third party would be unlawful since the Coega Development Corporation operated the 
Coega IDZ with an invalid permit. Furthermore, he argued that the expropriation would not be for a public 
purpose as required by the 1975 Expropriation Act. In the Supreme Court of Appeal (Offit Enterprises (Pty) 
Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA)) the 
applicant raised three arguments regarding the unlawfulness of the expropriation. Firstly, the applicant 
argued that the operator permit that allowed the Coega Development Corporation to operate in the IDZ was 
unlawfully issued and extended. Secondly, the applicant argued that the expropriation fell outside the ambit 
of the authorising legislation. The third argument was that any expropriation of his land would be in conflict 
with his right to just administrative action. The Constitutional Court (Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC)) directed the parties to address 
the following issues: Whether the applicants was deprived of its property and if so, by whom, and what would 
the appropriate relief be: Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 
and Others, Directions Dated 29 March 2010, www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/15016.PDF 
(accessed 7 November 2011). 
274
 This argument was considered only in the high court (Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (5) SA 661 (SE)) and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
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The applicant argued that the expropriation of its property would be invalid because 
it would not be for a public purpose as required by the Expropriation Act and section 25(2) 
of the 1996 Constitution. Since the second respondent did not have the authority to 
expropriate the property and the third and fourth respondent who had the authority to 
expropriate property had no intention of expropriating the property, there was never a real 
threat of expropriation. Nevertheless, both the high court and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
considered whether the expropriation of the applicant’s land for the benefit of the first 
respondent would be for a public purpose.275 
The high court acknowledged that the applicant’s land was constitutionally 
protected; section 25(1) of the Constitution protects property against arbitrary deprivation 
and section 25(2) sets out the requirements for a valid expropriation. The court stated that 
the Expropriation Act is law of general application that is subject to the Constitution. 
Referring to Du Toit v Minister of Transport,276 the court stated that if the provisions of the 
Expropriation Act are inconsistent with the Constitution, the Act should be interpreted by 
‘reading in’277 the relevant provision of the Constitution. Accordingly, an expropriation is 
only valid in terms of the Constitution and the Act if it is for a public purpose or in the public 
interest.278 This was also accepted by the Supreme Court of Appeal.279 
Although section 1 of the Expropriation Act defines public purpose, the high court 
agreed with the third respondent that it is not an exclusive definition. Both the high court280 
(relying on White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Community 
Development)281 and the Supreme Court of Appeal (relying on Fourie v Minsiter van 
Lande282 and White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Community 
Development)283 approved the wide meaning of the public purpose requirement adopted in 
these pre-constitutional decisions, before the Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 (4) SA 
242 (SCA)). 
275
 Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional Property Law’ 2010 ASSAL 251-294 at 275. 
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 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC). 
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 With the ‘reading in’ remedy a court saves the particular legislation from invalidity by adding words to the 
legislation that cure the flaw: Bishop M ‘Remedies’ in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) CLoSA Vol I 
(2
nd
 ed OS 2006) ch 9 at 104-105. See also Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010) 383-388. 
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 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (5) 
SA 661 (SE) 675. 
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 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 (4) 
SA 242 (SCA) para 11. 
280
 Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional Property Law’ 2008 ASSAL 231-264 at 260 states that the high court was 
correct in formulating the public purpose requirement widely. 
281
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Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd284 decision introduced the broader public interest 
interpretation of this requirement. 
Both the high court and the Supreme Court of Appeal referred to Van Streepen 
where the then Appellate Division of the Supreme Court stated that an expropriation that 
benefits a third party might not be for a public purpose, but it could be in the public interest. 
In Van Streepen, the Appellate Division did not indicate why such an expropriation might 
not be for a public purpose. In Offit,285 Wallis AJA, writing for the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, contended that a possible reason for the approach adopted in Van Streepen is the 
different role that the state - as opposed to private individuals - played at the time when 
Van Streepen was heard. In recent times traditional public functions are no longer solely 
performed by the state, but by the state in co-operation with private parties. According to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, private partnerships (state and private enterprise 
partnerships) are becoming a common feature. Therefore, it stated that 
‘[t]here is no apparent reason why the identity of the party undertaking the relevant 
development, as opposed to the character and purpose of the development, should 
determine whether it is undertaken for a public purpose.’286 
However, as is argued in previous chapters this is only the case when the purpose in itself 
is a valid public purpose. In this regard the Surpeme Court of Appeal points out that the 
first question to be asked is whether the purpose of the expropriation is a valid public 
purpose because if it is, the fact that the property is transferred to a third party is irrelevant. 
Therefore, both the high court and the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the 
applicant’s argument that if the expropriation had occurred it would not have been for a 
public purpose or in the public interest purely because it would benefit a third party. The 
courts easily accepted that economic development - with the benefits to which the courts 
referred - is in the public interest without placing any qualifications on its legitimacy, such 
as the existence of a legislative scheme. In terms of the Offit decisions it seems as if the 
courts separated the issue regarding third party transfers for economic development by 
first considering whether the expropriation is for a valid public purpose or in the public 
interest. However, once the courts accepted that the purpose is justifiable the third party 
transfer issue became less relevant. 
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4 6 2 4 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 
The primary issue in Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others287 (Harvey) did not 
concern the legitimacy of the expropriation and eventual transfer of property to another 
private party for economic development purposes. The high court had to consider whether 
it was competent to order the re-transfer of the applicant’s expropriated property because 
the purpose for which the property was expropriated was subsequently abandoned.288 
When the original purpose was abandoned the municipality awarded the property, on 
tender, to a third party for purposes of establishing a medium-density residential area. 
Therefore, when the court addressed the issue of re-transfer it also considered whether an 
expropriation that benefits a third party because the property is transferred to that party for 
economic development could be for a public purpose if the development does not form 
part of a land reform programme. 
The applicant relied on De Waal and Currie for its argument that ‘public purpose’ 
should be defined in contrast to ‘private purpose’. If the state expropriates property to build 
a road or a hospital the expropriation would be valid.289 However, if the expropriation 
specifically benefits an individual or increases the state’s wealth, it would not be for a valid 
public purpose and would therefore be unlawful.290 
According to the court, the argument that an expropriation for the benefit of a third 
party is invalid is broadly in accordance with the ‘jurisprudential principles applicable to 
expropriation of property in South Africa’.291 However, there might be instances where an 
expropriation that incidentally benefits third parties could still be for a public purpose or in 
the public interest. The court referred to Offit,292 where the Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that in exceptional cases, and outside the context of a land reform programme, an 
expropriation might still be valid even if the ultimate beneficiaries of the expropriation are 
private parties.293 The court in Harvey294 agreed with the Offit decision but cautioned 
against expropriation of property under the guise of a public purpose, while the property is 
actually expropriated in order to increase the wealth of the state or for the exclusive private 
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benefit of a third party.295 Therefore, an expropriation that also benefits a third party can 
still be valid (for a public purpose or in the public interest), provided that the third party 
performs a public function and requires the property for that purpose.296 
 
4 6 3 Legislative Authority to Expropriate Property for Economic Development 
Purposes 
Traditionally property was expropriated for public purposes that included the building of 
roads, various government facilities and securing the safety of the President. Above it was 
also argued that it is usually accepted that property can be expropriated and turned over to 
third parties responsible for providing a public service, such as electricity and railway 
companies, in order to fulfil a public purpose.297 In terms of the 1996 Constitution the 
purposes for which property can be expropriated were extended to include the 
expropriation of property for land reform purposes, even if it involved the transfer of the 
property to third parties.298 Given that expropriation for economic development purposes 
has not traditionally been regarded as being for a public purpose or in the public interest, 
the question that should be asked is whether expropriating property for purposes of 
economic development is authorised in terms of legislation. If legislation does not provide 
for the expropriation of property for economic development purposes and if it is found that 
economic development is not justified in terms of the public purpose or public interest 
requirement the expropriation would be invalid and the question regarding the transfer of 
the expropriated property to third parties does not come up. Therefore, it should first be 
considered whether legislation provides for the expropriation of property for economic 
development purposes. 
Legislation in foreign jurisdictions, such as the US, English and Irish law discussed 
above, often specifically authorises the expropriation of property for purposes of 
redevelopment or regeneration. In South African law, where most expropriations are still 
carried out in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, no reference is made to the 
expropriation of property for economic development purposes. However, recourse could 
be had to the legislation in terms of which the development takes place. The 
Manufacturing Development Act 187 of 1993 that was used to effect the development that 
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gave rise to the dispute in the Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others299 decisions made no reference to the 
expropriation of property for purposes of development. In fact the Act does not confer 
expropriation powers at all. The Eastern Cape Land Disposal Act 7 of 2000 grants the 
Premier of the province the authority to expropriate property, but it does not refer to the 
expropriation of property for economic development purposes. Furthermore, in the Offit 
decisions the Premier had no intention of expropriating property. 
In Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung 
Municipality,300 the expropriation notice allowed the local authority to expropriate property 
for purposes of constructing a road and doing all things necessary in connection with 
building that road. The court held that the provision was wide enough to legitimise the 
expropriation of the applicant’s land for economic development purposes. According to the 
court this development would enhance the economy of the town of Harrismith and was 
therefore in the public interest.301 
It is arguable that the legislation, although allowing expropriation for purposes of 
doing all things necessary in connection with building a road, cannot be read this broadly. 
In Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd302 the 
court held that the relocation of water or electricity pipes was in connection with the 
construction of the road. Expropriating gravel along the road in order to build the road is 
also an action in connection with building the road and, therefore, justifiable.303 
Expropriating property to allow a petrol company to erect a petrol filling station alongside 
the road may also be justifiable in terms of the expropriation legislation. However, the 
erection of a shopping mall is perhaps too far removed from doing all things necessary in 
connection with building the road to justify the expropriation for that purpose.  
As a result, there is no established precedent in case law where the expropriation of 
property for economic development purposes has been upheld. There is also no apparent 
legislation that authorises such an expropriation. This does not necessarily mean that the 
expropriation of property for the purpose of economic development can never be for a 
public purpose or in the public interest. It does, however, mean that the determination as 
to whether economic development does in fact constitute a valid public purpose or whether 
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it is in the public interest should arguably be subjected to stricter scrutiny in cases where 
the authorising legislation does not authorise expropriation for economic development 
specifically. 
 
4 6 4 Is Economic Development in the Public Interest? 
In the absence of legislation that specifically authorises the expropriation of property for 
economic development purposes, the courts have considered whether economic 
development is for a public purpose or in the public interest to justify the expropriation. In 
previous chapters it was shown that the public interest refers to purposes that benefit the 
public as opposed to public purpose, which is defined more narrowly and mainly refers to 
government purposes or actual public use. In Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral 
Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality304 the court considered whether the 
expropriation of the property for economic development purposes would be in the public 
interest. The court stated that the development, which included the construction of a 
shopping complex, would be for the benefit of the public because it would provide 
economic advantages to the community. These advantages included increased financial 
income as well as fostering a healthier and wealthier society. Therefore, the expropriation 
of the applicant’s property to stimulate the economy was held to be in the public interest. 
Once the court accepted that the purpose of economic development is in the public 
interest, it upheld the expropriation and did not evaluate whether the transfer of the 
property to a third party to realise the purpose is also legitimate. 
In Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) 
Ltd and Others305 both the high court and the Supreme Court of Appeal referred to the 
economic advantages that the development in the Coega IDZ would bring as justification 
for the expropriation. The high court accepted that the development would create 
numerous permanent and temporary employment opportunities and would provide 
additional social benefits, such as increasing the per capita income. Additionally, the 
investment potential of the development exceeded R20 billion. Accordingly, the high court 
was satisfied that the development scheme fell within the scope of the broad meaning of 
‘public purpose’, since it would benefit all the people in South Africa, and more specifically 
the local community of Port Elizabeth. Therefore, the high court concluded that the 
expropriation of the applicant’s land for the economic development of the area would be in 
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the public interest and therefore valid as long as the property was used to achieve that 
public interest. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the stake that the 
Eastern Cape government and the Department of Trade and Industry had in the Coega 
development project. The responsibility of the Coega Development Corporation is of 
national and provincial importance and is clearly set out in legislation. As a result, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the ‘industrial development with all its concomitant 
benefits of employment and economic growth is manifestly a public purpose, and indeed a 
central public purpose in South Africa’.306 Therefore, the high court and the Supreme Court 
of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s argument that if the expropriation had occurred it 
would not have been for a public purpose or in the public interest purely because it would 
benefit a third party.307 
As a result, in the Bartsch and Offit decisions the respective courts accepted that 
economic development with the concomitant benefits of increased employment 
opportunities and revenue is in the public interest and therefore justifiable in terms of the 
Expropriation Act and the 1996 Constitution. The courts effectively opened up the public 
interest requirement to include the expropriation of property for economic development 
purposes, even in the absence of legislative authority, purely on the basis of a particular 
interpretation of the public interest requirement. 
In the absence of clear and specific legislative authority, increased employment 
opportunities, increased revenue and the general improvement of the economy are 
possibly not enough to justify the expropriation of property for the state to implement 
projects of economic development. In German law, it is required that the legislation that 
authorises the expropriation must clearly and specifically authorise the expropriation of 
property for a very specific purpose. This purpose is further strictly judged against article 
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14 of the German Basic Law.308 Since economic development is not traditionally regarded 
as constituting a valid public purpose or public interest, it is possible to argue that without 
any legislative basis, the expropriation of property for economic development purposes 
should be invalid for a lack of statutory authority or in the least be subjected to heightened 
scrutiny as suggested by Lord Walker in Regina (Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd) v 
Wolverhampton City Council.309 
Furthermore, in most cases where the state has a specific objective in mind, for 
instance improving the security of the President’s estate to ensure his safety and privacy, it 
has a strategic plan on how to realise the specific objective.310 If in the course of that 
objective the state needs to expropriate property (which should only be the case if there is 
no other way of achieving the public purpose)311 it would be allowed to do so if the purpose 
of the plan is a public purpose or in the public interest. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
state needs to have a development plan in place before it can expropriate property in order 
to realise a particular development objective. As a result, it can be argued that without a 
legislative scheme, which includes the existence of a development plan, the state would 
not be able to expropriate property for economic development just because it might 
increase employment opportunities and promote a wealthier society. In terms of a 
legislative scheme, the increase of employment opportunities can merely be evidence that 
the development plan may eventually be in the public interest in the broadest and vaguest 
sense possible. 
 
4 6 5 Is the Transfer of Property to Third Parties for Economic Development 
Justifiable? 
Since it is arguable that economic development, at least in the absence of a legislative 
scheme, is not for a public purpose or in the public interest and since third party transfers 
of expropriated property are also a contentious issue at least in some cases, the transfer 
of expropriated property to private parties for economic development purposes poses a 
double problem. Above it was argued that outside of a legislative scheme the expropriation 
of property for economic development, with vague and undefined advantages such as 
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increased employment opportunities and revenue, may not be sufficiently justified in terms 
of the public purpose or public interest requirement. 
With regard to third party transfers, the court in Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral 
Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality312 held that the expropriation of property 
for the benefit of a third party can never be for a public purpose, but it can be in the public 
interest. It is unclear whether the court would have conceded that an expropriation can be 
for a public purpose even if the property is expropriated for the benefit of a third party. In 
Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and 
Others,313 the high court held that the fact that the property, if expropriated, would be 
transferred to a third party does not render the expropriation invalid from the outset. The 
public interest requirement is wide enough to justify expropriations that also benefit third 
parties. The Supreme Court of Appeal adopted the same approach and held that an 
expropriation cannot be invalidated simply because the ultimate owner of the land is a 
private party.314 It does not matter whether, in the fulfilment of the public purpose, the 
property is retained by the state or whether it would be transferred to a private party. In this 
regard, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that  
‘the expropriation of land in order to enable the private developer to construct low-cost 
housing is as much an expropriation for public purpose as it would be if the municipality or 
province had undertaken the task itself, using the same contractors.’315  
Therefore, Offit,316 as well as Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others,317 demonstrate 
that an expropriation that benefits a third party may still be for a public purpose provided 
that the third party requires the property to perform a public function that in itself is for a 
public purpose or in the public interest. This qualification concerning the justification for 
expropriating property and transferring it to third parties is important when considering 
expropriation for economic development purposes. If the expropriation is for a clear public 
purpose, applying a low level of scrutiny with regard to the transfer of the property to a 
third party in order to realise the purpose is not necessarily exceedingly troublesome. 
However, in the event that the purpose of the expropriation is in itself difficult to justify in 
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terms of the public purpose or public interest requirement - because there is no authority 
for the expropriation or because the purpose in itself is controversial - the determination as 
to whether the transfer of the property to third parties to realise the purpose is lawful, 
should be subjected to strict scrutiny. 
In the Bartsch decision, the court upheld an expropriation that benefited a third 
party on the basis that it would also bring about economic advantages. This decision 
illustrates the low level of scrutiny that the courts apply when they determine whether an 
expropriation that benefits a third party is in the public interest. It was already indicated 
that the legislation did not specifically authorise the expropriation of property for purposes 
of promoting, enhancing or stimulating the economy. The expropriation notice indicated 
that the power of expropriation in terms of the Expropriation Act of 1975 would be used to 
expropriate property to construct a road and doing all things necessary in connection with 
building the road. In the Bartsch decision there was no evidence relating to the number of 
employment opportunities that would be created. The indicators relied upon to justify the 
expropriation, such as ‘strategic economic advantages’ and ‘creating a healthier and 
wealthier environment’318 are too vague to justify the expropriation of the additional 
property. There are also no assurances that these advantages would occur and that the 
third party who receives the property will in fact implement projects that would generate 
these advantages. 
A general concern, also in foreign jurisdictions, is the lack of statutory conditions to 
ensure that the promised economic benefits actually materialise.319 Furthermore, the third 
party can in most instances not be held accountable if the various benefits do not 
materialise or if they do not in fact benefit the public in some way. Therefore, in the 
absence of some control mechanism there is a real possibility that the anticipated benefits, 
factors used to justify the expropriation, will not in fact materialise. The projected 
employment opportunities that the new General Motors plant in the City of Detroit, that 
gave rise to the dispute in Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit,320 would have 
generated never fully materialised321 and the planned development that resulted in the 
dispute in Kelo v City of New London322 has to date not been implemented.323 
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Therefore, in the event that the state insists that the expropriation is justified since it 
would provide a certain number of jobs or a certain amount of revenue, the courts should 
be wary if there is no form of oversight on the part of the state in order to ensure that the 
projected benefits actually materialise, nor any manner in which the third party can be held 
accountable in the event that the benefits do not materialise.324 In County of Wayne v 
Hathcock325 the Michigan Supreme Court placed a ban on economic development takings 
except where the state retains some sort of oversight.326  
As a result, the transfer of property for economic development purposes outside of 
a legislative scheme that authorises and regulates both the purpose of the expropriation 
and the transfer should be evaluated strictly. It has been argued that allowing 
expropriations of this kind has several negative effects on owners’ rights to property as 
well as other human rights, such as the right not be evicted from one’s home in an 
arbitrary manner.327 Numerous arguments against allowing the expropriation of property 
for economic development purposes that also involves a third party transfer have been 
raised by various authors. These arguments are briefly outlined below before an argument 
is made that stricter scrutiny, similar to the scrutiny applied in German law, should be 
applied in South African law to both the purpose of the expropriation and the transfer of the 
property in terms of legislation. 
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4 7 Arguments against the Transfer of Expropriated Property to Third 
Parties for Economic Development Purposes 
In the discussion of the US decisions of Kelo v City of New London328 and Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit329 it was shown that the respective courts easily 
accepted the condemnation of property for purposes of development or redevelopment if 
the proposed development was authorised by legislation and would proceed according to 
a development plan, even though the expropriation involved a third party transfer. 
However, the mere fact that the development was properly authorised and planned is not 
enough to satisfy all critics of these expropriations. Although some authors argue that the 
Kelo decision was decided correctly in terms of the US Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,330 
Gray notes his uneasiness with the expropriation of Kelo’s primary home for the benefit of 
a third party.331 The sanctity of the home has always been respected.332 Therefore, Gray 
argues that allowing the expropriation of a person’s home for the economic benefit of 
another party has a significant impact on home owners, whose homes might be their only 
possessions and a ‘symbol of the security and quality of their lives.’333 Walsh argues that 
although the Kelo and Poletown decisions are comparable to the Irish decisions of Crosbie 
v Custom House Docks Development Authority334 and Clinton v An Bord Pleanála and 
Others,335 since they also involved the expropriation of property for development purposes 
effected by a third party, the Kelo and Poletown decisions sparked more public outcry than 
the Irish decisions because the Kelo and Poletown decisions concerned the expropriation 
of homes, while the Irish cases concerned the expropriation of city centre properties.336 
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Therefore, the Irish owners merely lost the right to choose how to use their asset, while 
plaintiffs in Kelo and Poletown lost their actual homes.337 
It has therefore been suggested that expropriation for development of certain 
categories of property, for instance a person’s home, should not be allowed since such 
property is important to ‘an individual’s sense of personhood’.338 However, Fee argues that 
a complete ban on the takings of homes is probably not the best solution.339 Certain public 
purposes such as the building of roads and other public utilities will clearly justify the 
expropriation of property even when it includes homes.340 However, this general 
justification arguably does not extend to expropriation for economic development. Although 
an expropriation for a narrow and easily justified public purpose like road building would 
sometimes require that families or communities have to relocate to a different area, it is 
difficult to understand why they have to lose their homes and relocate just so that 
someone else can make a profit. Therefore, Fee argues that instead of placing homes - as 
a class of property - outside the reach of the state’s power of eminent domain it would be 
better to subject the expropriation of a home generally to higher scrutiny.341 
Apart from the economic cost that materialises when people are forced to relocate 
to a different area because their houses had been expropriated, there are also other costs 
involved. This is more apparent in cases where the compensation offered does not 
account for the actual loss suffered by the expropriated owners.342 With reference to 
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Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit,343 Michelman famously argued that 
property can represent more than just money, ‘because it may represent things that money 
can’t buy - place, position, relationship, roots, community, status … and security,’ but 
security in a different and deeper sense than just ‘investment-backed expectations.’344 
Michelman coined the term ‘demoralization cost’ to denote the additional and often not 
accounted for losses that expropriations of this nature might cause.345 Walsh argues that 
these additional costs can also include the loss of a support system from the previous 
neighbourhood that may not be present in the new neighbourhood.346 Informal 
arrangements concerning child-care as well as community assistance to an elderly person 
may disappear, which cannot automatically be transplanted into a new neighbourhood.347 
Furthermore, it might be impossible to afford the same type of residence in a different but 
comparable neighbourhood.348 
Apart from the additional cost that expropriation of homes for economic 
development might cause, Waring argues that the purpose of regeneration or economic 
development is hard to justify because it is vague, indefinable and difficult to predict.349 
With regard to third party transfers for building of roads or railways, the expropriation is 
usually justified by its serving of ‘geographically discrete and temporally-limited 
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projects,’350 but with economic development projects this is not the case. Economic 
development or the improvement of economic conditions can appear in any place at any 
given time, which means that property rights can become fragile because no-one can be 
sure whether such an expropriation might affect their property.351 This ultimately also 
undermines the right to security of possession generally.352 Property owners can therefore 
question why economic use should be the main criterion when determining whether the 
property should be expropriated, especially since the owners whose properties are 
targeted for economic development purposes are usually the most vulnerable and the 
least affluent members of society.353 Underkuffler also argues that the price of 
condemnation does not fall on those with social, political or economic power, but on those 
who live in more moderate neighbourhoods.354 Furthermore, Underkuffler argues that in 
light of the Kelo decision, run-down neighbourhoods or trailer parks will not fare well in 
terms of a development plan with expensive homes with ‘manicured lawns and 
gardens.’355 As a result, third party transfers for economic development could have 
disproportionally harsh effects on the less affluent members of society. 
Gray indicates a further reason why third party transfers for economic development 
purposes are troublesome.356 Gray states that the third party, ‘courtesy of the state,’357 
would be able to hold the expropriated property on exclusionary terms.358 As opposed to 
the expropriation of property to allow a third party to fulfil a public function and the 
application of ‘common carrier’ regulations that ensured that access to the public service 
rendered on the expropriated property was fair and equal, the developer in the Kelo 
decision would be able to freely select who would be eligible to use the property in future 
as occupiers or tenants.359 As a result, Gray argues that ‘[t]here was to be no public 
accountability, no public control, as the price of access to the public power of eminent 
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domain.’360 Public power is therefore used to bring about the expropriation, resulting in 
private ownership and exploitation of the resource, without any public oversight or 
accountability. 
Gray also argues that private takings result in a situation where property rules are 
replaced with liability rules and that consequently there is no security of property left.361 
The state would be able to reallocate resources in an unfair and unpredictable manner and 
the persons who would be the most negatively affected will be those unable to protect 
themselves.362 In this regard Walsh argues that the right to security of possession is 
reduced to security of value if private takings are allowed.363 She argues that the 
acceptance of ill-defined purposes such as ‘redevelopment’ or ‘regeneration’ gives the 
state an unfettered power to expropriate property.364 When the state is able or prepared to 
pay compensation there seems to be no way of preventing the expropriation of property 
since ‘regeneration’ and ‘redevelopment’ can in almost all cases justify an expropriation. 
Therefore Walsh states that 
‘[j]udicial acceptance of ill-defined public purposes as a justification for the exercise of 
compulsory acquisition powers significantly undermines security of possession of property, 
and reduces the right to private property to a right to compensation.’365 
Walsh also argues that the courts’ deference towards the non-specific purposes for which 
property can be expropriated renders a public purpose requirement meaningless. As a 
result, the state would be able to justify the condemnation of property for the benefit of 
another person easily, thereby ‘washing out any distinction between private and public use 
of property’366 effectively deleting the phrase ‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause.367 
Furthermore, Gray argues that perhaps the most important objectionable factor of 
takings that resemblance the Kelo-type taking is the fact that someone is losing her 
                                            
360
 Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 83. 
361
 Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 84, with reference 
to Calabresi G & Melamed AD ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Alienability: One View of the Cathedral’ 
(1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128. 
362
 Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 84, with reference 
to Justice O’Connor’s judgment in Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005). 
363
 Walsh R ‘“The Principles of Social Justice” and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for 
Redevelopment in the United States and Ireland’ (2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23 at 13-14. 
364
 Walsh R ‘“The Principles of Social Justice” and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for 
Redevelopment in the United States and Ireland’ (2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23 at 14. 
365
 Walsh R ‘“The Principles of Social Justice” and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for 
Redevelopment in the United States and Ireland’ (2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23 at 14. 
366
 Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) 494. See also Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ 
(2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 84. 
367
 Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) 494. 
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property so that someone else, namely a private developer, can make more money.368 
This result resembles expropriation for purely private purposes, which is unacceptable. 
According to Gray there is some immorality involved in taking someone’s home so that a 
different person can make a profit in which the previous property owner would have no 
share.369 Ultimately, the power of condemnation should only be available in circumstances 
where there is a direct benefit to the public, or if it involves public use and not when the 
primary benefit of the taking goes to a private party and the secondary benefits such as 
increased employment opportunities accrue, if it does materialise, to the public.370  
Given the arguments presented above concerning the problems resulting from a 
deferent attitude concerning the expropriation and transfer of property for economic 
development purposes, it is advisable that the South African courts should not be as 
deferent as the US, English and Irish courts, since the transfer of expropriated property for 
economic development purposes has the potential to unfairly burden the less affluent 
members in society. Furthermore, the potential benefits that the expropriation may bring 
with it often seem to be secondary to the primary purpose of the expropriation, namely the 
financial benefit of the third party. Because the secondary benefits are not guaranteed 
courts should be wary when easily accepting the ill-defined benefits as a justification for 
the expropriation. 
As a result, it is submitted that the courts should follow the German approach since 
it can arguably prevent the expropriation of property that lead to the unjust results 
described above. In terms of German law the expropriation of property for a public purpose 
must be authorised in legislation and must comply with the public good requirement in 
article 14.3 of the Basic Law of 1949. Furthermore, the property must be absolutely 
necessary for the fulfilment of the particular public purpose and the courts evaluate the 
legislation that authorises the expropriation and the purpose of the expropriation strictly. 
Third party transfer is possible, but only if the third party is responsible for realising a 
public purpose as defined narrowly. However, the legislation must provide for the 
expropriation and the transfer and the courts exercises strict control over its legitimacy. In 
that regard the protective function of article 14 of the Basic Law, which guarantees 
property, is fulfilled. 
 
                                            
368
 Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 83; Gray K ‘Human 
Property Rights: The Politics of Expropriation’ (2005) 16 Stell LR 398-412 at 406. 
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 Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 83. 
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4 8 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss third party transfers for economic 
development purposes. However, third party transfers for narrow and broader public 
purposes are also discussed. If the purpose of the expropriation can be described as a 
narrow public purpose, such as building roads, railways or an electricity plant, the party 
responsible for the realisation of the purpose is irrelevant; it can be the state or a private 
party. Therefore, if the third party is responsible for rendering the public service in terms of 
a contract with the state or in terms of legislation, the expropriation and transfer of the 
property to that party is not easily questioned. However, even in those instances the 
German courts investigate the nature of the third party’s business, since stricter scrutiny is 
applied in cases where the third party was not established for the fulfilment of that 
particular public purpose. 
If the property is expropriated for a broader public purpose, or in the public interest, 
it may still be valid even if the property is transferred to third parties. In terms of a land 
reform programme the expropriated property is transferred to third parties. Similarly, slum 
clearance projects usually involve the transfer of expropriated property to third parties or it 
enables third parties to occupy or make use of the expropriated property. As a result, the 
expropriated property is not used for a government or a public use, but the restitution of 
property or the elimination of slum is regarded as being in the public interest. For this 
reason, the expropriation and transfer of property for land reform purposes or for the 
elimination of slum areas are specifically authorised in terms of legislation. In South 
African law, the transfer of expropriated property for land reform purposes is also 
specifically legitimised by the 1996 Constitution and regulated in terms of a legislative 
scheme. Therefore, even when property is expropriated for broader public purposes the 
courts still evaluate whether there is some sort of legislative scheme or aim that would be 
realised by the expropriation. 
With regard to third party transfers for economic development purposes it is argued 
here that both the purpose of the expropriation and the transfer of the property to a third 
party in order to realise the purpose of development are problematic and that both should 
be subjected to appropriate levels of judicial scrutiny. It was argued that, unlike the 
expropriation and transfer of property for land reform or slum clearance purposes, neither 
economic development nor the transfer of property to third parties for economic 
development is usually authorised or regulated in terms of a legislative scheme. Whenever 
there is no legislative scheme that authorises the development the courts should scrutinise 
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both the expropriation and the transfer more strictly in terms of the public purpose and 
public interest requirement of section 25(2) of the Constitution. The courts refer to the 
economic advantages that can include increased employment opportunities,371 increased 
financial income372 and fostering a healthier and wealthier society373 as sufficient 
justification for the expropriation of property, even it involves a third party transfer. 
However, it was argued that outside of a legislative scheme the expropriation of 
property for economic development and the transfer of property to a third party for 
economic development should be subjected to stricter scrutiny. It is suggested that the 
South African courts approach the question concerning the lawfulness of the transfer of 
expropriated property for economic development purposes in the same manner as the 
German courts do. 
Therefore, South African courts should first consider whether the purpose, namely 
economic development, is specifically authorised in terms of legislation. If the legislation 
does not provide for the expropriation of property for purposes of economic development 
the expropriation could be declared unlawful for lack of statutory authority. If the legislation 
does provide for the expropriation of property for economic development purposes, the 
courts should still consider whether it is a valid purpose and whether expropriating the 
property is strictly required for the realisation of the public purpose. However, it is arguable 
that the level of scrutiny could be lower in cases where there is a legislative scheme. 
Nevertheless, it requires the courts to evaluate whether the purpose of the expropriation 
necessitates the expropriation of property. If the economic development also involves a 
third party transfer even stricter scrutiny should be applied to both the lawfulness of the 
purpose and the legitimacy of the transfer in order to realise the purpose. 
In the following chapter it is considered whether the availability of less invasive 
means, other than expropriation, is a valid defence against an ensuing expropriation that is 
otherwise for a valid public purpose. Therefore, this question only comes up when the 
purpose of the expropriation has been judged to be for a valid public purpose, therefore 
justified in terms of the Expropriation Act and the Constitution, but it is argued that the 
expropriation of property is excessive since the purpose can be realised without 
expropriating the property. 
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 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (5) 
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 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 
4 February 2010. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE LESS INVASIVE MEANS ARGUMENT IN 
EXPROPRIATION LAW 
 
5 1 Introduction 
In terms of section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution, an expropriation must be for a public 
purpose or in the public interest and just and equitable compensation must be paid. In 
previous chapters it is shown that recent case law and commentaries have confirmed that 
the justification for an expropriation lies in the public purpose or public interest that is 
served by the expropriation, while the payment of compensation is merely the result of an 
expropriation that is for a valid public purpose or in the public interest.1 Therefore, it is 
necessary that the public purpose or public interest that is served by an expropriation 
should be scrutinised properly by the courts to ensure that the expropriation is justified. In 
the previous chapter it was suggested that if the purpose of the expropriation is not 
subjected to rigorous scrutiny, it may lead to unjust results in certain situations. This is 
especially true when the purpose of the expropriation is not a narrow public purpose or 
more broadly in the public interest but for an even wider purpose such as expropriating 
property for economic development purposes. Furthermore, the previous chapter shows 
that the courts do not always strictly evaluate the lawfulness of transferring the 
expropriated property to third parties for the fulfilment of such broad purposes. 
In this chapter a different but related aspect of the public purpose requirement is 
analysed, namely whether the availability of an alternative, less invasive means - other 
than expropriation - to realise the purpose is a valid defence against a proposed 
expropriation. Generally, this argument relates to the question whether expropriating 
property is justified if the public purpose that necessitates the expropriation of property can 
also be realised by other, less invasive means. Applied to the expropriation for economic 
development purposes, the question that could be asked is whether there is another 
possible means to realise the benefits of economic development, namely increased 
employment opportunities and revenue, without expropriating the property. This question 
should be even more pressing if the expropriation also involves a third party transfer, since 
it can be asked why that specific property is absolutely necessary for the third party to 
realise the desired development or redevelopment goal. 
                                            
1
 See Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 82; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 500. 
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The decision of the expropriating authority (the expropriator) to expropriate property 
for a public purpose constitutes administrative action.2 Therefore, in addition to meeting 
the requirements of section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution the decision of the expropriator 
to expropriate property must also be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair as stipulated 
in section 33 of the Constitution.3 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(PAJA) gives effect to the constitutional right to just administrative action.4 
Therefore, when property is expropriated both section 25(2), which affords 
protection against expropriation that is not for a public purpose or that is unaccompanied 
by just and adequate compensation, and administrative law principles in section 33 of the 
Constitution and PAJA are implicated. Consequently, two constitutional rights are directly 
relevant when property is expropriated. This chapter will investigate how these two 
constitutional rights have a bearing on the argument that an expropriation is not justified 
since the proposed public purpose can be achieved by adopting a different and less 
invasive measure. The less invasive means argument can be aimed at the adoption of a 
different and less invasive measure such as a regulatory scheme that does not require 
expropriation of the property. The less invasive measure can also relate to the 
expropriation of only a portion of land instead of the entire parcel. Therefore, the adoption 
of such a different measure ensures that the public purpose is met, but without 
expropriating the property or the whole of the property. 
In recent case law the courts have indicated that they will not easily question the 
expropriator’s decision to expropriate property (or a specific volume of property) for a 
public purpose. This can be attributed to the deference traditionally shown towards the 
choices made by the administrator and the rationality test that the courts customarily apply 
in expropriation cases.5 In terms of the rationality test the decision of the administrator 
must be supported by the facts. If there is a rational connection between the decision that 
was taken and the aim that the state sets out to achieve, the decision of the administrator 
will be rational. In terms of this test, the impact that the decision - in this case the decision 
                                            
2
 Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works [2011] ZASCA 246, 1 December 2011 para 12; Offit 
Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 (4) SA 242 
(SCA) para 36. See also Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 77; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 501. 
3
 S 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair’. 
4
 In the long title of PAJA it is stated that the purpose of the act is ‘[t]o give effect to the right to administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair … as contemplated in section 33 of the Constitution’. 
See Hoexter C Administrative Law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 118. 
5
 With reference to Lebowa Minerals Trust Beneficiaries Forum Ltd v President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2002 (1) BCLR 23 (T) and Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 98-99, Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar 
JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 567 state that ‘[c]ourts generally 
respect the choices made by the legislature or executive as to where the public interest lies’. 
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to expropriate - has on the expropriated owner is not taken into account. Therefore, the 
availability of alternative less invasive means is also not considered. 
However, there might be instances where the application of a thin rationality test 
and ignoring the existence of an alternative, less invasive means are problematic, 
especially when it is not immediately clear that the expropriation is for a valid public 
purpose or in the public interest. Therefore, in this chapter it is also investigated how the 
decision of the expropriator is reviewed by the courts to illustrate the problems that might 
not be addressed by the application of a thin rationality test. 
 
5 2 The Less Invasive Means Argument in South African Expropriation 
Law 
5 2 1 Expropriating More Property than Strictly Necessary: Bartsch Consult (Pty) 
Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality 
In Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality6 
(Bartsch) the respondent expropriated the applicant’s land for the construction of a road. 
The applicant attacked the validity of the expropriation on the basis that it was not an 
expropriation for a public purpose because the expropriation was for the benefit of a third 
party. In the alternative, the applicant argued that the respondent was not justified in 
expropriating the whole property since only half of the property was needed for the public 
purpose.7 In this decision a distinction was made between the primary purpose of 
expropriation, namely the building of a road, and the secondary purpose of making the 
additional land available to a third party to erect a shopping mall.8 In terms of the 
expropriation notice the expropriation was for the purpose of constructing a road as well as 
doing all things necessary in connection with building that road. According to the court the 
secondary purpose related to ‘all things necessary in connection with the construction of 
the road’. Because the expropriation notice was wide enough to include the primary and 
the secondary purpose, the court held that the expropriation of the applicant’s land in its 
entirety was for a public purpose. 
According to the applicant, despite the fact that the respondents only required one 
third of its property for the building of the road, the property was expropriated in its entirety 
                                            
6
 [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 February 2010. 
7
 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 
February 2010 para 6. 
8
 This issue was also addressed in ch 4. 
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in order to transfer the property that was not needed for the construction of the road to a 
third party. Therefore, the validity of the purpose for expropriating the additional land, 
namely to allow the third party to erect a shopping mall, was contested. 
The court dismissed the applicant’s arguments, stating that the applicant confused 
motive with purpose. Having established that the expropriation was for a valid public 
purpose and that it was done in good faith, the court held that the motive behind the 
decision to expropriate was irrelevant ‘to the question whether the power of expropriation 
had been validly exercised.’9 Because the applicant could not prove that the expropriating 
authority acted in bad faith in expropriating its land, the court could find no fault in the 
decision of the respondent to expropriate the entire property.10 In this regard the court did 
not consider whether the expropriation of the additional property for purposes of allowing 
the third party to erect a shopping mall was for a public purpose. If the court held that the 
expropriation of property for the construction of a shopping mall was also a valid public 
purpose that was covered by the authorising legislation, then the expropriation of the entire 
parcel of land would have been lawful. Because the court was of the opinion that the 
expropriation of the additional property to allow the third party to erect a shopping mall on 
the property was allowed for in the expropriation notice, it did not consider the argument of 
the applicant that there was a less invasive means available to the applicant that, if 
resorted to, would not have had any impact on the fulfilment of the primary purpose. 
The Bartsch decision is interesting from a constitutional property law as well as an 
administrative law perspective. The court in Bartsch stated that the respondent is entitled 
to expropriate property in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, subject to the 1996 
Constitution, and that expropriating the property constitutes administrative action.11 
Therefore, the decision to expropriate can be evaluated from both a constitutional property 
law and an administrative law perspective. 
In terms of section 25, the Expropriation Act and the public purpose requirement, 
the applicant in Bartsch argued that the respondent’s decision to expropriate the entire 
parcel was unreasonable ‘to the extent that the stated public purpose for the expropriation 
                                            
9
 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 
February 2010 para 6. See the discussion on the relevance of motive in the decision to expropriate below at 
5 3. 
10
 The court failed to consider whether the purpose for which the additional property was expropriated was a 
valid public purpose. 
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 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 
February 2010 para 1 5. 
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could not be said to be a public purpose.’12 There was evidence that the respondent 
planned to transfer the additional property to another party for the erection of a shopping 
mall. This case demonstrates various issues that may arise in the context of expropriation 
law, namely whether the expropriator is entitled to expropriate additional land not needed 
for the public purpose; whether the motive behind the expropriation is relevant in 
determining whether the expropriation is for a public purpose; whether an applicant will 
succeed in a claim that the expropriation is unnecessary since there is a different, less 
invasive means that can be employed; and whether the expropriation of property for 
transfer to a third party for economic development purposes is in the public interest. The 
question regarding third party transfer for economic development is addressed in Chapter 
4. Therefore, the remaining issues are addressed in this chapter. 
As indicated, one of the questions that surfaced in the Bartsch decision is whether 
the expropriator is entitled to expropriate more property than is strictly necessary to fulfil 
the public purpose that justifies the expropriation in the first place. According to 
Gildenhuys13 the expropriating authority may expropriate more property than necessary if it 
foresees that it might require the additional property in future14 or that it will have to pay 
more compensation if the additional land is expropriated at a later stage.15 
However, if the excess property is not needed for the fulfilment of the public 
purpose but is intended for other purposes, such as selling the surplus land for a profit or 
transferring the land to a third party for development purposes, the expropriation of the 
surplus land can be challenged.16 In the pre-1996 decision of African Farms & Townships 
Ltd v Cape Town Municipality,17 the court upheld the expropriation of the owner’s entire 
parcel of land, although a substantial portion of the land would eventually be sold to other 
                                            
12
 Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 
February 2010 para 1 5. 
13
 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 88. 
14
 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 88, with reference to LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape 
Town Municipality 1969 (2) SA 256 (C) 268-270 and Estates Development Co v Western Australia (1952) 87 
CLR 126. In the LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality decision, the court held that the 
expropriator’s power of expropriation is not limited to the expropriation of property for its immediate purpose, 
thereby indicating that the expropriator may expropriate additional property than is immediately necessary. 
Again this is less troublesome when the purpose of the expropriation is for a narrow public purpose such as 
building roads, hospitals or schools, but if the additional property is expropriated for purposes that are further 
removed from the public interest, accepting that the expropriator may expropriate additional property may 
lead to unjust results. 
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 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 88, with reference to Thorcon Enterprises Ltd v District of 
West Vancouver (1988) 39 LCR 311, Gray v Oshawa City (1971) 19 DLR 3d 524 and Lynch v Ku-ring-gai 
Municipal Council and the Minister of Public Works (1947) 16 LGR 144. 
16
 Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 89. This is especially suspect when the additional land is 
transferred to a private party for economic development, in which case the private party is to receive 
substantial financial returns. See also Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 503. 
17
 1961 (3) SA 392 (C), discussed in ch 2 at 2 2 3 4. 
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private parties. Despite this decision, it is questionable whether an expropriation is justified 
when a part of the expropriated property will not be used for a public purpose. However, if 
an entire parcel of land is expropriated but the primary purpose of the expropriation (for 
which a large part of the property is expropriated) and the secondary purpose (for which 
the remainder is expropriated) are both for a valid public purpose, the expropriation of the 
entire parcel of land would be justified. 
Van der Walt18 argues that an expropriation should be invalid if more land is 
expropriated than is strictly required for the intended public purpose(s). On the basis of the 
Bartsch decision, Van der Walt argues that the validity of the primary purpose of the 
expropriation - the building of a public road - cannot simply justify the secondary purpose 
of transferring the excess land to a third party for economic development purposes.19 It 
was already indicated that the expropriation notice authorised the expropriation for 
constructing a road and doing all things necessary in constructing that road, and since the 
building of a shopping mall is arguably not included in this purpose to the extent that it is 
not necessary for the construction of a road to build a shopping mall next to it, the 
justifiability of the expropriation for purposes of building of the shopping should have been 
evaluated more strictly. 
In terms of South African law, the expropriator can only expropriate property in 
terms of authorising legislation. The legislation, namely the 1975 Expropriation Act as read 
with the 1996 Constitution, permits the expropriator to expropriate property for a public 
purpose or in the public interest. If the expropriator expropriates the property for a public 
purpose, such as building a road, the expropriator is arguably not justified to expropriate 
additional property to be used for a different purpose that might in itself not be a valid 
public purpose or that, even if it might be a valid purpose in itself, is not covered by the 
authorising legislation or necessary for the fulfilment of the primary purpose. If the 
additional property was expropriated for a public purpose - for instance for the purpose of 
establishing a service and recreation space where long-distance travellers could stop to 
refresh - expropriation of the additional property would have been justified.20 Alternatively, 
if the court in Bartsch tested the purpose for which the additional property was to be used 
and found that it was also a legitimate public purpose in terms of the authorising 
legislation, there would not have been an issue. In that event the expropriation of the 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 503. 
19
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 503. It should have been evaluated whether the 
development was for a public purpose, since such a finding could have justified the expropriation of the 
additional property. See the analysis in ch 4. 
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 See ch 4 at 4 6 3. 
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additional property would also have been justified. However, the failure of the court to 
consider whether the additional property would be used for a valid public purpose leaves 
room for an expropriating authority to abuse its expropriation power. 
 
5 2 2 Expropriation of Property Unnecessary 
5 2 2 1 Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 
In Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works21 (Erf 16 Bryntirion) the Minister of 
Public Works expropriated the applicant’s land for purposes of improving the security of 
the Bryntirion estate. The official residence of the President of South Africa, the state guest 
house and the houses of some cabinet members are situated in the Bryntirion estate. The 
applicant’s property was the only property in the estate that was not owned by the 
government. The Minister was of the view that the state had to own all the properties 
within the estate to ensure that the estate was properly secured. 
According to the Minister the security of the Bryntirion estate as a whole could only 
be upgraded effectively if the applicant’s property could be incorporated into the estate. 
The applicant, on the other hand, argued that the overall security of the Bryntirion estate 
could be improved without expropriating his property but by adopting other means such as 
constructing high walls around his property. The Minister was of the opinion that the 
building of high walls around the applicant’s property would not address the security issue 
due to the position of the applicant’s property in relation to the new entrance to the estate. 
The Minister argued that the applicant’s property ‘offers the prime possibility’ of setting up 
surveillance equipment to monitor traffic movements in and out of the estate; spying on the 
security methods applied in the estate; and housing persons who may intend to commit 
acts of sabotage or install equipment to jam telecommunications within the estate.22 
The high court considered whether the expropriation was for a public purpose in 
accordance with the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, whether the expropriation was justified 
in terms of the reasons given by the Minister, and whether the expropriation was 
procedurally fair. The court confirmed that the decision of the Minister to expropriate 
property in terms of the Expropriation Act was administrative action as contemplated by 
PAJA.23 Therefore, it considered whether the decision to expropriate was rational, 
justifiable and procedurally fair. The high court held that the decision was rational, because 
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the decision to expropriate addressed a legitimate security concern. It also held that the 
decision to expropriate was justifiable, because the Minister proved that the security 
measures could not be effectively implemented without incorporating the applicant’s 
property. Furthermore, it held that the decision to expropriate was procedurally fair since 
the applicant was given at least four opportunities to make representations to the Minister 
as to why the property should not be expropriated. 
The high court also considered whether the expropriation was for a public purpose 
in terms of the Expropriation Act. The court referred to Slabbert v Minister van Lande24 
(Slabbert), where it was held that the expropriation of property to improve the security and 
privacy of the Prime Minister was for a public purpose. In Slabbert the court held that the 
expropriation of property to improve the security of the Prime Minister was not an 
expropriation for a private purpose but for the advancement of the administration of the 
state and consequently for a public purpose. Therefore, the high court concluded that ‘the 
present case manifestly falls within the requirements of the Act [and] … is an expropriation 
for public purposes’.25 Once the court found that the expropriation was for a valid public 
purpose, the applicant’s argument relating to the availability of less invasive means to 
achieve the public purpose was addressed. The high court held that if the expropriation 
was for a valid public purpose the fact that there are other, possibly less intrusive means to 
achieve the result was irrelevant.26 
On appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal also considered whether the decision of 
the Minister to expropriate was rational and procedurally fair.27 It confirmed that the 
decision of the Minister was rationally connected to address a security concern and that it 
was procedurally fair. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal the high water mark of 
the applicant’s case was that the expropriation of his property was unnecessary, since 
there are other means available to the Minister to address the security concerns, such as 
incorporating his property in the new, upgraded estate. In this regard, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal held as follows: 
‘It is for the expropriating authority to decide how best to achieve its purpose. The 
evaluation of whether an expropriation is expedient or necessary lies with the expropriating 
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authority. The fact that there are other ways to achieve the purposes of the expropriation is 
irrelevant provided that the expropriation is for a “public purpose”’.28 
Therefore, both the high court and the Supreme Court of Appeal held that if an 
expropriation is for a valid public purpose, the argument that there are other, less intrusive 
measures to fulfil the public purpose will not be entertained. According to Van der Walt, 
this decision confirms the ‘standard view of the authority to take the decision to 
expropriate.’29 If the expropriation is for a public purpose, the decision of the expropriating 
authority cannot be questioned by the relevant parties or even by the courts,30 provided 
that the decision was made in good faith and without an ulterior motive.31 Since the 
decision of the Minister of Public Works to expropriate the applicant’s land was rationally 
connected to the intended purpose, both the high court and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that the decision to expropriate was not open to attack.32 
 
5 2 2 2 eThekwini Municipality v Sotirios Spetsiotis 
In eThekwini Municipality v Sotirios Spetsiotis,33 the applicant wanted to develop a beach 
front area for purposes of the 2010 Soccer World Cup. The respondent operated a 
restaurant on the beach front area in terms of a lease agreement between itself and the 
applicant. To develop the area the applicant had to demolish the premises on which the 
respondent was conducting its business. To achieve this aim the applicant expropriated 
the respondent’s lease. 
The respondent did not deny the potential benefits that the development would 
generate, but argued that there was no need to expropriate his lease for purposes of the 
development. According to the respondent, it was unnecessary for the applicant to 
demolish the building in which he operated his restaurant business since the 
redevelopment plan could be realised by simply relocating some of the restaurant’s 
outside seating area. Therefore, the respondent argued that there was no rational 
connection between the expropriation of its lease and the public purpose it intended to 
serve. 
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The court held that the development plan was for a public purpose and that there 
was a rational connection between the expropriation of the lease and the development 
plan. It did not consider whether the relocation of the respondent’s outside seating area 
would render the expropriation unnecessary because, according to the court, the 
respondent relied on the initial redevelopment scheme that was subsequently changed by 
the applicant. In terms of the changed redevelopment scheme the demolition of the 
building was inevitable. However, the court failed to consider whether the demolition of the 
building was strictly necessary for the purpose for which the lease was expropriated. 
 
5 2 3 Analysis 
The less invasive means argument presents itself in each of the three decisions discussed 
above, but in different forms. In the Bartsch34 decision the question relating to the less 
invasive means argument was based on the assumption that the expropriator could have 
elected to expropriate only two-thirds of the applicant’s property rather than the entire 
piece of property. In the Erf 16 Bryntirion35 and eThekwini Municipality v Sotirios 
Spetsiotis36 decisions the less invasive means argument related to the implementation of 
alternative means to expropriation that would still have resulted in the realisation of the 
public purpose. In the Erf 16 Bryntirion decisions the courts stated that alternative, less 
invasive measures are irrelevant when it has already been established that the 
expropriation is for a valid public purpose.37 The Supreme Court of Appeal also stated that 
there was no basis on which the expropriation of the applicant’s property for purposes of 
upgrading the security of the estate could be perceived as being irrational.38 In eThekwini 
Municipality v Sotirios Spetsiotis the court did not consider the alternative means since 
there was a rational connection between the expropriation and the fulfilment of the valid 
public purpose. In the Bartsch decision the court did not consider the alternative means, 
namely expropriating only the property strictly needed for the public purpose, since the 
court was of the opinion that the applicant confused motive with purpose. 
From these decisions it seems probable that the courts will not, in terms of section 
25(2), consider alternative means as an argument to invalidate an expropriation. This is 
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partly due to the rationality test that the courts apply in expropriation cases. The courts 
also adopt a deferential approach to the decision of the expropriator to expropriate 
property for a public purpose.39 
However, in terms of the logic advanced by the Constitutional Court in First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance40 (FNB), Van der Walt41 argues 
that the public purpose requirement could also be tested against the non-arbitrariness 
requirement in section 25(1). In FNB the Constitutional Court held that expropriation is a 
subset of deprivations and that review of all infringements with property has to start with 
the requirements for a valid deprivation in section 25(1).42 Although the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri SA43 stated that it is unnecessary to go 
through the deprivation analysis if both parties agree that the deprivation is not arbitrary 
and the only issue to be resolved is either whether there is in fact an expropriation or, in 
the event that there is an expropriation, the amount of compensation is attacked, there 
remain instances where the analysis has to start with section 25(1). For instance, when the 
lawfulness of the expropriation is attacked by one of the parties, in other words where the 
issue is whether the expropriation is for a valid purpose or in the public interest, the 
analysis should in all probability start with section 25(1). The reason for this is that any 
factor that would render the expropriation unconstitutional because it is not for a public 
purpose would also probably mean that it is an arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 
25(1). Therefore, apart from the specific requirements of section 25(2), considering 
whether the expropriation is justified in terms of the public purpose requirement because 
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there a less intrusive means available to the expropriator could also involve testing the 
expropriation against the requirements of section 25(1).44 
In terms of section 25(1), ‘[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of 
law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.’ The 
requirement ‘law of general application’ is also found in section 25(2) and seldom gives 
rise to difficulties in expropriation cases, since all expropriations rest on a legislative basis 
and is effected in terms of legislation, most notably the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.45 A 
deprivation may also not be arbitrary. A deprivation of property will be arbitrary if there is 
insufficient reason for it or if it is procedurally unfair.46 In terms of the procedurally unfair 
analysis, the test would resemble the procedural fairness test in terms of administrative 
law, but will probably only apply in cases where the deprivation is brought about directly by 
the legislation, without intervening administrative action.47 Since expropriation is almost 
always brought about by administrative action in South African law, this aspect of the 
arbitrariness test probably holds little if any meaning for expropriation cases. In terms of 
the test for substantive arbitrariness, namely whether there is sufficient reason for the 
deprivation, the test for non-arbitrariness could either be a rationality test or a 
proportionality test, depending on the relevant circumstances.48 
Van der Walt49 argues that in cases dealing with the core police power, for instance 
public health and safety, a rationality test would suffice, but in cases that go beyond the 
core police power a proportionality test would be more suitable. Instances where the 
application of the proportionality test would be more suitable than a rationality test include 
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the expropriation of property for the wider category of expropriation in the public interest 
such as broadly defined economic development purposes.50 In terms of the proportionality 
test the owner that bases his claim on the justifiability of the expropriation and not on the 
amount of compensation that is offered would be afforded additional protection by the 
application of a proportionality-type enquiry. In terms of the proportionality inquiry the 
effect that the expropriation has on the individual owner can be considered in addition to 
the rational link between the purpose of the expropriation and the means selected to 
realise it, which in turn means that the deprivation inquiry can include an investigation into 
whether alternative means are available to realise the purpose. 
However, given the decision in Erf 16 Bryntirion51 it is unclear whether the section 
25(1) inquiry would add anything in view of the rationality test applied in that inquiry and 
the rationality test applied in administrative law.52 Furthermore, decisions heard after FNB 
indicate that courts do not consistently apply the methodology, as adopted in FNB, 
according to which the arbitrariness test should be applied in all instances where property 
rights have been infringed.53 For instance, in Du Toit v Minister of Transport54 the 
Constitutional Court skipped the section 25(1) inquiry and proceeded directly to the 
question whether the compensation offered complied with section 25(3) of the 
Constitution. Although the applicability of this truncated approach in cases where it is 
agreed by all parties that there was an expropriation and where the amount of 
compensation is the only issue was confirmed in Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri 
SA,55 it was argued above that in certain situations the analysis necessarily has to start 
with section 25(1). This is arguably particularly the case when the justifiability of the public 
purpose supposed to be served by the expropriation is in issue, and by extension also 
when it is alleged that there are alternative, less invasive means available to satisfy the 
purpose. However, in view of the case law discussed earlier it remains uncertain whether 
the courts will apply a proportionality test, in terms of the non-arbitrariness test established 
in terms of section 25(1) by the Court in FNB, to expropriation cases of this kind. In that 
sense the alternative measures will possibly not be considered either. 
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However, the argument of Van der Walt56 in terms of the FNB and Erf 16 Bryntirion 
decisions concerning the test for arbitrariness in terms of section 25(1) can probably be 
extended to expropriation, in other words to section 25(2) cases. In the event that the 
expropriation concerns a function of government (akin to the core police-power functions) 
such as the building of roads and hospitals or the establishment of water catchment areas, 
the application of a rationality test will probably not have any negative effects for the 
affected property owner. However, in instances where the purpose of the expropriation 
moves away from these ‘traditional’ types of core purposes to a purpose that is not clearly 
defined or that is merely vaguely in the public interest an argument can be made for the 
application of a proportionality-type inquiry in terms of the section 25(2) public purpose 
requirement. In the Irish case law discussed below the proportionality inquiry involves the 
consideration as to whether the expropriator took alternative means into account when it 
decided to expropriate the property. The decision of the expropriator is therefore subjected 
to heightened scrutiny in a more contextual approach, taking into account various 
alternatives that might have been available. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether the 
South African courts will in fact develop this type of test in terms of section 25(2) of the 
Constitution, given the uncertainty that exists in case law concerning the distinction 
between the public purpose and public interest requirements. 
Because expropriation has such a drastic impact on an individual’s constitutionally 
protected property rights there must be a sufficient and pressing public purpose or public 
interest to justify the expropriation of one owner’s property for the benefit of the 
community.57 In principle the state should only be permitted to expropriate property that is 
strictly necessary for the fulfilment of the public purpose and the state’s expropriation 
power should be regarded as a tool to be used only when all other possibilities to realise 
the public purpose have proved to be ineffective. For instance, if the state wants to declare 
a portion of a person’s farm an environmentally sensitive area and wants to prevent 
development on that piece of property, it would first have to consider whether a non-
expropriatory, regulatory measure, such as placing a ban on development on the 
environmentally sensitive area, will sufficiently preserve the environment. Only if such a 
‘less invasive’ regulatory measure will be ineffective in achieving the relevant public 
purpose will the state be justified in expropriating the land. The state should also have 
considered buying the property and only if an agreement to buy proves to be impossible or 
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ineffective should it consider expropriating the land. However, if the regulatory measure 
would be just as effective - and would pass the non-arbitrariness test in terms of section 
25(1) - the public purpose requirement should prevent the expropriation since the 
expropriation is not strictly necessary for the achievement of the public purpose. 
Therefore, if the community can enjoy a benefit without one owner having to 
sacrifice his property through expropriation, the expropriation of his property to enable the 
community to enjoy the same benefit raises concern. This concern is not necessarily 
adequately addressed through the application of a thin rationality test since it excludes an 
inquiry into the availability of alternative and less invasive means. Since the decision to 
expropriate property is also administrative action, it should be investigated whether there is 
a mechanism in administrative law that would persuade the court to consider alternative 
means in terms of a different test. 
 
5 3 The Relevance of Motive in the Decision to Expropriate 
An ancillary issue in Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-
Phofung Municipality58 (Bartsch) is the relevance of motive in the decision to expropriate 
property. In Barstch the court stated that the motive behind the decision of the expropriator 
to expropriate is irrelevant when the power of expropriation was validly exercised. 
According to Gildenhuys,59 it is accepted that if the expropriation is for a public purpose, 
the motive behind the decision to expropriate is irrelevant. Gildenhuys refers to White 
Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minster of Community Development60 (White Rocks 
Farm), where the applicant argued that the real reason for the expropriation was of a 
financial nature, namely to save money. In the White Rocks Farm decision the court also 
held that the applicant confused motive with purpose. The purpose was a valid public 
purpose and the decision as to the best way to realise the purpose is the motive behind 
the decision. Since the purpose was a valid public purpose the motive behind the decision 
to expropriate the property rather than to adopt a different measure is irrelevant. In another 
decision, LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality,61 the applicant 
argued that his property was expropriated prematurely in order to avoid paying more 
compensation at a later stage. The court held that if the purpose of expropriation is a valid 
purpose and if the expropriation is undertaken in good faith, the motive behind the decision 
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to expropriate is irrelevant.62 Therefore, the motive in itself will not invalidate the 
expropriation.63 
Hoexter64 states that this line of argument, which has also been adopted in various 
other cases decided during the apartheid era, is not to be preferred. She refers to 
Broadway Mansions (Pty) Ltd v Pretoria City Council65 and Olifantsvlei Townships Ltd v 
Group Areas Development Act,66 where the court also refused to question the relevant 
administrator’s motives, ‘even if these might have been of a reprehensible kind.’67 Hoexter 
argues ‘that where a legitimate purpose has been pursued by a functionary, the court will 
not concern itself with the true motives of the functionary.’68 However, Hoexter prefers the 
approach taken in cases such as Waks v Jacobs69 and Hart v Van Niekerk NO,70 where 
the courts were prepared to question the motives behind the decisions of the 
administrators.71 For instance, Waks v Jacobs concerned the placing of a reservation on 
certain public parks for the exclusive use of white citizens. The purpose of the reservation 
was to solve a ‘black nuisance problem’72 in a white residential area. The court held that 
this reservation, which was made possible in terms of the Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act 49 of 1953, conflicted with section 63 of the Transvaal Local Government 
Ordinance 17 of 1939, which required the local authority to maintain parks for the benefit 
of all members of the public. Furthermore, the court held that the real reason for the 
reservation was politically motivated and not, as stated, for solving a nuisance problem.73 
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Baxter74 also argues that the motive behind an administrator’s decision to 
expropriate property for a public purpose cannot be irrelevant when a court reviews the 
decision of the administrator. He argues that the law should concern itself with whether the 
public authority was motivated by spite or ill-will towards the individual or whether the 
authority took unfair advantage of its powers.75 Hoexter agrees with Baxter’s argument that 
the motive behind the expropriation is relevant in so far as it can aid in the discovery of the 
real purpose.76 In this regard Gildenhuys also argues that the expropriator’s motive can be 
an indication that the stated purpose of expropriation is not the real purpose, which could 
render the expropriation invalid.77 
Quinot78 also points out that the court in Bartsch79 failed to recognise that motive 
(together with ulterior purpose) is an independent ground of review in terms of section 
6(2)(e)(ii) of PAJA.80 Furthermore, Quinot81 criticises the court’s reliance on pre-1996 
administrative law decisions and the failure on the court’s part to recognise that authorised 
reasons (section 6(2)(e)(i)) and good faith (section 6(2)(e)(v)) are further grounds of review 
in terms of PAJA. 
In Bartsch, the motive behind the decision of the administrator to expropriate the 
additional property may have been to stimulate the economy. To realise this goal, the 
administrator expropriated the entire parcel of property under the pretence that it was 
needed for the building of a public road when in reality part of the property was to be 
transferred to a third party for the construction of a shopping mall. The motive seems to be 
an indication of whether the property was to be expropriated - in its entirety - for a public 
purpose. Therefore, the motive cannot be totally irrelevant, because it can be an indication 
of where the public purpose really lies.82 In this decision it is arguable that the motive 
behind the decision to expropriate the property was to facilitate economic development of 
the property by a third party. That purpose in itself may be valid and may even be 
authorised by the relevant legislation, but in the absence of closer scrutiny it is unclear 
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whether this was in fact the case. Therefore, the motive behind the decision to expropriate 
property should be a relevant consideration when determining whether the expropriation is 
for a valid public purpose or in the public interest, at least in some cases. 
 
5 4 Administrative Law Implications 
5 4 1 The Administrative Law Principle of Reasonableness: Rationality and 
Proportionality 
In Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works83 the high court considered 
whether the decision of the administrator was rational. It held that the decision to 
expropriate ‘had a rational purpose relating [to] legitimate security concerns’.84 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal85 also confirmed that the decision of the Minister to expropriate 
the property was rationally connected to a security concern. In eThekwini Municipality v 
Sotirios Spetsiotis86 the court held that the expropriation of the applicant’s lease was 
rationally connected to the development of the beach front area. In Bartsch Consult (Pty) 
Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality87 the court did not consider 
whether there was a rational connection between the building of the road (the purpose of 
the expropriation) and the expropriation of the additional property. According to Van der 
Walt,88 the traditional view favoured by the courts, in which the decision to expropriate is 
‘open to no more than rationality review’,89 should be re-considered in light of the new 
constitutional principles of legality and reasonableness. 
In terms of the administrative justice requirement of reasonableness, an 
administrator’s decision must be rational and proportional.90 In terms of the rationality 
question, the decision of the administrator must be supported by the facts that the 
administrator had at his disposal when making the decision and this decision must be 
supported by the reasons for the decision.91 Therefore, if there is a rational connection 
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between the decision that was taken and the aim set out to be achieved, the decision of 
the administrator will be rational. 
A decision would also be irrational if it serves no lawful government purpose.92 In 
the Erf Bryntirion93 decisions it was accepted that the decision to expropriate was for a 
governmental purpose and that it was rational. Even if the decision of the expropriator was 
subjected to stricter scrutiny it is unlikely that the decision to expropriate would have been 
overturned, given that the expropriation was clearly for a public purpose and the Minister 
of Public Works showed that expropriation was the only way in which to improve the 
security of the Bryntirion estate.94 
However, in Bartsch the decision to expropriate was taken for the apparently ulterior 
purpose of benefiting a third party, and the fact that the court did not investigate whether 
the expropriation to benefit a third party was for a public purpose or in the public interest 
demonstrates the court’s deference towards the decision of the expropriator to expropriate 
property. This also implies that the court neglected to consider alternative means, since 
that would have involved questioning the expropriator’s decision. 
The approach of the courts to test the decision of the administrator only on the 
basis on rationality stems from the English law tradition based on the principle of 
parliamentary supremacy.95 In current South African law, where constitutional supremacy 
replaced parliamentary supremacy, it might be necessary for the courts to reconsider, in 
light of the new constitutional notion of reasonableness, its reluctance to decide whether 
less invasive means would have been available to the state to fulfil the desired purpose.96 
This could also involve the proportionality test, which is the second leg of the 
reasonableness question.97 
In terms of the proportionality test, the adopted measure (in this case the decision 
to expropriate property) must be proportional to the aim (the purpose) that is to be 
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achieved by the expropriation.98 This proportionality principle includes three sets of 
questions. Firstly, it should be considered whether the adopted measure is suitable to 
achieve the aim.99 In other words, it should be established whether there is an appropriate 
balance between the means adopted and the end result.100 Secondly, it should be 
established whether the adopted measure is strictly necessary.101 According to De Ville, 
this involves considering whether any ‘lesser form of interference with the rights of a 
person was possible in order to achieve the desired aim (such alternative measures being 
equally effective to the measure taken)’.102 Thirdly, if the adopted measure is both suitable 
and strictly necessary, it should be considered if it does not place an unfair or 
disproportionate burden on the individual whose rights are affected.103 
The status of proportionality as a ground for review is controversial in South African 
law.104 Proportionality was not specifically included in PAJA as a ground for review, but 
substituted with section 6(2)(h), ‘a ground dealing with unreasonable effects’.105 Although 
there are fears that the courts would be overburdened by this type of review or that courts 
would replace the decision (or policy) of administrators with its own policy preferences,106 
Hoexter argues that the meaning of reasonableness supposes ‘an area of “legitimate 
diversity,”’107 an area in which many reasonable choices can be made.108 
Although the status of this ground of review is controversial in South African 
administrative law,109 it is worth considering whether this principle should not apply in 
South African expropriation law as it does in German expropriation law. Therefore, 
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German expropriation law is discussed with a focus on the constitutional principle of 
proportionality that also specifically applies to expropriation law. 
 
5 4 2 Proportionality in German Expropriation Law 
As indicated in the previous chapter, article 14.3 of the 1949 Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany states that property can only be expropriated if it is undertaken for a 
public good.110 It was also argued that article 14 of the Basic Law is a guarantee of the 
substance of property and not its equivalent in monetary value. As a result, an 
expropriation of property is not justified by the payment of compensation.111 The Federal 
Constitutional Court, which has authority to test whether actions of the state or legislation 
complies with the Basic Law, scrutinizes the expropriation, and specifically the purpose of 
the expropriation, carefully.112 In terms of article 14.3 expropriations must be authorised by 
a valid law and, in terms of the linking clause (Junktim-Klausel), the law has to determine 
the manner and extent of the compensation that has to be paid.113 In the event that the 
limitation results in an expropriation of property without making provision for 
compensation, the limitation will be invalid.114 
The expropriation must be for the public good (zum Wohle der Allgemeinheit)115 but 
it is up to the legislature to decide for which purpose the expropriated property is to be 
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used. In a concurring judgment in the Dürkheimer Gondelbahn116 decision, Böhmer J 
summarised the understanding of the public good requirement in terms of German 
expropriation law. Böhmer J interpreted the public good requirement as requiring that the 
expropriation ‘must be strictly necessary’117 for the fulfilment of the particular public good. 
Therefore, the legislation that authorises the expropriation must clearly state the purpose 
for which the property is expropriated and this purpose must be for the public good.118 
Apart from the specific requirements of article 14.3, an expropriation also has to 
satisfy the general requirements that apply when limitations are placed on property.119 This 
includes the proportionality requirement as well as constitutional principles such as 
equality and the protection of trust.120 The principle of proportionality plays a central role in 
German constitutional law.121 Although there is no explicit reference to the proportionality 
principle in the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court often invokes this principle to 
test whether an act of government or legislation is in conflict with the Basic Law.122 
Proportionality, as understood in German law, consists of three aspects.123 Firstly, 
the means adopted must be appropriate or suitable to the fulfilment of the end result.124 
Secondly, the adopted means must have the least restrictive effect on the right protected 
in the Basic Law.125 In terms of this consideration the standard that must be met is that of 
rationality.126 Thirdly, the adopted means must be proportionate to the end result.127 
Therefore, the burden placed on the individual’s right must not be excessive.128 
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In terms of this understanding of the public good, coupled with the proportionality 
principle described above, the German Federal Constitutional Court has indicated that an 
expropriation can only be valid if it is the only feasible manner (ultima ratio) to achieve the 
public good.129 In this regard Mostert states that the expropriation must be requisite, which 
means that no ‘other more lenient or less serious method would have been appropriate’.130 
For example, if the state could have acquired the land on the open market or if the state 
already has sufficient land at its disposal for realising that specific purpose, the 
expropriation will be invalid.131 Furthermore, if the state expropriates an entire parcel of 
land, but only a section is strictly required for the purpose, the expropriation of the entire 
parcel will also be invalid.132 Therefore, if the purpose of the expropriation could have been 
served by adopting less drastic means, the expropriation will be invalid.133 This is in 
accordance with the view of the German courts that the public good that is served by the 
expropriated property has to be strictly necessary to ensure that the appropriate balance 
between the protection of the individual property right and the interests of the society is 
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maintained.134 Therefore, in terms of German law the state’s power of expropriation can 
only be implemented as a matter of last resort. If the expropriation can be served without 
expropriating the property, expropriation will be unlawful. 
Given the similarities between the German property clause and section 25(1)-(3) of 
the 1996 Constitution135 it is arguable that expropriation should also be regarded as a 
matter of last resort in South African expropriation law. In Harvey v Umhlatuze 
Municipality136 the court confirmed that the expropriation is justified by the public purpose 
that is served and not by the payment of compensation. This indicates that the mere 
payment of compensation does not justify the state to expropriate property, but that the 
public purpose must justify the expropriation on its own, regardless of the fact of 
compensation. 
It can be said that the strict German approach to the expropriation of property for 
public purposes means that the state should only be allowed to use its expropriating 
powers as a matter of last resort.137 If the public purpose requirement is understood to 
mean that expropriation can only be utilised as a matter of last resort the question of 
alternative means (other than expropriation) surfaces, since the availability of a different, 
less invasive mean to fulfil the public good would invalidate the expropriation. 
The German courts’ approach to the evaluation of the public purpose is in contrast 
to the position of the courts in the United States. The German courts interpret the public 
purpose requirement strictly in terms of the authorising legislation. Therefore, the courts 
strictly evaluates both the justification of the expropriation in terms of the public purpose 
the expropriation is intended to serve and the authorising legislation, which must 
specifically authorise the expropriation for the fulfilment of the particular public purpose.138 
The courts in the United States, especially the US Supreme Court, are deferential to the 
decision of the legislature as to what constitutes a valid public purpose. Various decisions 
prove that the courts’ power to review the decision as to what constitutes a valid public 
purpose is severely limited, effectively giving the legislature ‘wide scope in determining 
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what is or is not a public purpose for purposes of expropriation.’139 As a result, when the 
courts are satisfied that there is a rational connection between the taking and the purpose, 
the taking is upheld and the question concerning less invasive means does not surface. 
The courts in Ireland are also deferential towards the decision of the legislature as 
to what constitutes a public purpose.140 However, as is argued below, although the Irish 
courts are usually fairly deferential towards the decision to expropriate, they do consider 
whether less invasive means were available and whether the expropriating authority 
considered the alternative means before it made the compulsory purchase order.141 
 
5 5 Acceptance of the Less Invasive Means Argument: Irish Law 
Case law from the Republic of Ireland shows that Irish courts are more receptive than the 
South African courts to the argument that the expropriator could have adopted a less 
invasive measure in fulfilment of a particular public good. Forde argues that if the purpose 
of the expropriation can be achieved without expropriating property, the compulsory 
acquisition of property can be invalidated since it is unnecessary and disproportionate.142 
Therefore, the Irish courts consider whether the expropriator took the availability of 
alternative means into account before it decided to expropriate property, since doing so 
could indicate whether the expropriation was in fact for the public good. 
Similar to the position in German law, Hogan and Whyte state that ‘compensation 
cannot validate an interference with property rights that is not justified by the exigencies of 
the common good’.143 The authors’ argument was accepted by the Irish court in Clinton v 
An Bord Pleanála and Others144 and Egan v An Bord Pleanála.145 Therefore, it must be 
shown that the compulsory acquisition of property is in the public interest; the mere 
                                            
139
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 483. See the discussion in ch 4 at 4 4 1 
concerning the decisions of the US Supreme Court (Berman v Parker 348 US 26 (1954), Midkiff v Hawaii 
Housing Authority 267 US 229 (1984), Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005)) where this deferent 
approach is pertinent. 
140
 See Walsh R ‘“The Principles of Social Justice” and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for 
Redevelopment in the United States and Ireland’ (2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23. See the 
discussion of the Irish decisions in ch 4 at 4 4 3 where this deferent approach is described. 
141
 See Walsh R Private Property Rights in the Irish Constitution (PhD thesis Trinity College Dublin 2011) 
245. 
142
 Forde M Constitutional Law (2
nd
 ed 2004) 737. See also Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: 
A Comparative Analysis (1999) 239. 
143
 Hogan G & Whyte G (eds) JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4
th
 ed 2003) para 7 7 88. See also Walsh R 
‘“The Principles of Social Justice” and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for Redevelopment in 
the United States and Ireland’ (2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23 at 9; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 471. 
144
 [2005] IEHC 84. 
145
 [2011] IEHC 44. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 157 
 
payment of compensation cannot justify the expropriation.146 Irish courts can therefore 
strike down an expropriation if it can be shown that the purpose of the expropriation can be 
achieved by less drastic measures. The decisions in which the plaintiffs have argued that 
the expropriator should have applied a less drastic measure than expropriation to fulfil the 
public purpose are discussed below. 
In O’Brien v Bord na Móna,147 the plaintiff argued that the permanent expropriation 
of his bogland for the extraction of turf in terms of the Turf Development Act of 1946 
conflicted with articles 40 and 43 of the Irish Constitution of 1937. The Turf Development 
Act also allowed for the temporary expropriation of land for this purpose and the plaintiff 
argued that his property should have been expropriated temporarily rather than 
permanently. In this regard the plaintiff argued that the property should re-vest in him once 
all the turf had been extracted from his property. The high court held that the public 
interest justifies the permanent expropriation of the applicant’s land, even until after the 
land had been stripped of all turf. The Supreme Court did not deal with this issue, but in 
relation to this decision Hogan and Whyte state that it is ‘arguable that an interference with 
property rights, even when in essence warranted by the common good, must not exceed 
the measure of that exigency’.148 
In An Blascaod Mór and Others v The Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland149 
the Commissioner of Public Works served a compulsory purchase order on the applicants 
in terms of the An Blascaod Mór National Historic Park Act 11 of 1989. The Great Blasket 
or An Blascaod Mór is a small island where a small community lives. Despite its size, the 
community of the Great Blasket produced an ‘extraordinary literary legacy’.150 Writers of 
the island also attracted renowned scholars to the island. The aim of the Act was to 
establish and maintain, for the common good, a national historic park that includes the 
preservation of the dwellings used by the famous writers. 
In relation to the right to property the plaintiffs argued that the expropriation was not 
for a public purpose and that the objective of the Act, which includes preserving the 
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amenity and allowing access to the general public, could be achieved by less intrusive 
means such as promulgating regulatory legislation that could prevent further development 
of the area.151 Therefore, on the basis of article 43.2.2 the plaintiffs argued that the state 
should have adopted less drastic measures. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that the 
state should observe the principle of proportionality in reconciling the rights to property and 
the exigencies of the common good.152 
The court held that the Act was discriminatory since it differentiated between people 
who have occupied property on the island before and after 17 November 1953. If a person 
occupied the property before 17 November 1953, his property could not be expropriated in 
terms of the Act. However, if a person acquired the property after 17 November 1953 his 
property could be expropriated. The plaintiffs all acquired their respective properties after 
17 November 1953, which meant that their properties could be expropriated, while other 
owners’ properties were exempt from expropriation in terms of this Act. 
In the absence of any legitimate reasons to differentiate between these two groups, 
the court held that the discrimination in terms of the Act was not justified in terms of the 
common good. Therefore, the court concluded that the legislation and manner in which the 
state attempted to enforce the regime signalled a failure on the part of the state to protect 
the plaintiffs’ property rights from unjust attack in contravention of article 40.3.2.153 The 
court also held that the state’s attempt to delimit the rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
‘in accordance with the exigencies of the common good’154 was contrary to article 43.2.3 of 
the Constitution.155 
Walsh points out that this decision provides an example of a proportionality test 
applied on the basis of the constitutional requirement in article 43.156 In this decision the 
court stated that ‘exigencies’ does not mean useful or desirable, but necessary. In this 
regard the court held that the encroachment (the expropriation) must be proportionate to 
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the aim. Accordingly, the question to be asked is whether a ‘pressing social need’ is 
present so as to justify the infringement of the right to property.157 
In the case of Lord Ballyedmond v The Commission for Energy Regulation and 
Others158 the Bord Gáis Éireann (BGE) expropriated the applicant’s land in terms of article 
8(1) of the Gas Act of 1976. In terms of this Act the BGE is mandated to develop a gas 
supply network. To establish this network the BGE acquired the temporary right to enter 
the land while constructing the pipeline, as well as a permanent right to enter onto the land 
in order to maintain and operate the pipeline once completed.159 
On 7 December 2005 the Commission for Energy Regulation issued an acquisition 
order for the construction of a pipeline which traversed the applicant’s property. Before this 
order was issued, the applicant consulted with the Commission regarding the proposed 
route of the pipeline. The Commission preferred route A, which was the most direct route 
that the pipeline could follow. This route was also the least expensive, but it ran directly 
through the applicant’s property. The applicant proposed a different route, route B. Route 
B was much longer than route A, but implementing route B would cause the pipeline to be 
further away from the applicant’s house and would also run across the applicant’s 
neighbours’ property. The Commission proposed a third route, route C, but this route was 
not acceptable to the applicant. 
The Commission compiled a report in which it assessed the feasibility of the three 
proposed routes. In terms of the report, route A was recommended because it was the 
optimum route taking in account factors such as safety, environmental impact and financial 
considerations. In terms of the report it was concluded that route A was the most economic 
route, while route B was the least economic. As a result, the Commission compulsorily 
acquired the applicant’s property to construct the pipeline along route A. 
According to the court, ‘[i]t is always open to a person in respect of whom a 
compulsory purchase order is sought to suggest that different land may meet the 
requirement of the acquiring authority’.160 However, the decision that the Commission had 
to make was not whether an alternative route was preferable, but whether the acquisition 
should be made. According to the court there could be instances where a different route 
would have had less adverse effects and in which case there would come a point where 
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the Commission acted irrationally or disproportionately in not choosing the alternative 
route. Alternatively, there could be situations where a different route could have more 
advantages and in which case the Commission could cross a certain point where it acted 
irrationally or disproportionately in not opting for the alternative route. Therefore, the 
question before the Commission was not whether route B was better than route A or C but 
whether ‘it was inappropriate [for the Commission] to make acquisition orders in respect of 
Route A because of any demonstrated superiority of an alternative’.161 
This decision shows that the expropriated owner can argue that there are less 
intrusive means to achieve the public purpose, but there should be a substantive reason 
for choosing the alternative and not mere unhappiness over the proposed expropriation.162 
According to the court, the Commission’s decision to select route A might have been 
disproportionate or irrational, and therefore invalid, if there had been an obvious, more 
suitable alternative route.163 If there had been an obvious, more suitable route, the court 
would have found the decision of the Commission to choose route A to be disproportionate 
and irrational and therefore invalid. However, this would probably not be in terms of the 
public purpose requirement, but in terms of administrative law principles. The position 
would probably be similar in South African law. If the decision of the expropriating authority 
is unreasonable the decision to expropriate would be invalid in terms of administrative law 
principles and not on the basis of section 25(2). 
However, the Lord Ballyedmond v The Commission for Energy Regulation and 
Others164 decision shows that the owner of property can suggest alternatives when his 
property is to be expropriated. Furthermore, this decision suggests that Irish courts are 
open to consider alternative measures that would reduce the harsh effect of expropriation. 
This is different to the approach taken by the South African courts, where the availability of 
less invasive means is not considered when the expropriation is for a public purpose.165 
 
5 6 Conclusion 
It seems unlikely that the South African courts will pay much attention to the availability of 
less invasive means in terms of the public purpose requirement in section 25(2) of the 
1996 Constitution. When the courts are satisfied that there is a rational connection 
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between the expropriation and the purpose that is served, the decision to expropriate is 
apparently not open to attack, provided that the expropriation is for a valid public 
purpose.166 
This approach might be justified in instances where the purpose of expropriation is 
uncontroversial, such as the building of roads, establishing conservation areas and 
improving the security of the State President.167 It was already indicated above that even if 
a proportionality test was applied in the Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public 
Works168 decisions, it would not have changed the outcome. Ensuring the safety and 
security of the President was for a public purpose, and if expropriation is the best means to 
realise the purpose, the decision to expropriate will not be set aside. Similarly, if a road 
needs to be built the court will not simply invalidate the expropriation because the owner 
proposes a different route that does not traverse his property but other property. In this 
regard the Irish decision of Lord Ballyedmond v The Commission for Energy Regulation 
and Others169 is informative. In that decision the court stated that the expropriation of 
specific property could only be questioned if a substantive reason that should have moved 
the authority to rather select a different route was present. 
However, in instances where the purpose of the expropriation is in itself 
controversial, such as expropriating property for economic development purposes or 
transferring expropriated property to third parties for economic development purposes, a 
mere rationality test may lead to unjust results. In Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral 
Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality170 the court did not consider alternative 
means - expropriating only the property necessary for the building of the road - since the 
court was of the view that the applicant confused motive with purpose. It is arguable that 
the court ought to at least have tested whether the purpose of expropriation, namely 
economic development, was in the public interest. In terms of the rationality test the impact 
that the expropriation had on the property owner was not considered at all, nor was it 
considered whether there was an appropriate balance between the infringement of the 
property owner’s right and the end result. This can in effect mean that the property owner 
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has to bear the burden of expropriation alone, not for the sake of the community or the 
public at large, but for the economic benefit of another private party. 
In terms of a stricter proportionality enquiry, due consideration could be given to the 
appropriate balance between the impact on the property owner and the purpose of the 
expropriation. Therefore, courts should probably apply a proportionality test, possibly on 
the basis of administrative law, in expropriation cases, since an enquiry into the 
proportionality of the decision to expropriate arguably affords stronger protection of 
property rights by ensuring that expropriation must be strictly necessary to achieve the 
desired aim. In the event that alternative less intrusive measures are available it should at 
least cast doubt on whether the expropriation is strictly necessary and justified. 
It was indicated above that in German law the application of the general 
constitutional principle of proportionality dictates that an expropriation must be the only 
way in which the public purpose can be realised. In the event that an alternative and less 
burdensome measure is available, the expropriation would be unlawful. This leads to the 
conclusion that the availability of less invasive measures plays a central role in the 
expropriation process, and is not irrelevant as is the case in present South African law. 
The Irish case law referred to above is an example that indicates the courts’ 
consideration of the less invasive means argument. The Irish courts do not simply dismiss 
the alternative measure when it has been decided that the expropriation is for a valid 
public purpose, but evaluates whether the expropriating authority considered and should 
have considered the alternatives. Although the availability of an alternative measure does 
not automatically invalidate an expropriation it can indicate that the decision to expropriate 
should be reviewed, and possibly be set aside, because the alternative measure was not 
considered in the expropriation process. 
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CHAPTER 6: NON-REALISATION, COMPLETION, OR 
ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 
 
6 1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, it is shown that the public purpose or public interest justifies an 
expropriation, while the payment of compensation is merely a result of an expropriation.1 
Therefore, difficulties arise when the original public purpose that justifies the expropriation 
is not implemented or if it comes to an end. This problem can arise in two different 
situations, but raise similar issues. The first situation is where the purpose for which the 
property was expropriated cannot be or is not realised. The second situation arises when 
the original public purpose was realised but later ends or is abandoned. Both situations 
can also involve a change in purpose, namely that the property is used for a different 
purpose for which it was expropriated. 
The first situation, where the original public purpose is not or cannot be realised, 
can arise due to a number of reasons. It might be impossible for the expropriating authority 
to implement the original public purpose either as a result of unforeseen financial 
constraints or because it has become physically impossible to realise. The same problem 
can arise when a burdensome regulatory measure is implemented by a different and 
higher authority after the property has been expropriated, for instance when a new national 
physical planning measure renders the local planning scheme impossible to realise. The 
state may also simply decide to abandon the original purpose. The non-realisation of the 
original public purpose casts serious doubts on the legitimacy of the expropriation, since 
the property was expropriated for that particular purpose, which has now become 
unrealisable or is simply abandoned. A relevant consideration in this regard is whether the 
state acted in bad faith when it originally expropriated the property. If the property was 
expropriated in bad faith, in other words the expropriating authority knew that the purpose 
would not be realisable once it has expropriated the property, the expropriation would be 
invalid.2 
The second situation, where the original public purpose was implemented but later 
comes to an end or is abandoned, can also arise due to a number of reasons. The original 
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public purpose can end upon the completion of a particular project or the state can decide 
to abandon the current use of the property, either because the original purpose has 
through time become impossible due to changing circumstances or because there is some 
other need not originally foreseen for which the property can be used more effectively.3 
If it is accepted that the public purpose justifies the expropriation of property, non-
realisation, completion or abandonment of the original public purpose should in principle 
mean that the justification for the expropriation falls away, unless a new legitimate public 
purpose is put forward.4 When a new public purpose is not put forward the state is in 
principle no longer justified in taking or retaining ownership of the property, since the 
justification for so doing arguably falls away when the public purpose is not realised or 
ends, unless a new purpose is put forward. Therefore, in both situations it is possible that 
a change in purpose can justify the state to retain possession of the property and to use it 
for a different purpose. However, in this chapter it is argued that the changed purpose 
should also be a valid public purpose and the courts should be able to test the new 
purpose against the public purpose or public interest requirements of section 25(2) of the 
Constitution. In that way the state would not be able to use expropriated property for 
purposes other than for a public purpose or the public interest. 
The possibilities raised above are important for this dissertation because a changed 
purpose can involve economic development purposes as well as third party transfers for 
economic development purposes. For instance, in Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and 
Others5 (Harvey) the change in purpose involved the sale of the expropriated land to a 
third party for development purposes. In instances where the purpose of expropriation is 
vaguely linked to a public purpose, such as economic development, and where the courts 
apply a low level of scrutiny as to the legitimacy of the purpose, the non-realisation of the 
original purpose seems more likely. For instance, in Poletown Neighborhood Council v City 
of Detroit6 it was projected that a certain number of jobs would be created while the jobs 
actually created was almost half the projected number.7 Furthermore, in Kelo v City of New 
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London8 the development for which the properties were expropriated has to date not yet 
been implemented. 
An important question that arises upon non-realisation of the public purpose (and 
one that can also be asked when the realised public purpose comes to an end or is 
abandoned) is whether the courts are able to order that the previously expropriated 
property be returned to the previous owner. This question was addressed in Harvey where 
the applicant argued that the expropriator should return the expropriated property to him 
when the original public purpose for which the property was expropriated could not be 
realised. 
All the questions that are mentioned above are discussed in this chapter, namely 
whether the state is justified in continuing to possess and use expropriated property for a 
different purpose when the original purpose for which it was expropriated becomes 
impossible, ends or is abandoned; what level of scrutiny the courts should apply when 
adjudicating claims involving change, termination or abandonment of the purpose; and 
whether the original owner may have a claim for re-transfer of the property if the original 
purpose of the expropriation is not realised or abandoned. Each of these issues is 
considered in view of the implications for property that was either expropriated or is to be 
used for economic development, including instances where such use involves transfer of 
the property to a third party. 
 
6 2 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 
In Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others9 the court had to consider whether the 
public purpose requirement endures beyond the initial act of expropriation. The 
municipality expropriated the applicant’s land for a valid public purpose - creating a public 
recreational open space and conservation area - but when the purpose could not be 
realised the municipality changed the intended use of the property. The new purpose 
involved sale of the land on tender to a private developer for the erection of residential 
houses. The applicant argued that the first respondent had an obligation to award him 
restitution of his former property - against payment of the market value - since the first 
respondent abandoned its plan to use the property for the original purpose.10 
                                                                                                                                                 
opportunities that the development of the Poletown area would have created, only about 3600 actually 
materialised. 
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Since there is no legislative authority for this proposition in South African law, the 
applicant relied on a particular interpretation of the public purpose requirement in section 
25(2) of the 1996 Constitution, based on authority in German law. The applicant argued 
that when the public purpose falls away, becomes impossible, or is changed, the 
expropriation is no longer ‘legally and constitutionally sustainable in the face of a claim to 
the property by the original owner’.11 
Before investigating the applicant’s argument in terms of German law, the court 
considered expropriation in South African law as well as in other foreign jurisdictions. In 
terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 there are only two prerequisites for a valid 
expropriation: it must be for a public purpose and compensation must be paid. In terms of 
section 25(2) of the Constitution, expropriation must be for a public purpose or in the public 
interest and just and equitable compensation must be paid. The court confirmed that the 
public purpose requirement serves as the justification for the expropriation, while the 
payment of compensation is merely the result of the expropriation.12 
The court considered foreign law on the question whether re-transfer of 
expropriated property is possible if the original purpose falls away, becomes impossible or 
is abandoned.13 In English law, administrative rules14 recommend that the public authority 
should grant the expropriated owner or her descendants the first opportunity to purchase 
the land at the current market value in the event that the property is no longer needed for 
the purpose for which it was required.15 In French law, the expropriating authority must use 
the property for the public purpose for which it was expropriated.16 If the property is not 
used for the intended purpose or if the purpose ceases the expropriated owner may, within 
five years, demand the restitution of his property, provided that the expropriating authority 
has not requested use of the property for a new public purpose.17 When the expropriating 
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authority sells the land, the previous owner has the first option to re-purchase the land.18 
Similarly, in Italian law, the previous owner can reclaim his previously expropriated 
property in the event that the property is not used for the intended purpose in the time-
frame provided by the authorising legislation.19 In Canada, the Canada Act of 1982 permits 
the Minister of Public Works to expropriate property if it would be for a public work or 
another public purpose. If the Minister abandons the purpose, he must file a notice of his 
intention to abandon. The expropriated owner can either accept or reject the 
abandonment. If he accepts the abandonment of the purpose the expropriation proceeds, 
but if he rejects it the property should be returned to him.20 The court also undertook an 
overview of expropriation law in Australia,21 Sweden22 and the United States.23 However, 
the court did not clearly state whether the abandonment of the initial public purpose in 
these jurisdictions necessitates or allows the re-transfer of the property to the original 
owner. 
From the discussion of foreign law the court concluded that there is no unfettered 
power of expropriation. The power of expropriation must be justified by its serving some 
‘public purpose, use, interest, benefit or necessity’.24 The state can only retain possession 
of the property as long as the property is used for the reason for which it was expropriated. 
However, in jurisdictions where the re-transfer of expropriated property occurs it is not 
through the inherent power of the courts, but in terms of legislation or administrative rules 
that specifically regulate this matter. 
Nevertheless, the applicant argued that since the public purpose was abandoned, 
he had a right to reclaim the expropriated property. To substantiate this claim, the 
applicant relied on an argument made by Van der Walt.25 Relying on German law,26 Van 
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22
 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) paras 100-103. 
23
 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) paras 104-107. 
24
 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 114. 
25
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 256. In Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law 
(3
rd
 ed 2011) 493-499, this argument was retained and expanded with reference to Harvey v Umhlatuze 
Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) and the Malaysian decision of United Development 
Company Sdn Bhd v The State Government of Sabah and Another [2011] 7 MLJ 209, which is discussed 
below at 6 4 2. However, since the applicant’s argument was based on Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law (2005), references to both the 2005 and 2011 editions are included below. 
26
 BVerfGE 38, 175 [1974], BVerfGE 56, 249 [1981] (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn); BVerfGE 97, 89 [1997]. In 
BVerfGE 38, 175 [1974], the Federal Constitutional Court held that the ownership guarantee in art 14 of the 
Basic Law serves as the basis for the repurchase of the property by the former owner if the public purpose is 
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der Walt states that if property was ‘expropriated for a public purpose that was never 
realised (of for a purpose that ceased to exist),’27 the property should be returned to the 
previous owner, even if compensation was paid.28 If the public purpose falls away, the 
state is no longer justified in retaining the property. Therefore, Van der Walt states that 
‘[t]he public purpose that justifies expropriation has to endure beyond the initial act of 
expropriation and must have a lasting rather than fleeting or temporary quality to secure the 
interest of the public in fulfilment of that purpose.’29 
In German law, specific statutes provide for the re-transfer of previously expropriated 
property upon non-realisation of the public purpose.30 Therefore, the public purpose 
requirement is bolstered by legislation to ensure that the expropriated property could be 
re-transferred to its original owner in the event that the public purpose becomes 
impossible.31 Furthermore, these statutes often provide for the amount that the previous 
owner has to repay in such an event. In the absence of legislation, German courts have 
held that this principle of re-transfer is implied in the property guarantee in article 14 of the 
Basic Law of 1949.32 However, since there is no equivalent doctrine or comparable 
legislation in South African law, the court in Harvey was not willing to order re-transfer.33 
Instead, the court held that since the municipality initially expropriated the property 
in good faith, a change in circumstances that renders the original purpose impossible 
justifies the municipality’s decision to change the purpose for which the property is to be 
used. Therefore, the court held that the applicant was not entitled to the restitution of his 
                                                                                                                                                 
amongst others, specifically provides for ‘re-expropriation’. See Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 
2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) paras 129-131; Du Plessis E ‘Restitution of Expropriated Property upon Non-
realisation of the Public Purpose’ 2011 TSAR 579-592 at 588-589. 
27
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 256; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 
ed 2011) 494. 
28
 See Wendt R ‘Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung’ in Sachs M (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 2007) 
582-639 at 629 para 165 and the discussion of German law below. 
29
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 256. See also Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 493-494. 
30
 See Sonnekus JC & Pleysier AJH ‘Eiendomsverwerwing of –verlies onder `n Tydsbepaling of `n 
Voorwaarde en die Privaatregtelike Implikasies vir Onteiening (Deel 2)’ 2011 TSAR 601-625 at 613-619. 
31
 BVerfGE 97 89 [1997]; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 
149. See also Papier HJ ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T, Dürig G et al (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar Vol II (53
rd
 update 
2008) 311 para 591; Van der Walt AJ & Slade BV ‘Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey V 
Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)’ (2012) 129 SALJ 219-235 at 224. 
32
 BVerfGE 38, 175 [1974]; Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 97. 
See also Currie DP The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 293-294; Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 149; Du Plessis E ‘Restitution of 
Expropriated Property upon Non-realisation of the Public Purpose’ 2011 TSAR 579-592 at 589. 
33
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 497. The high court relied on the Constitutional 
Court’s decision in First National Bank of SA t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA t/a v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC), where the Constitutional Court held 
that foreign law cannot by ‘simplistic transference’ determine the proper interpretation of the South African 
bill of rights. See also Du Plessis E ‘Restitution of Expropriated Property upon Non-realisation of the Public 
Purpose’ 2011 TSAR 579-592 at 582. 
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previously expropriated property, because the principle that expropriated property should 
be returned to the previous owner upon the non-realisation of the stated public purpose 
does not form part of South African law.34 
 
6 3 Evaluation of Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 
6 3 1 Introduction 
Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others35 illustrates an interesting aspect of 
expropriation law that has not surfaced in South African law before.36 According to the 
construction relied on by the plaintiff in this case, non-realisation of the public purpose 
might allow the previous owner, in principle at least, to claim re-transfer of his expropriated 
property, provided he repays either the compensation initially received or the current 
market value. However, the court refused to grant such an order on the basis that there is 
no South African legislation or doctrine similar to that which exists in German law that 
would assist the court in making such an order.37 
In Chapter 5 it is argued that the state should only use its expropriating power in 
exceptional instances or, in other words, as a matter of last resort.38 Therefore, if the state 
requires property for a specific public purpose and cannot acquire the property on the 
open market, it is allowed to expropriate the property. But the public purpose must be 
evaluated strictly since the property is expropriated against the will of the owner. Although 
the expropriated owner receives compensation, the expropriation is justified by the public 
purpose that is served and not by the compensation. This means that, in principle at least, 
the state is not allowed to do with the property as it pleases, even after expropriation.39 
 
                                            
34
 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 497. 
35
 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP). 
36
 See Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional Property Law’ 2010 ASSAL 251-294 at 288. 
37
 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 497; Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional 
Property Law’ 2010 ASSAL 251-294 at 291. In Ouano and Others v Mactan-Cebu International Airport 
Authority; Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v Inocian and Others GR No 168770; GR No 168812, 
9 February 2011 (Republic of the Philippines) the Supreme Court of Manila granted the re-transfer of the 
expropriated property upon the non-realisation of the public purpose without any legislative foundation. 
38
 See also Sonnekus JC & Pleysier AJH ‘Eiendomsverwerwing of –verlies onder `n Tydsbepaling of `n 
Voorwaarde en die Privaatregtelike Implikasies vir Onteiening (Deel 2)’ 2011 TSAR 601-625 at 607. 
39
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 498. 
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6 3 2 Absence of a Legislative Basis 
The power of expropriation in South Africa is purely based on statutory law; there is no 
common law power of expropriation.40 Since statute law does not provide for the re-
transfer of expropriated property and given that there is no common law rule to that effect 
either, it is probably understandable that the high court was reluctant to grant the order for 
re-transfer in Harvey.41 In this regard, Van der Walt argues as follows: 
‘It is perhaps understandable that the High Court should be hesitant to effect a quite 
important development of the law, without any statutory foundation, purely on the basis of 
examples from foreign law that are based on jurisdiction-specific statutory foundations.’42 
However, Sonnekus and Pleysier43 argue that there is no reason why the South African 
Constitutional Court could not develop such a right of re-claim as the German 
Constitutional Court did in several decisions.44 The authors base their argument on the 
similarities between section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution, which protects property against 
arbitrary deprivation, and article 14 of the German Basic Law.45 As a result, the authors 
suggest that the South African Constitutional Court could deduce a general right of re-
transfer, based on section 25(1), similar to the right of re-transfer that was developed by 
the German Federal Constitutional Court.46 
However, the ‘boundaries and contours’47 of such a right to reclaim expropriated 
property upon non-realisation of the public purpose might be too technical for the courts to 
adjudicate, especially with regard to the calculation of the amount of money that the 
previous owner would have to repay.48 Therefore, it is arguably best to have legislation in 
place that addresses this lacuna that exists in South African law. Legislation that enables 
                                            
40
 Harvey V Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) 601 (KZP) para 81; Jacobs M & Gildenhuys A 
‘Expropriation in South Africa’ in Erasmus GM (ed) Compensation for Expropriation: A Comparative Study 
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 ed 2001) 10; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional 
Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 496. In Joyce & McGregor v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658 at 671, 
the court stated that ‘all rights of expropriation must rest upon a legislative foundation’. 
41
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 497. 
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 Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional Property Law’ 2010 ASSAL 251-294 at 291. See also Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 497. 
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 Sonnekus JC & Pleysier AJH ‘Eiendomsverwerwing of –verlies onder `n Tydsbepaling of `n Voorwaarde 
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44
 BVerfGE 38, 157 [1974]; BVerfGE 97, 89 [1997]. 
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en die Privaatregtelike Implikasies vir Onteiening (Deel 2)’ 2011 TSAR 601-625 at 614. See also Van der 
Walt AJ & Slade BV ‘Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and 
Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)’ (2012) 129 SALJ 219-235 at 227. 
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 Sonnekus JC & Pleysier AJH ‘Eiendomsverwerwing of –verlies onder `n Tydsbepaling of `n Voorwaarde 
en die Privaatregtelike Implikasies vir Onteiening (Deel 2)’ 2011 TSAR 601-625 at 614. 
47
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 499. 
48
 See Van der Walt AJ & Slade BV ‘Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze 
Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)’ (2012) 129 SALJ 219-235 at 234-235. 
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the courts to order the re-transfer of expropriated property upon the non-realisation of the 
public purpose and that indicates how the amount of repayment should be structured will 
strengthen the justificatory public purpose requirement.49 
 
6 3 3 State as ‘Private Owner’ of Expropriated Property 
The court in Harvey was of the view that the municipality can use the property post-
expropriation in the same manner that a private owner can, in other words that it could 
freely decide on the purpose for which it wants to use the land.50 Although it was stated in 
Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association (Mukhwevho 
Intervening)51 that there is no reason why the government should not have the same rights 
as any other owner, this statement should not be understood out of context.52 In the 
context of expropriation and against the backdrop of the protective nature of section 25, 
the state is restricted to using the property for the specific purpose for which it expropriated 
the property.53 Therefore, Van der Walt54 argues that the state is bound to use the 
expropriated property for a public purpose or in the public interest, even once expropriation 
has taken place.55 Although the inclusion of the public interest requirement in section 25(2) 
of the Constitution leads to a more generous approach instead of the traditional narrow 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
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 ed 2011) 499; Van der Walt AJ & Slade BV ‘Public 
Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)’ 
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Property upon Non-realisation of the Public Purpose’ 2011 TSAR 579-592 at 582-583. 
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 Du Plessis E ‘Restitution of Expropriated Property upon Non-realisation of the Public Purpose’ 2011 TSAR 
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Cebu International Airport Authority; Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v Inocian and Others GR 
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‘Administrative Law’ 2011 ASSAL 41-76 at 56 argues that the decision of the court in Harvey to allow the 
municipality to change the purpose has certain administrative law implications. He argues that the decision 
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powers. Therefore, Quinot argues that if administrators are allowed to change the purpose for which a 
certain power is granted they can extend their own authority. If the new changed purpose is also a valid 
public purpose it is arguable that the administrators would not extend their authority. Therefore, it is only in 
the event that the new changed purpose is not a valid public purpose or not in the public interest that there 
would be no authorization and would it also create administrative law difficulties in addition to being invalid 
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54
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 499. 
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 See also Du Plessis E ‘Restitution of Expropriated Property upon Non-realisation of the Public Purpose’ 
2011 TSAR 579-592 at 584. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 172 
 
reading of the public purpose requirement, the state cannot use the expropriated property 
post-expropriation in any manner or for any purpose it chooses.56 As a result, the state 
cannot simply use changing circumstances or needs as a justification to change the use of 
the property.57 
 
6 3 4 The Role of Good Faith 
In Harvey, the court held that since the initial expropriation was done in good faith, the 
state is allowed to change the purpose for which the property is used. If the state 
expropriated the property in bad faith, in other words knowing that the declared purpose 
would not be realisable, the expropriation would have been invalid from the beginning. In 
that situation bad faith on the part of the state would invalidate the initial expropriation and 
since the initial expropriation was never justified, the change in purpose (whether a valid 
public purpose or not) is irrelevant. The rationale for this would be to prevent the state from 
using an apparently valid public purpose as a smokescreen to use the property eventually 
for a purpose that may not necessarily be a valid public purpose. 
Furthermore, good faith on the part of the expropriating authority is not relevant at 
the initial expropriation; neither the Constitution nor the Expropriation Act makes mention 
of good faith as a requirement or justification for the expropriation. Therefore, the good 
faith of the expropriator should also be irrelevant afterwards. At most, good faith on the 
part of the expropriating authority can indicate that the initial public purpose was not a 
smokescreen to hide the real purpose for the expropriation, which might not be a valid 
public purpose.58 
 
6 3 5 Change of Purpose and Re-transfer of Property 
The applicant in the Harvey decision argued that since the original purpose was 
abandoned he had a right of re-transfer since the justification for the expropriation fell 
away. With regard to the non-realisation of the original public purpose and the re-transfer 
argument there are two issues that should be distinguished. The first issue concerns the 
legal position when the purpose for which the property was expropriated is never realised. 
The second issue concerns the legal position when the state subsequently decides to 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
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58
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 498; Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 
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change the purpose - a purpose that was duly implemented - to a different purpose. In 
both cases, the question concerning a change of purpose comes to light. Is the state 
allowed to use the property for a different purpose when the original purpose cannot be 
realised? Can the state change the use of the property when the original purpose is no 
longer the most viable purpose? It is submitted that in both cases the new, changed 
purpose must at the very least also be tested against the public purpose requirement in 
the 1975 Expropriation Act and the 1996 Constitution. 
Therefore, in relation to both issues the courts should investigate whether a 
different purpose has been put forward and evaluate whether the new (or changed) 
purpose is also a valid public purpose in terms of the constitutional requirement.59 It is 
arguable that when the new purpose is also a valid public purpose, the justification for the 
expropriation would revive.60 Therefore, when the original public purpose ends or the 
original purpose cannot be implemented and the expropriator decides to change the use of 
the property, the court should at least test the changed purpose against the public purpose 
requirement. In that sense, the court in Harvey should have considered whether the new 
public purpose, which involved a third party transfer for development purposes, was also a 
valid public purpose in terms of the 1996 Constitution and the Expropriation Act of 1975. 
Instead, the court argued that since the original expropriation was undertaken in good 
faith, the municipality could do with the property as it pleases post-expropriation if 
changing circumstances rendered the original purpose impossible. 
If the state is allowed to change the purpose of expropriation at whim it can easily 
abuse its expropriation powers. It may, for instance, expropriate property with the 
ostensible intention of building a road or a dam, and later change the purpose to a purpose 
that is arguably not a valid public purpose or sell it off to private parties that may use the 
property for what is not a public purpose either.61 The abuse that will follow results from 
the fact that the original purpose is judged against the constitutional requirements - public 
purpose or public interest - but the changed purpose is not subjected to the same scrutiny. 
Therefore, it should be considered whether South African law should make statutory 
provision for the previous owner to successfully reclaim the expropriated property when 
                                            
59
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 497-498; Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional 
Property Law’ 2010 ASSAL 251-294 at 292; Van der Walt AJ & Slade BV ‘Public Purpose and Changing 
Circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)’ (2012) 129 SALJ 219-
235 at 227. 
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 See generally Van der Walt AJ & Slade BV ‘Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey v 
Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)’ (2012) 129 SALJ 219-235 at 234. 
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 See Sonnekus JC & Pleysier AJH ‘Eiendomsverwerwing of –verlies onder `n Tydsbepaling of `n 
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the public purpose that originally justified the expropriation is not realised or is abandoned. 
From the overview of foreign law in the Harvey decision it is clear that provision is made in 
certain foreign jurisdictions for the previous owner to reclaim the expropriated property 
once the purpose of expropriation is not implemented or ends upon the completion of the 
particular purpose. This right of re-transfer is not always based on legislation, but on a 
particular interpretation of the public purpose requirement. Since the applicant in Harvey 
relied on German law, the German position relating to the re-transfer of expropriated 
property upon the non-realisation of the public purpose is analysed more fully below. 
Furthermore, case law from the jurisdictions of Malaysia and the Philippines is 
discussed below. These jurisdictions, although ‘not on all fours with South African law’,62 
are discussed below because they shed interesting light on this issue. In these 
jurisdictions, the right of re-transfer is not contained in legislation, but made possible by the 
courts through a particular interpretation of the public purpose requirement. Finally, the 
Crichel Down Rules, which provides for the previous owner to reclaim his compulsorily 
acquired property in English Law, is discussed to indicate how the re-transfer of 
expropriated property is contained in a set of legal rules. 
 
6 4 The Right of Re-transfer in Foreign Law 
6 4 1 German Law 
In Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others63 the applicant specifically relied on the 
argument of Van der Walt,64 based on German law, to substantiate the claim that he is 
entitled to re-transfer of the previously expropriated property on payment of the current 
market value.65 Van der Walt relies on three German cases66 to argue that when the 
purpose for the expropriation ends, the property should be returned to its original owner in 
terms of the public purpose requirement.67 
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 Van der Walt AJ & Slade BV ‘Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey V Umhlatuze 
Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)’ (2012) 129 SALJ 219-235 at 227. 
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 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP). 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 256; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
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 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) paras 80, 125-132. 
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 BVerfGE 38, 175 [1974]; BVerfGE 56, 249 [1981] (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn); BVerfGE 97, 89 [1997]. 
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In one German decision,68 property was expropriated for the construction of a road. 
The owner argued that he had a right of re-transfer since the construction of the road 
never took place. The Federal Constitutional Court held that the expropriation of land is not 
aimed at the taking of the land but the actual use of the land for a specific and necessary 
public purpose. The expropriation is only lawful as long as the property is used for that 
purpose and once the purpose ends, the owner has the right to reclaim the property. 
Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court held that the basis for the right of 
repurchase is article 14 of the German Basic Law of 1949 and that it is not necessary to 
have a specific statutory basis for such a claim.69 This claim, however, does not take the 
form of re-expropriation.70 Only the state has the power to expropriate property, ‘but the 
former owner can claim the land back if the expropriation was never carried through (and 
so legitimised)’.71 Therefore, expropriation is only allowed for the specific public purpose 
and when that purpose is abandoned, or becomes impossible, the expropriated owner can 
reclaim the property. The fact that compensation was paid is not a defence to such a 
claim, since the expropriation is justified by the public purpose that is served and not by 
the payment of compensation,72 which is similar to the position in South African law. 
In Dürkheimer Gondelbahn,73 the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed that the 
public purpose justifies the expropriation and that an expropriation will always be subject to 
the requirement that its use must be for the specific public purpose.74 In this decision the 
Court held that a right of re-transfer in terms of article 14 of the Basic Law is only possible 
if the expropriation took place in terms of article 14.3. In this case, the expropriation was 
carried out in the German Democratic Republic, and the purpose of the expropriation fell 
away after the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany.75 Nevertheless, the Court 
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confirmed that a right to re-transfer upon the non-realisation of the public purpose is 
possible in terms of article 14, even in the absence of specific legislation.76  
In a different decision the German Federal Constitutional Court confirmed that the 
public purpose for which the expropriation was sought is both the purpose of the 
expropriation and the legitimisation.77 Therefore, in terms of the guarantee of property in 
article 14 of the Basic Law the Court stated that the previous owner of the property 
acquires the right to repurchase the property when the purpose for which the property was 
expropriated is not fulfilled since the legitimisation fell away when the public purpose fell 
away.78 
Therefore, even though there are various laws in German law that make provision 
for the re-transfer of previously expropriated property upon the non-realisation of the public 
purpose, the German Federal Constitutional Court has based such a claim of re-transfer 
on article 14 of the Basic Law.79 However, according to the court in Harvey80 the re-
transfer of previously expropriated property to its former owner has routinely developed in 
legislation and therefore creates a ‘statutory and regulatory framework’81 used by the 
German courts to develop the right of re-transfer in terms of article 14 of the German Basic 
Law. 
 
6 4 2 Malaysian Law82 
In Malaysian law property is protected against compulsory acquisition and use without 
compensation in terms of section 13 of the 1957 Federal Constitution of Malaysia. Section 
13 of the Malaysian Constitution makes no reference to the public purpose requirement, 
but in terms of the Land Acquisition Act of 1960 the compulsory acquisition of property 
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 See Papier HJ ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T, Dürig G et al (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar Vol II (53
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 update 2008) 
310 para 591; Du Plessis E ‘Restitution of Expropriated Property upon Non-realisation of the Public Purpose’ 
2011 TSAR 579-592 at 589. 
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625 at 613-614, especially fn 164. 
78
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Tydsbepaling of `n Voorwaarde en die Privaatregtelike Implikasies vir Onteiening (Deel 2)’ 2011 TSAR 601-
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 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP). 
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 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 134. 
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must be for a public purpose.83 In case law it is also evident that compulsory acquisition 
must serve the general public interest.84 
In United Development Company Sdn Bhd v The State Government of Sabah85 the 
plaintiff requested that his property be returned to him on the basis that the property was 
not used for the purpose for which it was acquired. In 1979 the government had 
compulsorily acquired the plaintiff’s property for developing the Skim Penempaton Semulia 
project. However, it later emerged that the government planned to use the land for a 
different project, namely the Taman Kekal Pengeluaram project. In 2001, the plaintiff 
asked that the property be returned to him, on payment of RM1m, because the property 
was not used for the intended purpose.86 The high court of Malaysia decided that the 
government acted in bad faith by not putting the land to use for the intended purpose for a 
period of 30 years. Therefore, the expropriation was void and of no effect and the plaintiff 
could take repossession of the property. 
Although the decision was ultimately decided on the bad faith of the government, 
the court made some interesting remarks concerning the public purpose requirement. 
When the government declares that a compulsory acquisition is for a public purpose the 
courts adopt a deferential approach towards the decision of the government. However, if 
the acquiring authority has misconstrued its statutory powers or if bad faith is present, the 
decision of the acquiring authority can be reviewed.87 
The court stated that the government cannot use the acquired property for a 
purpose other than that stated in the notice of acquisition that appeared in the Government 
Gazette. In terms of the Land Acquisition Ordinance the government must clearly state the 
intended use of the property, which means that the government does not have an 
unfettered discretion to deal with the property as it deems fit after acquisition. Therefore, 
even though the government can acquire property for a public purpose it does not have 
complete freedom to deal with the property in any way it wishes after expropriation.88 
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 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 272; Van der Walt 
AJ & Slade BV ‘Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 
2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)’ (2012) 129 SALJ 219-235 at 228. 
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 S Kulasingman & Another v Commissioner of Lands, Federal Territory and Others [1982] 1 MLJ 204. See 
also Tan K, Min YT & Seng LK Constitutional Law in Malaysia and Singapore (1991) 674. 
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 [2011] 7 MLJ 209. 
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 The RM1m that the plaintiff was prepared to repay was the amount of compensation that he received 
when the property was originally expropriated. 
87
 United Development Company Sdn Bhd v The State Government of Sabah [2011] 7 MLJ 209. See also 
Van der Walt AJ & Slade BV ‘Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze 
Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)’ (2012) 129 SALJ 219-235 at 229. 
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 United Development Company Sdn Bhd v The State Government of Sabah [2011] 7 MLJ 209 para 29. The 
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The court left open the question whether the notice of acquisition that appeared in 
the Gazette can be revoked and under which circumstance this can be done. However, it 
stated that it is illegal and unjust to allow the government to use the property for a different 
purpose (even if the different purpose is a valid public purpose) than the one stated in the 
Gazette because the landowner negotiated compensation on the basis that the property 
would be used for a particular purpose. According to the court, ‘[l]and owners must be 
protected against compulsory deprivation of their properties for oblique motive disguised 
as “public purpose” ... [since] [t]he possibility cannot be discounted as the State 
Government in the present case in fact tried to alienate the said land to a third party in 
1996’.89 
In terms of this decision an argument can be made that compulsorily acquired 
property must only be used for the purpose for which it was acquired. In the event that the 
property is not used for the specific purpose, it could be an indication that the property was 
compulsorily acquired in bad faith, which would render the acquisition void. Although 
somewhat different to the issue in Harvey - since bad faith would also render the 
expropriation invalid in South African law90 - the Malaysian decision shows that the specific 
purpose for which property is expropriated should endure beyond the initial act of 
expropriation. 
The Malaysian court adopted a strict approach towards a change in purpose. It 
stated that the government is not allowed to change the purpose of the acquisition, even if 
the changed purpose is a public purpose. It has already been argued above that in South 
African law a changed purpose would not automatically invalidate the expropriation, since 
the public purpose requirement is still met on condition that the new purpose is also a valid 
public purpose.91 In so far as the new purpose is not a valid public purpose and not subject 
to scrutiny by the courts, the expropriation may not be justified. 
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 United Development Company Sdn Bhd v The State Government of Sabah [2011] 7 MLJ 209 para 31. 
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 Van der Walt AJ & Slade BV ‘Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze 
Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)’ (2012) 129 SALJ 219-235 at 226. See also Gildenhuys A 
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6 4 3 The Law of the Philippines92 
In the Republic of the Philippines, property may not be taken for public use without 
compensation.93 Therefore, in case law it is accepted that two requirements apply when 
the state uses its power of eminent domain: it must be for a particular public purpose and 
just compensation must be paid.94 
A dispute concerning the re-transfer of previously expropriated property upon non-
realisation of the public purpose came before the Supreme Court of the Philippines in 
Ouano and Others v Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority; Mactan-Cebu 
International Airport Authority v Inocian and Others.95 In 1961, the National Airport 
Corporation, now the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), required 
several plots of land to expand the airport in Cebu City. The first group of owners, the 
Inocians, willingly sold their property to the MCIAA, but reserved the right to reclaim the 
property if the property was no longer needed for the stated purpose.96 Due to a dispute 
concerning the amount of compensation the second group of owners, the Ouanos, refused 
to sell their properties. Therefore, the Ouanos’ properties were expropriated and the 
expropriation was confirmed by the court of first instance. 
It later emerged that the expansion of the airport did not take place. Subsequently, 
the airport was closed down and abandoned. The Inocians reclaimed their properties, but 
the MCIAA was of the opinion that they had no such right. In this decision both the 
Inocians and the Ouanos claimed that they had a right to take re-transfer of the property 
against payment of the condemnation price since the public purpose was not realised. 
The MCIAA relied on Fery v Municipality Cabanatuan97 (Fery) to deny the 
claimants’ claim. In the Fery decision (heard before the 1978 Constitution of the Republic 
of the Philippines was promulgated), the court stated that if an undertaking is given that 
the expropriated owner can reclaim the property when the purpose of expropriation 
ceases, the owner would be entitled to take re-transfer of the property. However, if no 
undertaking to that effect is given the property is held by the state in fee simple. If the 
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 Research for this section has been published in Van der Walt AJ & Slade BV ‘Public Purpose and 
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 GR No 168770; GR No 168812, 9 February 2011. 
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purpose of expropriation is later abandoned, the previous owner would have no claim over 
the property and therefore no right of re-transfer. 
However, the Fery ruling has been overturned by the Supreme Court in Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v Lozada SR98 (Lozada). In terms of the public 
purpose requirement, the Court in Lozada held that the expropriated property may only be 
used for the purpose indicated in the expropriation petition. If the expropriating authority 
wants to change the purpose, it can file a different petition with a different purpose. If it 
does not file for a new purpose the previous owner would have the right to reclaim the 
expropriated property. According to the court, this is possible even in the absence of an 
undertaking that the expropriated owner can reclaim the property upon the non-realisation 
of the public purpose. If the expropriated owner did not have this implied right, the 
expropriation process is flawed since the public use requirement is not met. This leads to a 
violation of the individual’s right to justice, fairness and equity.99 
In Ouano and Others v Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority; Mactan-Cebu 
International Airport Authority v Inocian and Others100 the Supreme Court stood by its 
previous ruling in Lozada. Relying on Lozada, as well as Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and 
Others v Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority101 and Mactan-Cebu International 
Airport Authority v Tudtud,102 the Supreme Court held that the expropriated owners were 
entitled to take possession of their previously expropriated property when the public 
purpose was abandoned. It stated that the ‘government cannot plausibly keep the property 
in any manner is pleases and, in the process, dishonour the judgment of expropriation’.103  
According to the Supreme Court the state no longer acquires unrestricted 
ownership of expropriated property. It differentiated between property willingly sold to the 
state and property expropriated by the state against the will of the owner. In the latter 
case, the transfer of the property is always conditional on it being used for the public 
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purpose for which it was expropriated.104 Therefore, if the purpose of expropriation 
terminates or is abandoned the former owner may, if he so wishes, reclaim the property. If 
so, he will have to repay or return the compensation received. According to the Supreme 
Court in Ouano and Others v Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority; Mactan-Cebu 
International Airport Authority v Inocian and Others,105 the possibility of expropriating 
property without an assurance to reclaim the property once the purpose of expropriation 
ends ‘may be too much’.106 The Court was further prompted to abandon the Fery107 
decision, since the absence of the right to reclaim expropriated property upon the 
abandonment of the public purpose could imply that the state’s expropriation powers can 
be used ‘deliberately … as a subterfuge to benefit another with influence in the political 
process, including development firms’.108 
Although the right to reclaim expropriated property upon the non-realisation of the 
public purpose developed on the basis of the assurance that was routinely given to 
expropriated owners in expropriation procedures, these decisions still convincingly show 
that the state must use the expropriated property for the public purpose for which the 
property was expropriated.109 If a different public purpose is filed, then the expropriation 
can proceed because the expropriation would still be justified. Nevertheless, the decisions 
indicate a strict view of the power of the state to expropriate property for a public purpose. 
 
6 4 4 The Crichel Down Rules in English Law 
In English law there are rules that regulate the position of compulsorily acquired property 
that becomes surplus, in other words no longer needed for the purpose for which it was 
acquired. In terms of the Crichel Down Rules110 certain government departments are 
required to offer back compulsorily acquired property or property sold under the threat of 
compulsory acquisition to the former owners or their successors in title when the property 
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is no longer needed for the purpose for which it was acquired.111 The rules apply to all 
property in England and properties in Wales ‘acquired by and still owned by a UK 
government department’.112 
The origin of the Rules is particular to the United Kingdom and is briefly stated 
here.113 After the Second World War, Commander Marten sought to re-purchase land in 
the Crichel Estate that was compulsorily acquired for purposes of the war, but was 
rendered surplus after the war came to an end. However, the relevant state department 
denied his request and transferred the land to the Commissioners of Crown Lands. After a 
public outcry, based on allegations of corruption and maladministration, a public enquiry 
was launched. The report resulting from the enquiry led to the resignation of the 
responsible minister, Sir Thomas Dugdale. Before resigning, Dughale indicated how 
surplus land compulsorily acquired should be dealt with in future.114 Dugdale indicated that 
where compulsorily acquired agricultural land becomes surplus and is not needed by a 
different state department, the land should be sold. Furthermore, he stated that the 
government recognises that previous owners, or their successors in title, should in certain 
instances be entitled to successfully reclaim the said land.115 These indicators became 
known as the Crichel Down Rules. 
The Crichel Down Rules have been amended numerous times116 since being 
introduced in a 1954 Treasury Circular.117 On the 31st of October 2004, the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister produced an updated Circular on Compulsory Purchase and Crichel 
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Down Rules.118 In terms of this Circular these rules are non-statutory and therefore, not 
compulsory.119 However, it is assumed that these rules should apply in a mandatory 
manner by certain departments.120 It is for this reason that Gibbard states that ‘[t]he terms 
“rules” is itself something of a misnomer, as the guidance is in the form of advice rather 
than a set of statutory regulation, and is not universally applicable’.121 However, the 
general rule is located in paragraph 10 of Part II of the Circular:  
‘Where a department wishes to dispose of land to which the Rules apply, former owners 
will, as a general rule, be given a first opportunity to repurchase the land previously in their 
ownership provided that its character has not materially changed since acquisition.’122 
Therefore, former owners or their successors in title are given a first opportunity to 
purchase the land when the purpose of acquisition ends.123 In terms of the Rules, the 
property is to be sold to the qualifying former owner at the current market value as 
established by a professional qualified valuation officer.124 
In terms of the Annexure, the Rules apply to all government departments, non-
departmental public bodies and other organisations subject to ‘a power of direction by a 
Minister’.125 It is recommended that local authorities as well as other statutory bodies 
that have compulsory acquisition power but that are not subject to Ministerial powers 
should follow the rules.126 
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In terms of the Rules there are also certain exceptions to the general rule to offer 
the property to the previous owner. If the land is needed by a different state 
department, the current department is not required to offer the property to the previous 
owner.127 If the land is needed by a local authority or body with compulsory purchase 
power the current state department is not required to offer the property to the previous 
owner but on condition that the said body had the necessary authority at the time of 
acquisition to acquire the land.128 There are also certain exceptions based on the lapse 
of time in paragraph 14 of the Rules.129 
Furthermore, it is clear that the Rules will not apply where the character of the 
land has been changed materially. This includes instances where buildings have been 
erected on previously bare land or where additions to existing buildings were made that 
altered the character of the land.130 Temporary buildings will not necessarily constitute 
a material change and evaluating whether development has materially changed the 
land, the relevant state department should consider the costs of restoring the land to its 
original state.131 In the event that a portion of the land has been materially changed, the 
portion that was not materially changed can be offered to the previous owner.132 
The practical application of the Crichel Down Rules is not beyond reproach. The 
Rules themselves had their origin in a hasty decision made by a minister before 
resigning, and have been amended numerous times as ‘knee-jerk policy reactions to 
the rulings in hard cases, with the consequence that they have developed in a 
haphazard way’.133 The procedure itself, for instance getting in touch with previous 
owners or their successors in title, can be a lengthy affair and often conflicts with other 
government obligations and targets.134 
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Furthermore, since the Rules are non-statutory they frequently conflict with state 
departments’ own policies concerning the disposal of land. Therefore, ‘there is much 
misunderstanding surrounding the issue of the offer-back procedures in practice, 
leading to inconsistent and often inappropriate application of the Rules’.135 However, 
according to Gibbard the underlying philosophy of the Crichel Down Rules is still 
sound.136 Gibbard indicates that there is a moral obligation to allow former owners the 
first option to re-acquire property that was taken from them and not used for the 
purpose it was initially acquired for. The operation of such a system that allows for such 
a right must be applied consistently and there must be proper guidance in place so that 
it can function ‘fairly and predictably’.137 
 
6 5 Evaluation of the Overview of Foreign Law 
6 5 1 Use Restricted to the Purpose for which the Property was Expropriated 
During the discussion of foreign law above it became clear that in some jurisdictions the 
expropriated property must be used for the purpose for which it was expropriated. In 
German law, expropriation will always be subject to the requirement that its use must be 
for a specific public purpose.138 That specific public purpose is judged against the public 
purpose requirement in article 14.3 of the Basic Law of 1949 and the fulfilment of the 
public purpose must require the expropriation of the relevant property. 
Similar to the German courts, Malaysian courts interpret the public purpose 
requirement strictly. In Malaysian law it is accepted that the state must use the property for 
the purpose set out in the notice of acquisition as it appeared in the Government Gazette. 
This was confirmed by the Malaysian high court in United Development Company Sdn Bhd 
v The State Government of Sabah.139 The court stated that the government does not have 
unfettered power to deal with the property after expropriation in any way it deems fit. It 
therefore has an obligation to use the property for the specific public purpose, since the 
landowner negotiated compensation based on the assumption that the property would be 
used for a particular purpose. In United Development Company Sdn Bhd v The State 
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(ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol II (2003) 329-351 at 351. 
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 Gibbard R ‘The Crichel Down Rules: Conduct or Misconduct in the Disposal of Public Lands?’ in Cooke E 
(ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol II (2003) 329-351 at 351. 
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 See BVerfGE 56, 249 [1981] (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn), discussed in ch 4 at 4 4 4 2. See also Hofmann 
H ‘Art. 14’ in Schmidt-Bleibtreu B, Hofmann H & Hophauf A (eds) Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (11
th
 ed 
2008) 513 para 66. 
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 [2011] 7 MLJ 209. 
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Government of Sabah140 the court did not indicate whether the public purpose can be 
changed and under which circumstances. 
 
6 5 2 State Permitted to Change the Purpose for which the Property was 
Expropriated 
In contrast, it is accepted in other jurisdictions that the state may under certain 
circumstances and within limits change the purpose for which the expropriated property is 
used. The Ouano and Others v Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority; Mactan-Cebu 
International Airport Authority v Inocian and Others141 decision from the Philippines shows 
that the state may change the use of the property after expropriation. In this regard the 
Supreme Court reasoned as follow: 
‘A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the 
petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If 
not, it behoves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so 
desires.’142 
Although the Court stated that the state cannot use the expropriated property for any 
purpose and dishonour the judgment of expropriation, it indicated that the state can 
change the purpose if it files a new expropriation petition. This reason is arguably to 
ensure that the property is still used for a valid public purpose, since the Court was of the 
opinion that there is ‘no more cogent point for the government’s retention of the 
expropriated land’143 if the condition (the public purpose) that allowed the state to 
expropriate the property in the first place falls away. 
Similarly, the Crichel Down Rules exclude the obligation to offer the expropriated 
property to the previous owner if the acquired property is needed by a different state 
department. Therefore, it might be possible to use the property for a different purpose. 
However, since the obligation of re-transfer is not imposed when the property is needed by 
a different state department or body as stipulated in the Rules, and since the property is 
                                            
140
 [2011] 7 MLJ 209. 
141
 GR No 168770; GR No 168812, 9 February 2011. 
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 Ouano and Others v Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority; Mactan-Cebu International Airport 
Authority v Inocian and Others GR NO 168770; GR NO 168812, 9 February 2011. This reported decision is 
neither paragraphed nor paginated. 
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 Ouano and Others v Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority; Mactan-Cebu International Airport 
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regarded as not being ‘surplus to Government requirements’144 it is arguable that the 
property will in most instances continue to be used for a public purpose. 
 
6 5 3 Re-transfer Guaranteed 
In German law, where expropriation is only allowed for a specific public purpose, non-
realisation or abandonment of that specific public purpose means that the owner can re-
claim the property. Since the courts are only concerned with the specific public purpose for 
which the property is expropriated, a change in purpose is not even considered. It was 
established that provision is made in various pieces of legislation for the re-transfer of 
expropriated property once the purpose is not realised or abandoned. As was indicated in 
Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others,145 similar legislation exists in several other 
jurisdictions as well, with the same effect. However, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court has held that even in the absence of specific legislation a right of re-claim is implicit 
in the guarantee of property in terms of article 14 of the Basic Law of 1949.146 
In Philippine law, the Supreme Court in Ouano and Others v Mactan-Cebu 
International Airport Authority; Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v Inocian and 
Others147 has held that property owners has an implicit right to re-claim expropriated 
property once the purpose for which the property was expropriated is not realised, ends or 
is abandoned. The Supreme Court held that if the expropriated owner did not have this 
implied right, the expropriation process is flawed since the public use requirement would 
not be met. 
In English law the Crichel Down Rules compel government departments to offer the 
acquired property to the original owner, or his successors in title, when the land becomes 
surplus. These rules contain detailed provisions concerning when and under which 
circumstances the relevant departments are obliged to offer the property to the previous 
owner, or his successors in title. Therefore, the Crichel Down Rules guarantee that 
compulsorily acquired property will be offered to the previous owner if it is no longer 
needed for a public purpose by the acquiring authority or by a different authority. 
 
                                            
144
 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Compulsory Purchase and the Crichel Down Rules Circular 06/2004 
(31 October 2004) 111 para 15 1. 
145
 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP). 
146
 BVerfGE 38, 175 [1974]. See further Papier HJ ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T, Dürig G et al (eds) Grundgesetz 
Kommentar Vol II (53
rd
 update 2008) 510-511 para 591. 
147
 GR No 168770; GR No 168812, 9 February 2011. 
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6 6 The Way Forward for South African Law 
Since there is no legislation that can regulate the re-transfer of expropriated property upon 
the non-realisation of the public purpose in South African law it is submitted that the 
existing Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 should be amended to that effect. The Act should 
provide for mechanisms through which previous owners can re-claim their previously 
expropriated property in certain situations and to allow the courts the authority to oversee 
this process. The main objective of the amending provisions should be to indicate the 
nature of this right of re-transfer, the persons entitled to claim re-transfer, the time-frame 
within which the expropriated owner can reclaim the property upon the non-implementation 
of the purpose, setting up a framework for calculating the amount that has to be repaid, as 
well as the circumstances under which the state would not be required to re-transfer the 
property to the previous owner. 
In view of the uncertainties and difficulties that arise due to the non-statutory nature 
of the Crichel Down Rules it is not advisable to adopt that approach. Rather, provision for 
such a right should place a statutory obligation on the expropriating authority to follow a 
particular process when the purpose for which the property was expropriated cannot be 
realised, ends, or if the purpose is subsequently abandoned. This process should also be 
activated when the expropriated owner re-claims the property upon the non-realisation or 
abandonment of the original purpose, or if the previous owner claims that the changed 
purpose is not a valid public purpose. 
The issue of the lapse of time should be addressed clearly in this provision. To 
prevent uncertainty the law should attach a time-frame to the realisation of the public 
purpose. For instance, if the purpose for which the property was expropriated is not 
realised for a period of three years, the state should file a new purpose. Notice of the new 
purpose could be served on the previous owner, such as in Canadian law, or be placed in 
the Government Gazette and/or local newspapers. If a new purpose is not filed, the 
previous owner should be able to claim a right to repossession of the property. There are 
examples in foreign law of how such a time-frame could be construed. In French law an 
owner can reclaim the property if it has not been used for the public purpose for a period of 
five years.148 In Dutch law, an owner can reclaim the property after three years has lapsed 
and it has not been used for the intended purpose.149 The time-frame is something that 
has to be decided by the legislator, but it should be a relatively short period (3-5 years) 
                                            
148
 See Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 93. 
149
 See Sonnekus JC & Pleysier AJH ‘Eiendomsverwerwing of –verlies onder `n Tydsbepaling of `n 
Voorwaarde en die Privaatregtelike Implikasies vir Onteiening (Deel 2)’ 2011 TSAR 601-625 at 622. 
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rather than a longer period, since the whole purpose of expropriation is to expropriate 
property that is required, many times on an urgent basis, for the realisation of a particular 
public purpose. 
If the purpose is abandoned or ends after the three year time period, the question 
as to what the state can do with the property arises. As a general rule, the expropriated 
property should always be used for a public purpose. Therefore, upon the completion or 
abandonment of the public purpose, the state should be forced to follow a specific 
process. If the state department that initially needed the property for the fulfilment of a 
public purpose can use it for a different public purpose the state can retain possession of 
the property, since it would still be justified in doing so. In that regard the state should file 
the new purpose, for instance by advertising it in the Government Gazette. If the previous 
owner contests the change in purpose, the courts should be able to decide whether the 
new purpose is a valid public purpose. 
If the original state department cannot use the property for a different public 
purpose but it can be used for a valid public purpose by a different state department, the 
previous owner’s right to reclaim the property should generally be excluded, provided that 
the proposed use by the different state department is also advertised in the Government 
Gazette. However, if the previous owner argues that the purpose to which the different 
state department will put the property is not a valid public purpose, she should be able to 
approach a court to determine whether the property is still to be used for a valid public 
purpose. If the state department that initially required the property for a public purpose or a 
different state department cannot use the property for a different public purpose or if the 
court determines that the new purpose is not a valid public purpose, the previous owner 
should be given the first opportunity to purchase the land in order to take repossession of 
the property. The offer to repurchase should be made within a specific time period (for 
instance a year) after the state or a court has concluded that the property cannot be used 
for a different public purpose. 
Therefore, when a new public purpose cannot be established and the state wants to 
dispose of the land the legislation should force the expropriating authority to first offer the 
property to the previous owner or his successors in title. In that sense, the price that has to 
be repaid should either be the current market value of the property, as is the case in terms 
of the United Kingdom’s Crichel Down Rules, or the compensation that was originally paid 
plus legal interest, as was the case in the Philippine decision of Ouano and Others v 
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority; Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v 
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Inocian and Others.150 The decision between the two options of calculating the amount 
that has to be paid is probably one of policy and should be left up to the legislature, but 
given the argument below regarding the re-transfer of property that has materially changed 
since expropriation, a strong case for requiring the payment of the current market value 
can be made. 
In terms of the Crichel Down Rules, the state is under no obligation to offer the 
property to the previous owner upon the abandonment of the public purpose when the 
property has been changed materially, for instance through development.151 In terms of 
the Crichel Down Rules, the property is deemed to have materially changed when 
buildings have been erected on land that was vacant when it has been expropriated. 
Therefore, in the event that the state expropriates a vacant piece of land to build a hospital 
and in fact does so, but later the hospital falls into disuse because of a lack of funds, the 
state is under no obligation to offer the property to the previous owner. 
However, it is arguable that the state could in that instance still offer the property to 
the previous owner, or his successors in title. If the price that has to be paid is market 
value, the owner will not be unduly favoured since he would have to pay for any 
improvements that might have been made to the property. There might be other instances 
where the state may be exempt from selling previously expropriated property, even to the 
previous owner. One example might include a nuclear electricity plant that was erected on 
expropriated land that fell into disuse. There may be a strong case not to sell the property 
since it may contain hazardous waste. If the property has been developed for or is usable 
for land reform purposes, the expropriating authoirty may also be exempt from offering the 
property to the previous owner. 
The law as it stands states that the state is only allowed to use expropriated 
property for a public purpose.152 What should happen when the state no longer has a need 
for the property and the previous owner rejects the offer to re-purchase the land? It is 
arguable that in that case, and in only that case, the state is able to deal with the property 
as if it held it in private ownership. In this instance, the public purpose has probably played 
its part and has rendered enough protection to the expropriated owner. It has ensured that 
the original expropriation was for a public purpose and it has given the expropriated owner 
the opportunity to reclaim the property when the property could no longer be used for a 
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public purpose. In that regard the state can freely dispose of the property in any matter it 
deems fit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 192 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
7 1 Introduction 
The central question addressed in this dissertation is whether expropriation for economic 
development is justifiable in terms of section 25 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, especially if the expropriation involves a third party transfer of the 
expropriated property. In terms of section 25(2) of the Constitution an expropriation must 
be for a public purpose or in the public interest and just compensation must be paid. It is 
generally accepted that the public purpose or public interest justifies an expropriation and 
that the payment of compensation is no more than a natural consequence of an 
expropriation rather than the source of its legitimacy.1 This dissertation therefore considers 
the question whether the public purpose or public interest said to be served by it can justify 
both the expropriation of property for economic development purposes and the transfer of 
that property to a third party for the realisation of the intended economic development. In 
this regard it is argued in the chapters above that either the public purpose or the public 
interest can, at least in some instances, justify the expropriation of property for economic 
development purposes or the transfer of the expropriated property to third parties for the 
intended economic development, but that certain restrictions and qualifications of such a 
use of the state’s power to expropriate are necessary. 
To understand the meaning of the phrases ‘public purpose’ and ‘public interest’ in 
terms of the 1996 Constitution the dissertation starts off with an historical analysis of the 
understanding of the requirements in Chapter 2. In that chapter it is shown that the 
legislation that authorised expropriation before the constitutional era only referred to 
expropriation for ‘public purposes.’2 Public purpose was usually contrasted with private 
purpose and could be understood in either broad or narrow terms.3 In terms of the narrow 
understanding, ‘public purpose’ was said to include goals directly related to government 
purposes, such as the building of government buildings, roads or other necessary 
infrastructure. In terms of the broad reading, the public purpose requirement was said to 
include a wider set of goals that would benefit the public at large or even the local public.4 
Examples of expropriation for a public purpose in the broader sense include the provision 
                                            
1
 See Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 82; Minister of Minerals and 
Energy v Agri SA (CALS Amicus Curiae) (458/11) [2012] ZASCA 93, 31 May 2012 para 18. 
2
 See the Expropriation Act 55 of 1965; Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
3
 Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society 1911 AD 271. See 
also Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 95. 
4
 Minister of Lands v Rudolph 1940 SR 126; Fourie v Minister van Lande en `n Ander 1970 (4) SA 165 (O). 
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of housing for technicians responsible for important telecommunications networks5 and the 
preservation and conservation of the country’s water reserves.6 The judicial choice 
between the broad and the narrow interpretation of the phrase ‘public purpose’ traditionally 
depended on the legislation involved and the facts of each case.7 
This distinction between the broad and the narrow understanding of the public 
purpose requirement was applied in South African case law until the decision in 
Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty)8 (Van 
Streepen). In Van Streepen the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court did not make 
reference to the broad and narrow understanding of the public purpose requirement in 
earlier cases but held that although an expropriation that benefits a third party can never 
be for a public purpose, it can in certain circumstances be legitimate insofar as it is in the 
public interest. Therefore, it is argued in Chapter 2 that when the court in Van Streepen 
referred to ‘public purpose’ it referred only to the narrow understanding of the public 
purpose as established in earlier case law and when it referred to the ‘public interest’ it 
referred to the broad understanding of the public purpose requirement in earlier cases.9 As 
a result, the position regarding the justificatory requirements for an expropriation before 
the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 was promulgated was that the phrase ‘public 
purpose’ related to government purposes narrowly interpreted, while the phrase ‘public 
interest’ related to expropriation for purposes that benefit the public more broadly and that 
may also incidentally benefit third parties. 
The property clause in the Interim Constitution of 1993 only referred to expropriation 
for public purposes. Given that the court in Van Streepen held that an expropriation that 
benefits a third party can never be for a public purpose there was concern that the 
expropriation of property in the area of land reform would be invalid in terms of this 
interpretation of the clause because land reform can also involve the transfer of 
expropriated property to third parties benefiting from land reform initiatives.10 Therefore, in 
section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution both the public purpose and the public interest were 
                                            
5
 Fourie v Minister van Lande en `n Ander 1970 (4) SA 165 (O). 
6
 White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minster of Community Development 1984 (3) SA 785 (N). 
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 See Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society 1911 AD 271; 
Minister of Lands v Rudolph 1940 SR 126; Slabbert v Minister van Lande 1963 (3) SA 620 (T). 
8
 1990 (4) SA 644 (A). 
9
 See the discussion in ch 2 at 2 4 3 and ch 3 at 3 3 3. 
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 See Chaskalson M ‘The Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 131-139 at 
136-138; Chaskalson M ‘Stumbling towards Section 28: Negotiations over the Protection of Property Rights 
in the Interim Constitution’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 222-240 at 238; Budlender G ‘The Constitutional Protection of 
Property Rights: Overview and Commentary’ in Budlender G, Latsky J, Roux T Juta’s New Land Law (OS 
1998) ch 1 at 48; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 340. See 
ch 3 at 3 2. 
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included, together with section 25(4),11 to ensure that third party transfers of land 
expropriated for land reform purposes would not be invalidated simply because it involves 
a third party transfer of the land.12 It is therefore concluded in Chapter 3 that the public 
purpose requirement in section 25(2) is limited to narrow public purposes (as it was 
understood in earlier case law), or government purposes, while the public interest 
requirement refers to broader public purposes, namely a purpose that benefits the public 
more broadly. 
It is concluded in Chapter 3 that third party transfers for narrow public purposes are 
generally unproblematic. Legislation often specifically authorises the expropriation of 
property on behalf of a third party for the realisation of a project of public importance.13 
Furthermore, there is evidence that a third party transfer for broader public purposes may 
sometimes be in the public interest and therefore valid. In South African law an example of 
a third party transfer that is in the public interest is in the area of land reform, which is 
specifically legitimised in the Constitution and regulated in terms of legislation. At least as 
far as land reform is concerned, it is therefore clear that transfer of expropriated property 
to a third party beneficiary would not be in conflict with the section 25(2) requirement. 
 
7 2 Expropriation for Economic Development and the Transfer of 
Property for Economic Development Purposes 
In this dissertation it is argued that the question whether a third party transfer of 
expropriated property is legitimate in terms of section 25(2) becomes problematic in 
situations where it already has become clear that the expropriation is for a valid public 
purpose or in the public interest in any event.14 If the expropriation is neither for a lawful 
public purpose nor in the public interest, the expropriation would be invalid and the 
legitimacy of transfer of the property to a third party would be irrelevant.15 Furthermore, if 
the expropriation is invalid for any other reason, such as it being arbitrary, not authorised 
by legislation, or corrupt, the expropriation would also be invalid and the question 
regarding the legitimacy of a third party transfer would not feature.16 
                                            
11
 S 25(4)(a) of the 1996 Constitution states that the ‘public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land 
reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources’. 
12
 See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
591-592; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 462-463. 
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 See ch 3 at 3 3 3. 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 465. 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 465. 
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 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 465. 
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With regard to the transfer of property to third parties a distinction is made between 
an expropriation that is for a public purpose and an expropriation that is in the public 
interest.17 If the purpose of the expropriation is a public purpose, defined narrowly as state 
or government purposes, the question regarding the validity of a third party transfer of the 
property is usually less pertinent, since in such cases the identity of the party responsible 
for realising the public purpose is generally irrelevant.18 In situations where expropriated 
property is transferred to a third party for public purposes as defined narrowly, the property 
is in fact required either for a public use (such as the building of roads) or for the primary 
benefit of the public (such as the construction of electricity plants to provide electricity to 
the public) in any event. Therefore, if property is expropriated for purposes directly related 
to narrow government purposes, such as the building of roads, schools or hospitals, the 
party responsible for constructing, managing and maintaining the infrastructure can be 
either the state or a private party and the legitimacy of transferring the expropriated 
property to a third party to that end would generally not be a big constitutional issue. This 
position also finds support in foreign law.19 Foreign law indicates, however, that it is 
preferable to establish a framework of controls within which the legitimacy of third party 
transfers can be adjudicated, for example (as in German law) that the level of scrutiny can 
be lower if the third party to whom the expropriated property is to be transferred not only 
undertakes a particular public service for which the property is required on behalf of the 
state, but exists only and purely for the purpose of delivering the particular public service 
(such as providing public infrastructure). 
If the expropriation is in the public interest (or for a public purpose defined broadly) 
the expropriated property may also be transferred to a third party for realisation of the 
public purpose, at least in certain situations. For purposes of slum clearance and land 
reform, for instance, property is occasionally expropriated and transferred to third parties. 
In that case both the expropriation and the transfer of the property are deemed to be in the 
public interest. In the area of slum clearance the public interest usually relates to the 
clearance of a blight that may be detrimental to the general welfare and health of society.20 
In the area of land reform the purpose of transferring the property to third parties is either 
to break up the unequal existing division of land or to provide for other restitutionary 
purposes, such as providing remedies to people previously affected by racially 
                                            
17
 See ch 4 at 4 2 - 4 3. 
18
 See Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 
(4) SA 242 (SCA) para 15 and the discussion in ch 4 at 4 2. 
19
 For instance, in US and German law the transfer of property to third parties for narrow public purposes are 
generally allowed. See ch 4 at 4 2. 
20
 See the US decision of Berman v Parker 348 US 26 (1954), discussed in ch 4 at 4 3 2. 
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discriminatory legislation and practices.21 This argument could also justify expropriation 
and third party redistribution of property ‘in such a way as to provide support to a vital 
process of reconciliation, reconstruction and development.’22 In situations where property 
is expropriated and transferred to third parties because doing so is deemed to be in the 
public interest, the purpose of the expropriation is usually identified in the authorising 
legislation,23 which is an important consideration for evaluating the legitimacy of 
expropriation for purposes such as slum clearance and land reform. However, in cases 
where property is expropriated for broader public purposes the courts would usually 
inquire whether there is some sort of legislative scheme that regulates or controls the 
realisation of the purpose by expropriating and transferring the property. 
Against this backdrop this dissertation considers the question whether third party 
transfers for economic development purposes can be in the public interest. Economic 
development in general has not traditionally been regarded as a public purpose that could 
justify expropriation, and it is not immediately evident that it is in the public interest, 
especially in the absence of a regulatory legislative scheme. In Chapter 4 the question 
whether a particular third party transfer of expropriated property for economic development 
is legitimate in terms of the constitutional provisions is split up into two separate questions, 
namely firstly whether economic development is in the public interest and secondly 
whether the transfer of expropriated property to a third party for economic development 
purposes is in the public interest. 
With regard to the first question, namely whether economic development generally 
is or can be in the public interest, the main issue is whether the expropriation of property 
for economic development purposes is specifically authorised in terms of legislation, or 
whether the expropriation of property for purposes of economic development takes place 
in terms of a statutory development scheme. In contradistinction to the trend in foreign law 
to authorise specifically the expropriation of property for redevelopment or development in 
dedicated legislation,24 detailed authorising legislation does not exist in South African law. 
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 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
629. 
22
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
629. 
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 See the District of Columbia Development Act of 1945, which was used to expropriate property to 
eliminate slum neighbourhoods in terms of a development plan. The expropriation of the properties in this 
case was challenged in Berman v Parker 348 US 26 (1954), which is discussed in ch 4 at 4 3 2. See also the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, which authorises the expropriation of property for purposes of 
restoring land to persons previously dispossessed of property through unfair legislation and practices. See 
the discussion in ch 4 at 4 3 3 1. 
24
 The Regional Development Agencies Act 1998, which led to the dispute in Smith v Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 1013 (Admin) and Sole v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] 
EWHC 1527 (Admin) specifically authorise the compulsory acquisition of property to stimulate economic 
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The Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, which was used to expropriate the applicant’s property 
for economic development in Bartsch Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-
A-Phofung Municipality,25 only refers very broadly and generally to the expropriation of 
property for public purposes. Similarly, in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others26 the courts accepted that the anticipated 
expropriation and transfer of property to third parties for economic development purposes 
would be in the public interest and would satisfy the requirements of the Expropriation Act 
and section 25(2) of the Constitution, even though both the Expropriation Act and 
Constitution only refer to the expropriation of property for a public purpose or in the public 
interest. Furthermore, neither the specific legislation that incorporated the Coega 
Development Corporation, the Manufacturing and Development Act 187 of 1993, nor the 
Eastern Cape Land Disposal Act 7 of 2000 granted explicit expropriation powers and 
therefore neither of these statutes specifically authorised the expropriation of property for 
economic development purposes.27 It is therefore argued in Chapter 4 that the context 
within which foreign courts generally defer to the legislative decision to expropriate 
property for economic development, namely the existence of fairly specific and dedicated 
authorising legislation does not exist in South Africa and therefore such a deferential 
approach is not justified. 
In cases where legislation does not specifically authorise the expropriation of 
property for economic development or redevelopment purposes, the expropriation of the 
property can still be valid if it complies with the constitutional requirements. However, in 
situations where legislation does not specifically authorise expropriation for economic 
development purposes, the judicial determination as to whether it in fact complies with the 
constitutional requirements should be stricter than in cases where legislation specifically 
authorises it.28 In the foreign jurisdictions discussed in Chapter 4, namely US, English and 
Irish law, the courts easily allow an expropriation involving a third party transfer for 
economic development if the legislation specifically permits and authorises the 
expropriation for such purposes. Therefore, the foreign courts in these jurisdictions apply a 
relatively low level of scrutiny when considering the purposes for which property may be 
                                                                                                                                                 
development. The Detroit Economic Development Corporation Act 1974 PA 338, which led to the dispute in 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit 410 Mich 616 (Mich, 1981) was promulgated to stimulate 
the economies of distressed areas. In Crosbie v Custom House Docks Development Authority [1996] 2 IR 
531 (HC), the Irish court relied on s 9 of the Urban Renewal Act of 1986, which authorises the relevant 
authority to ‘acquire, hold and manage land in that Area for its development, redevelopment or renewal 
either by the Authority or by any other person’ to validate the compulsory acquisition. 
25
 [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 February 2010. 
26
 2009 (5) SA 661 (SE); 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA). 
27
 See ch 4 at 4 6 3. 
28
 See ch 4 at 4 6 3. 
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expropriated, provided that the authorising legislation permits the expropriation of property 
for purposes such as redevelopment or economic regeneration. In other words, if the 
authorising legislation specifically allows for expropriation for the sake of economic 
development or redevelopment, the courts are deferent as to the means adopted to realise 
the purpose. The fact that the property is transferred to third parties is therefore not 
subjected to strict scrutiny. 
The German courts, on the other hand, are stricter in evaluating the purposes for 
which property may be expropriated. In German law expropriation can only be effected in 
terms of legislation and the legislation must always clearly authorise the expropriation of 
the property for a specific public purpose.29 Furthermore, the expropriation must be strictly 
necessary for the realisation of the purpose.30 Therefore, the courts exercise strict control 
over the authority for an expropriation as it is specified in the authorising legislation. If the 
legislation does not authorise the expropriation for purposes of a specific economic 
development or regeneration, expropriation for that purpose would be invalid for lack of 
statutory authority, regardless of whether it includes third party transfer of the property.31 
Since economic development has not traditionally been regarded as a valid public 
purpose or in the public interest in South African law, it is possible to argue that without 
any specific, dedicated legislative basis, the expropriation of property for economic 
development purposes should generally be invalid for lack of statutory authority, as in 
German law. Alternatively, it is argued in Chapter 4 that expropriations of this kind should 
at least be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny, as was also suggested in a recent 
decision of the UK Supreme Court.32 
As a general rule, a third party transfer of expropriated property is unproblematic if 
the purpose of the expropriation is for an apparently legitimate public purpose or in the 
                                            
29
 Papier HJ ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T, Dürig G et al (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar Vol II (53
rd
 update 2008) 279 
para 522; Wendt R ‘Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung’ in Sachs M (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 
2007) 582-639 at 628 paras 158-159; Schmidt-Aßmann B ‘Expropriation in the Federal Republic of 
Germany’ in Erasmus GM (ed) Compensation for Expropriation: A Comparative Study Vol I (1990) 81-103 at 
81; Currie DP The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 291. 
30
 Wendt R ‘Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteignung’ in Sachs M (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (4
th
 ed 2007) 
582-639 at 628 para 160; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 
147. See also the discussion in ch 5 at 5 4 2. 
31
 BVerfGE 56, 249 [1981] (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn); BVerfGE 74, 264 [1986] (Boxberg) 286. See the 
discussion of these cases in ch 4 at 4 4 4. 
32
 In Regina (Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council [2010] UKSC 20 Lord Walker, 
writing a separate concurring judgment, argued that private takings are particularly sensitive and as a result 
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny. See Waring EJL ‘The Prevalence of Private Takings’ in Hopkins 
N (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law Vol VII (forthcoming 2013) (copy of paper on file with the author) 15 
and the discussion of this decision in ch 4 at 4 4 2 3 2. 
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public interest as set out above.33 However, in a situation where the purpose of the 
expropriation is in itself difficult to justify, the determination as to whether the transfer of 
the property to a third party is lawful should be subjected to even stricter scrutiny. The 
expropriation of property for purposes of economic development of redevelopment is 
difficult to justify in general because it is so vague.34 There is usually no hard evidence 
concerning the number of jobs or the amount of revenue that will be created by a 
development of this kind and in cases where it is promised that a certain number of jobs 
would be created, there is no assurance that it will indeed materialise, nor is there any 
accountability in the event that it does not materialise. As a result, both the expropriation 
and the transfer of property to third parties for economic development purposes should be 
subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny, unless there is dedicated and more or less specific 
authorising legislation that sets out a scheme in terms of which the legitimacy of the 
expropriation and of any third party transfers that might be involved can be judged. 
In Chapter 4 the arguments of various authors who are against allowing the transfer 
of expropriated property for economic development purposes are reviewed in addition to 
the discussion of case law. This literature focuses on a number of particularly problematic 
aspects of third party transfers of property expropriated for economic development. In the 
first place, third party transfers for economic development purposes have in various 
situations resulted in persons losing their homes.35 The expropriation of homes has 
additional negative effects on the expropriated persons, such as the loss of a support 
system or informal arrangements concerning child-care and care for the elderly,36 and 
these costs are not necessarily accounted for by the payment of market value 
compensation.37 It may also be impossible to obtain a similar residence in a 
neighbourhood equal to the one from which the persons are displaced.38 People may be 
more accepting of the expropriation of their homes for public purposes that serve narrow 
                                            
33
 See Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 
(4) SA 242 (SCA); Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) and the discussion in 
ch 4 at 4 6 5. 
34
 In this regard see Waring EJL ‘The Prevalence of Private Takings’ in Hopkins N (ed) Modern Studies in 
Property Law Vol VII (forthcoming 2013) (copy of paper on file with the author) 20-21; Walsh R ‘“The 
Principles of Social Justice” and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for Redevelopment in the 
United States and Ireland’ (2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23 at 13-14. 
35
 See Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005); Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit 410 
Mich 616 (Mich, 1981). 
36
 Walsh R ‘“The Principles of Social Justice” and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for 
Redevelopment in the United States and Ireland’ (2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23 at 16. 
37
 Michelman FI ‘Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just 
Compensation” Law’ (1967) 80 Harv LR 1165-1258 at 1214-1216; Michelman FI ‘Property as a 
Constitutional Right’ (1981) 38 Wash & Lee LR 1097-1114 at 1112. 
38
 Walsh R ‘“The Principles of Social Justice” and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for 
Redevelopment in the United States and Ireland’ (2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23 at 16. 
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public purposes, such as when a new road or electricity plant need to be constructed, but 
they may feel extremely uneasy about sacrificing their homes for purposes not directly 
linked to a narrow public purpose, especially if the process is only justified because 
someone else may make better economic use of the property.39 Furthermore, it has been 
argued that third party transfers for economic development purposes have 
disproportionate effects on the less affluent members of society.40 As a result, it has been 
argued that the expropriation of homes should generally be subjected to stricter scrutiny.41  
In addition to the disproportionately harsh effects that third party transfers for 
economic development may have on the less affluent members of society, it has also been 
argued that expropriation of this kind renders the public purpose requirement redundant. It 
replaces the security of property with a security of value.42 In addition to the third party 
holding the expropriated property on exclusionary terms after expropriation, the 
expropriation of property to enable someone else to make a profit seems like an 
expropriation for a private purpose that should not be allowed.43 As a result of the overview 
of academic criticisms, it is argued in Chapter 4 that the power of condemnation should 
only be available in situations where there is a real and direct benefit to the public, or if it 
involves subsequent public use of the property.44 The power of condemnation should 
therefore not be used when the primary benefit of the expropriation goes to a private party 
and the secondary benefits such as increased employment opportunities accrue, if they do 
materialise at all, to the public.45 
As a result of the negative externalities that come about when third party transfers 
for economic development are allowed, it is argued in this dissertation that the South 
African courts should not be as deferent as the US, English and Irish courts towards the 
purposes for which property may be expropriated. It is suggested that the German 
approach towards the purposes for which property may be expropriated, as authorised in 
                                            
39
 The author wishes to thank Professor Lee Fennell for bringing this formulation under his attention. 
40
 See Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005); Underkuffler LS ‘Kelo’s 
Moral Failure’ (2006) 15 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 377-387 at 386. 
41
 Fee J ‘Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of the Home’ (2006) 81 Notre Dame LR 783-819 at 801. See also 
Van der Walt AJ ‘Housing Rights and the Intersection between Expropriation and Eviction Law’ in Fox-
O’Mahony L & Sweeney JA (eds) The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and Dispossession (2011) 55-100 
at 99. 
42
 Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 84, with reference 
to Calabresi G & Melamed AD ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Alienability: One View of the Cathedral’ 
(1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128. See also Waring EJL ‘The Prevalence of Private Takings’ in Hopkins N (ed) 
Modern Studies in Property Law Vol VII (forthcoming 2013) (copy of paper on file with the author) 21; Walsh 
R ‘“The Principles of Social Justice” and the Compulsory Acquisition of Private Property for Redevelopment 
in the United States and Ireland’ (2010) 32 Dublin University Law Journal 1-23 at 13-14. 
43
 Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 83; Gray K ‘Human 
Property Rights: The Politics of Expropriation’ (2005) 16 Stell LR 398-412 at 406. 
44
 See Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 82-84. 
45
 Gray K ‘There is No Place like Home’ (2007) 11 Journal of South Pacific Law 73-88 at 82-84. 
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legislation and judged against the public purpose requirement in article 14.3 of the 1949 
Basic Law, should be adopted. In terms of German law the legislation must authorise the 
expropriation, the purpose for which it may be undertaken and the eventual transfer of the 
property to another private party for the realisation of that purpose. Accordingly, the courts 
strictly evaluate whether the expropriation is justified for that purpose, whether the 
expropriation and transfer of the property are strictly necessary for that purpose, and 
whether the whole process complies with article 14.3 of the Basic Law. More specifically, it 
is argued here that the contextual reasons for a more deferential judicial attitude in other 
jurisdictions, particularly the tendency to authorise and regulate specific expropriation and 
developments schemes in dedicated legislation, do not exist in South African law and that 
such a deferent approach is therefore not justified here. 
Statutory or judicial control over expropriation schemes is desirable especially in 
cases where the purpose of the expropriation is vaguely formulated - such as 
‘regeneration’ or ‘development’ - and in cases that involve third party transfers. In such a 
case the legislation can strictly control the situations under which property can be 
expropriated or impose restrictions when property is eventually expropriated. The courts 
should also control the purposes for which property may be expropriated, and such control 
must be stricter in cases where legislation does not impose any restrictions.  
With regard to third party transfers for economic development it is therefore argued 
that both the purpose of the expropriation and the third party transfer should, each on its 
own, either be legitimised by legislation or be evaluated strictly by the courts. If legislation 
does not explicitly legitimise third party transfers for economic development purposes or if 
the legislation that exists does not impose restrictions, the courts’ scrutiny of each aspect 
of the expropriation should accordingly be stricter. 
 
7 3 The Less Invasive Means Argument in South African Expropriation 
Law 
Apart from the central question regarding the legitimacy of expropriation of property for 
economic development purposes and subsequent third party transfer of such property, 
Chapter 5 raises the related question whether the availability of an alternative, less 
invasive means - other than expropriation - to realise a valid public purpose is or should be 
an effective defence against a proposed expropriation. If the public purpose can be 
realised without expropriating property, it is arguably unnecessary to expropriate property 
for that purpose and then the expropriation might be open to attack on the basis of the 
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section 25 requirement. Acceptance of the less invasive means argument in South African 
expropriation law can strengthen the argument above concerning the strict level of 
scrutiny, since it would involve considering whether the expropriation is absolutely 
necessary for the achievement of the particular public purpose. However, recent case law 
confirms that as long as there is a rational connection between the purpose of the 
expropriation and the expropriation as a means to realise that purpose, and provided the 
purpose vaguely satisfies the public purpose or public interest requirement on that low 
level of scrutiny, the courts will not query or invalidate the decision of the expropriator to 
expropriate the property purely because there may be an alternative means to realise the 
same purpose.46 The generally deferent attitude adopted by the courts implies that the 
availability of an alternative, less invasive means to realise the purpose is not currently a 
valid ground for an attack on the decision to expropriate. 
In situations where the purpose of the expropriation is uncontroversial, this 
approach is unproblematic. For instance, ensuring the safety of the State President is a 
valid public purpose as understood narrowly and if the responsible authority decides that 
expropriation of private property is the best way to ensure the safety of the President, the 
expropriation should arguably not be set aside by the courts easily merely because 
alternative measures to reach the goal are available.47 With reference to Irish law it is 
argued in Chapter 5 that even if there are alternative means available to realise a valid 
public purpose, the decision to expropriate property along a specific route or in a specific 
manner can only be set aside if there is a substantial reason as to why the expropriating 
authority should have elected a different route.48 Mere unhappiness on the side of the 
expropriated owner is not a ground for setting aside the expropriation. To this extent, 
current reluctance to accept the less invasive means argument is justifiable. However, it is 
argued in Chapter 5 that in cases where the purpose of the expropriation is in itself 
controversial, such as vaguely defined economic development purposes or transferring 
expropriated property to third parties for economic development purposes, the availability 
of less invasive means to realise that purpose cannot be irrelevant. This is especially true 
in the absence of a dedicated legislative scheme that defines the proposed development 
and that includes some kind of control over or accountability regarding attainment of the 
purpose. 
                                            
46
 See Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works [2011] ZASCA 246, 1 December 2011. 
47
 See especially Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works [2010] ZAGPPHC 154, 12 October 
2010; [2011] ZASCA 246, 1 December 2011 and the discussion at ch 5 at 5 4 1. 
48
 See Lord Ballyedmond v The Commission for Energy Regulation and Others [2006] IEHC 206; Walsh R 
Private Property Rights in the Irish Constitution (Phd thesis Trinity College Dublin 2011) 246 and the 
discussion in ch 5 at 5 5. 
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In German law, legislation must be specific about the purposes for which property is 
expropriated. It therefore has to indicate that expropriation of property is absolutely 
necessary for the achievement of a particular, specified public purpose. As a result of the 
public purpose requirement, coupled with the proportionality principle applied by the courts 
when adjudicating expropriation cases, an expropriation is only valid if it is the only manner 
in which the public purpose can be realised; if an alternative, less invasive means is 
available to realise that specific public purpose, the expropriation can be set aside by the 
courts.49 This ensures that the appropriate balance between the protection of individual 
property rights and the interests of society is maintained, without unduly interfering with the 
decision-making powers of the administration.50 Therefore, it is suggested in Chapter 5 
that a stricter proportionality enquiry, as is applied in German expropriation law, should 
also be applied in South African law in cases where the purpose of the expropriation is 
controversial or in cases where it is not immediately apparent that the purpose complies 
with the constitutional requirements. 
Recent South African case law51 suggests that courts will not apply a 
proportionality-type enquiry to expropriation decisions, even if the constitutional analytic 
logic of First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance52 (which allows for a proportionality-type analysis in suitable cases) is adopted.53 
Again, this level of judicial deference is acceptable where the purpose of the expropriation 
is unproblematic. However, it is argued in Chapter 5 that South African courts should apply 
a stricter proportionality-type test, possibly on the basis of administrative law, in 
expropriation cases where it is not immediately clear that the expropriation is for a valid 
public purpose or in the public interest, such as expropriation for vague economic 
development purposes not controlled in terms of a development scheme set out in 
                                            
49
 BVerfGE 24, 367 [1968] (Deichordnung); Papier HJ ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T, Dürig G et al (eds) Grundgesetz 
Kommentar Vol II (53
rd
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Schmidt-Bleibtreu B, Hofmann H & Hophauf A (eds) Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (11
th
 ed 2008) 513-514. 
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Expropriated Property upon Non-realisation of the Public Purpose’ 2011 TSAR 579-592 at 587. 
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Aßmann B ‘Expropriation in the Federal Republic of Germany’ in Erasmus GM (ed) Compensation for 
Expropriation: A Comparative Study Vol I (1990) 81-103 at 81. 
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ZAFSHC 11, 4 February 2010. 
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Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 204 
 
dedicated authorising legislation. In such cases, a stricter enquiry into the proportionality of 
the decision to expropriate arguably affords stronger protection of property rights by 
ensuring that expropriation must be strictly necessary to achieve the desired aim. In the 
event that alternative less intrusive measures are available it should at least cast doubt on 
whether the expropriation is strictly necessary and justified. However, this will arguably 
only be the case when the purpose of the expropriation is not a narrow public purpose, but 
more broadly in the public interest. 
 
7 4 Non-realisation, Completion, or Abandonment of the Public Purpose 
Since it is generally accepted that the public purpose or public interest justifies an 
expropriation, questions inevitably arise when the purpose that justifies the expropriation is 
not realised; when the purpose is completed or if it is abandoned. This issue relates to the 
transfer of property for economic development purposes in the sense that when the 
purpose is not realised, is completed or abandoned and the state decides to change the 
use of the property, the changed purpose can involve economic development by a third 
party, as was the case in Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others54 (Harvey). In 
Chapter 6 it is argued that the non-realisation, completion or abandonment of the public 
purpose can be a result of various reasons. If the public purpose is not realised, or if it is 
completed or abandoned, it means that the expropriation is in principle no longer justified. 
However, if the purpose is changed after non-realisation, completion or abandonment, 
expropriation would still be justified if the new purpose is also a valid public purpose as 
determined by a court.55 The core argument in Chapter 6 is that situations like this at least 
require stricter judicial scrutiny of the purpose for which expropriated property is to be used 
once the original purpose becomes impossible, is completed or is abandoned. 
One question that arises upon non-realisation of the public purpose (and one that 
can also be asked when the realised public purpose terminates or is abandoned) is 
whether the courts are able to order that the previously expropriated property be returned 
to the previous owner. In Harvey, the applicant argued that he should be able to take re-
possession of the property since the purpose for which the property was expropriated was 
not realised and subsequently changed. In this decision the court refused to order re-
transfer of the property because there was no legislative basis or applicable doctrine to 
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 See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3
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 ed 2011) 497-498; Van der Walt AJ & Slade BV 
‘Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 
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justify such an order.56 The court held that since the original expropriation was undertaken 
in good faith, the expropriating authority is allowed to change the intended use of the 
property if the original purpose becomes impossible to realise or is abandoned. In this 
regard the court did not inquire whether the changed purpose was also a valid public 
purpose.57 If the court had found that the new purpose was also a valid public purpose, the 
state would have been justified in retaining ownership of the property.58 
In certain foreign jurisdictions, such as German and Malaysian law, the expropriated 
property can only be used for the purpose for which it was expropriated.59 In other foreign 
jurisdictions, such as English law and the law of the Philippines, the expropriating authority 
is allowed to change the use of the expropriated property, but only if certain conditions are 
met. Therefore, the expropriating authorities do not have the unfettered power post-
expropriation to do with the property as it pleases. In German, English and Philippine law, 
the previous owners are able to claim re-transfer of their previously expropriated property 
upon non-realisation or abandonment of the original public purpose. In German and 
English law, legislation exists that compels the authorities to offer the property to its 
previous owners if it is no longer needed for the purpose for which it was expropriated.60 In 
English law the obligation to offer the property to the previous owners can be excluded in 
certain circumstances. In the law of the Philippines, the obligation to offer the property to 
the previous owners developed out of the assurance that was routinely made to owners 
who lost their property through expropriation that they would be able to re-claim the 
property if it is no longer needed for the purpose for which it was expropriated.61 
The court in Harvey refused to order re-transfer of expropriated property upon non-
realisation of the public purpose since there is no legislation on which to base such an 
order for re-transfer. Therefore, it is argued in Chapter 6 that the Expropriation Act 63 of 
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1975 should be amended to provide for the re-transfer of expropriated property upon non-
realisation of the public purpose, at least in certain clearly circumscribed cases. It is 
suggested that this Act should provide for mechanisms through which previous owners 
can re-claim their expropriated property in certain situations and to allow the courts the 
authority to oversee this process. The main objective of the amending provisions should 
be to indicate the nature of this right of re-transfer; the persons entitled to claim re-transfer; 
the time-frame within which the expropriated owner can reclaim the property upon the non-
implementation of the purpose; calculation of the amount that has to be paid for re-
transfer; as well as the circumstances under which the state would not be required to re-
transfer the property to the previous owner. In that regard the state would be prevented 
from changing the purpose for which expropriated property is used at its own discretion.62 
It would also prevent the state from using a valid public purpose as a smokescreen to use 
the property for a different purpose after the property has been expropriated. 
 
7 5 Recommendations 
This dissertation shows that there are a number of aspects of expropriation law, 
specifically with reference to the public purpose or public interest requirement, which have 
recently been the subject of case law for the first time. However, because there is no 
detailed framework in legislation or doctrine that can assist the courts in dealing with these 
problematic public purpose or public interest issues, the courts develop the law on a case 
to case basis. Since this position is not ideal, recommendations are made here concerning 
the possible ways of preventing the development of the law in piece-meal fashion, in 
favour of a more systematic development. Although amending legislation may be one way 
of solving the various issues it is probable that dedicated legislation would not be able to 
cover all aspects. Therefore, heightened judicial scrutiny may be better in certain cases. 
The South African law of expropriation is based purely on statutory law; the state 
has no inherent power of expropriation. Therefore, legislation - particularly the 
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 - could be amended to assist the courts in adjudicating 
certain public purpose or public interest issues discussed in this dissertation. It is 
suggested here that legislation would be able to clarify the issue of how long the public 
purpose should endure post-expropriation and the issues that revolve around it. The 
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legislation can for example stipulate that expropriated property must be used for the public 
purpose for which it had been expropriated within a certain period of time, for instance 
three years. If the purpose cannot be realised within that three year time frame, or if the 
foreseen use was implemented but subsequently completed or abandoned, the legislation 
should require the relevant authorities to change the purpose. In that regard the courts 
should be allowed to test the new purpose against the constitutional requirements. If the 
state cannot use the property for an alternative public purpose, or if the courts find that the 
new purpose is not a legitimate public purpose, the legislation should provide for the 
possibility of re-transfer of the property to the previous owner. This provision should 
stipulate who is entitled to reclaim the property, namely the previous owner; stipulate the 
circumstances under which the state would not be required to re-transfer the property; and 
set out guidelines for the courts to determine the amount that the previous owner would 
have to repay if he wants to take transfer of the property. In Chapter 6 it was argued that 
the amount should be set at market value, but the courts should have the discretion to 
deviate from this amount in certain cases. 
Since legislation, if amended, will not be effective in resolving all of the public 
purpose or public interest issues, the courts have the responsibility to scrutinise the 
purposes for which property is expropriated in a manner that provides optimal protection to 
property rights while simultaneously not frustrating necessary reforms. As a starting point, 
courts should acknowledge that the public purpose or public interest requirement justifies 
an expropriation, as was done in Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others.63 From this 
point of view further principles can be deduced. The main principle should be that because 
the public purpose or public interest justifies an expropriation, a sufficient and absolutely 
necessary public purpose or public interest must be present to justify the expropriation. 
This will involve scrutinising the purpose of every expropriation carefully, especially since it 
is not common to authorise expropriation for a specific purpose in dedicated legislation, so 
that the decision to expropriate is largely left to the administration. In that context, stricter 
judicial control is necessary. If necessary, scrutiny of the purpose for which property is 
expropriated should take into account the legislative regulatory scheme, even if the 
legislation does not explicitly authorise the expropriation. 
If the purpose can be achieved without expropriating property, courts should 
investigate why the alternative and less invasive method was not adopted, at least in 
cases where the purpose is not clearly and directly related to generally accepted, narrow 
public purposes. If the property is expropriated for broader purposes that are vaguely 
                                            
63
 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP). 
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beneficial to the public at large, the scrutiny should be stricter than in cases where the 
property is expropriated for narrower public purposes, such as the building of roads. If the 
expropriation is absolutely necessary this investigation will prove that; if not, it may point to 
an abuse of power such as expropriating property for an ulterior purpose. 
Furthermore, the courts should be stricter in their determination as to whether a 
specific expropriation complies with the public purpose or public interest requirements in 
cases where it is not immediately apparent that the purpose is a legitimate public purpose. 
For instance, if the purpose of expropriation - such as economic development - is not 
clearly authorised in legislation and if it is not immediately clear that the purpose is a valid 
public purpose or in the public interest, stricter scrutiny should be applied as to the 
lawfulness of the expropriation. 
The same would apply to the transfer of property to third parties for a particular 
purpose. When the property is expropriated for a narrow public purpose and transferred to 
third parties for the realisation of that purpose, a low level of scrutiny would not create any 
problems. If the third party was established particularly for the purpose of fulfilling the 
public purpose, a lower level of scrutiny is equally warranted. In cases where the 
expropriated property is transferred to third parties for broader purposes in the public 
interest but takes place in terms of a legislative scheme or is mandated by the 
Constitution, such as land reform, it is arguably less problematic if the courts apply a lower 
level of scrutiny. 
However, in cases where it is not immediately apparent that the expropriation is for 
a public purpose and where the property is transferred to third parties for the realisation of 
the purpose, both the purpose of the expropriation and the transfer of the property for the 
realisation of this purpose should be subjected to heightened scrutiny. If the expropriation 
and transfer of property for purposes such as third party transfers for economic 
development purposes do not take place in terms of a regulatory legislative scheme or are 
not mandated by the Constitution, even stricter scrutiny should be applied. 
Therefore, a third party transfer of property that is expropriated for broader public 
purposes should generally be subjected to stricter scrutiny. This will apply especially to 
cases where it is likely that the expropriation and third party transfer will not benefit the 
public directly but rather the third party; where there is no form of accountability to ensure 
that the benefits that were predicted to accrue to the public in fact materialise; where a 
person’s home is expropriated; and where third party transfers have disproportionately 
negative effects on the less affluent members of society. 
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Generally, the power of expropriation should only be available in cases where it is 
absolutely necessary for the achievement of a particular public purpose or when it will 
clearly be in the public interest. If the purpose that is served by the expropriation is 
evaluated strictly in every specific case to ensure that it complies with the constitutional 
requirements, it is possible that some of the issues that have surfaced in this dissertation 
will not surface in future or will be resolved consistently and satisfactorily. 
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